

**MEDITERRÁN TANULMÁNYOK**  
**ÉTUDES SUR LA RÉGION**  
**MÉDITERRANÉENNE**

**XIV.**

**UNIVERSITÉ DE SZEGED**

**Département d'Histoire Moderne  
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## *La « petite guerre » dans les commentaires de Monluc*

Ludwig RAVAILLE  
Commission d'études franco-  
hongroise sur le XX<sup>e</sup> siècle

Monluc, grand homme de guerre de la renaissance à la carrière admirable au service des rois de France tout au long du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, a laissé pour la postérité ses *Commentaires*<sup>1</sup>. Dictant ses plus grands exploits, Monluc a enrichi ses récits pittoresques de réflexions personnelles, de préceptes techniques, de considérations moralisatrices et de remontrances, le tout avec le souci du détail. Discours militaire destiné aux capitaines, auxquels il montre l'histoire de sa vie en exemple, son œuvre est une source de premier plan pour l'historien traitant de la guerre au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Issu de l'une des plus importantes familles de Guyenne, Monluc ne dut sa réputation et sa brillante carrière qu'à ses longs et brillants services militaires, tout au long du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, des guerres d'Italie au début de sa carrière aux guerres de religion en France à la fin de sa vie. Alors qu'il se rend en Italie à l'âge de dix-sept ans, il se fait remarquer par son intrépidité. Suit ensuite une longue carrière. Revenant en France, il assiste au siège de Fontarabie, il est fait capitaine à l'âge de vingt ans, puis il prend part à la défense de Marseille assiégée par le connétable de Bourbon. Il entre en Italie avec l'armée française, puis il participe à la bataille de Pavie, et il poursuit la guerre en Italie (destruction d'infrastructures, prises de places fortes...). Il participa également au succès de la bataille de Cérisoles. Fait chevalier par le comte d'Enghien, il reçoit le titre de maître de camp devant Boulogne, étonne l'armée par son audace en contrant une attaque de nuit où logeaient ses troupes. Partant pour l'Italie avec le maréchal de Brissac, il reçoit de Henri II le gouvernement de Montcallier, puis celui d'Albe en 1553<sup>2</sup>. De retour en France, il prend part activement aux guerres de religion. C'est en Guyenne que Monluc a exercé son métier d'homme de guerre pendant les guerres civiles : il mena la guerre à Toulouse, à Bordeaux, à Targon, à Lectoure, à Vergt, à Piles, à Mont-de-Marsan, à Agen et à Rabensteins, qu'il conserva pour le roi, au milieu des opérations militaires et des intrigues politiques. Fait chevalier de l'ordre de Saint-Michel, capitaine, maître de camp puis Maréchal de France le 20 septembre 1574, il paraît à la tête des armées à l'âge de quarante sept ans. Homme intrépide, courageux, actif, audacieux et ingénieux, il a contribué à faire évoluer les pratiques de la guerre, dans un siècle en pleine évolution sur le plan militaire. Il mourut le 26 juillet 1577. Blaise de Monluc est un grand écrivain militaire de son temps

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<sup>1</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981.

<sup>2</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 243.

pour la qualité de ses écrits d'un point de vue militaire, concernant les affaires et les pratiques de la guerre.

Dans ses *commentaires*, il retrace fidèlement les exploits de guerre et les petits coups auxquels il a participé des guerres d'Italie 1521 jusqu'aux guerres de religion en France à la fin de sa vie. Les *commentaires* de Monluc sont le portrait de l'homme de guerre qu'il est sur le terrain, s'engouffrant dans toutes les opérations, même les plus périlleuses, se glissant dans les brèches, montant aux échelles, traversant des rues dans lesquelles sifflent de nombreuses arquebusades. Monluc aime la « petite guerre » et la « petite guerre » aime Monluc. Monluc est un capitaine adroit et avisé, il apprécie la « petite guerre » et la « petite guerre » le lui rend bien. Partisan de la « petite guerre » malgré lui, Monluc nous donne dans ses commentaires une lecture personnelle très vivante de son métier d'homme de guerre sur le terrain. Les Commentaires de Monluc, au centre de cet article, nous sont donc utiles d'un point de vue tactique, le capitaine retranscrivant minutieusement les campagnes auxquelles il a participé. « *L'on accordera tousjours que je me suis trouvé en autant de combats, batailles, rencontres, entreprises de nuit et de jour, assauts, prises et deffences des villes qu'homme qui soit aujourd'hui de toute l'Europe* »<sup>3</sup>, souligne-t-il. Ces commentaires, écrits avec un style original, précis et clair, nous permettent de comprendre comment Monluc a innové et rénové l'art de la guerre au XVI<sup>ème</sup> siècle, surprenant toujours l'ennemi par sa mobilité et sa vitesse d'exécution. D'après l'œuvre de Monluc, il est donc intéressant pour problématique d'analyser que dans la pratique, sans parler de théorie, la « petite guerre » fut employée selon les schémas tactiques de la guerre de la Renaissance comme un moyen de guerre au service d'opérations plus lourdes, mais elle apparut de plus en plus souvent plus comme un mode de guerre particulier. Voilà l'essence de la portée d'une étude de la « petite guerre » au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, s'appuyant ici sur une source particulière, les Commentaires de Monluc.

Ainsi, afin de bien comprendre la place de la « petite guerre » au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle dans l'esprit des hommes de guerre du temps, les commentaires de Monluc nous permettent de cerner la vision de la « petite guerre » par Monluc à travers ses conceptions de la guerre et le vocabulaire qu'il utilise pour qualifier la « petite guerre ». Ils nous permettent ensuite de faire un bilan tactique et de noter une certaine vision « monlucienne » de la « petite guerre », qu'il s'agisse de la « petite guerre » régulière ou de la « petite guerre » non régulière.

*Approches de la notion de « petite guerre » dans les Commentaires de Monluc : considérations terminologiques, historiques et historiographiques*

Etudier la « petite guerre » à partir des Commentaires de Monluc est un travail fastidieux et un article de quelques pages sur le sujet ne se veut en aucun cas exhaustif. Il aura cependant le mérite de souligner l'intérêt particulier d'une étude sur la « petite guerre » au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, basée principalement sur l'étude de mémoires d'hommes de guerre très actif sur le terrain. Cette étude sur la « petite guerre » en Europe au XVI<sup>e</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 794-795.



siècle est en cours et elle devrait déboucher sur la validation d'une thèse de doctorat prochainement.

La « petite guerre » baigne dans chaque récit militaire de Monluc. Pour s'en convaincre, avant toute analyse sur le fond, il convient d'examiner avec minutie toute la terminologie. On pourra se rendre compte dès lors que la « petite guerre » est au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle un phénomène complexe dans l'esprit comme dans les opérations de guerre, qu'elle soit au service de la grande guerre ou qu'elle se détache des grandes opérations des armées régulières pour devenir un mode de guerre de troupes plus ou moins conventionnelles. Ainsi, étudier les *Commentaires* de Monluc permet d'apporter un nouvel éclairage sur l'étude de la « petite guerre » au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Le récit des faits de guerre relevant « petite guerre » a toujours été présent dans les récits des chroniqueurs ou des historiens de tous les temps, même chez les civilisations les plus anciennes. Selon l'historien Geoffroi Parker, la « petite guerre » a constitué dans les pays européens une étape essentielle de la guerre moderne, au même titre que les batailles rangées ou les sièges. A côté des grandes batailles, il écrit ceci : « *il faut considérer les innombrables petites guerres où les nombreuses concentrations de troupes, causèrent de grands dommages à l'ennemi, sans pour autant prétendre à forcer la décision* »<sup>4</sup>. Ce type complexe de guerre qui relève d'abord d'une stratégie des accessoires, mérite de ce fait d'être analysé pour mieux comprendre ce que fut la guerre et l'ensemble des activités militaires au XVI<sup>ème</sup> siècle. Quant à la notion de « petite guerre » dans l'Histoire de la pensée militaire française, elle est dans l'historiographie actuelle une notion tardive dans l'esprit des historiens, qui privilégient le XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle pour l'étude théorique de la « petite guerre ». Pourtant, et ce point est nouveau et original, on retrouve l'expression « *petite guerre* » dans les sources françaises du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, définie et associée à une tactique guerrière particulière, ce qui permet d'apporter un nouvel éclairage historique et historiographique sur l'importance de la « petite guerre » au sein ou en marge de la guerre régulière au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle sur le plan tactique.

Sur le plan d'une étude scientifique concernant la guerre au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, dont une des sources majeures est l'œuvre de Monluc au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, on peut se référer aujourd'hui une conception « anachronique » de la « petite guerre », par rapport au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. On considère aujourd'hui la « petite guerre », selon la définition de Karl Von Decker, comme « *tous les mouvements qui ne font que seconder les opérations d'une armée (...) sans avoir pour but la conquête ou la conservation d'un pays, ceux par conséquent qui ont pour objet la sécurité du gros de l'armée, le secret de ses mouvements et de sa position et les combats dont le but est seulement de nuire à l'ennemi (...). La petite guerre a pour but de nuire à l'ennemi sans vouloir décider de la question générale par les combats livrés* ».

Cette définition est tardive dans l'Histoire. Le plus important lorsque l'on commence une étude de la « petite guerre » au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle est de trouver une authentification certaine et éclairante du sujet dans les sources sur lesquelles on travaille. Alors, la notion de « petite guerre » elle-même est-elle un concept militaire précis dans l'esprit de Monluc et de ses contemporains ? Monluc n'emploie que rarement le terme « petite guerre » mais

<sup>4</sup> Voir l'ouvrage de (J. ) PARKER, *la révolution militaire ; la guerre et l'essor de l'occident 1500-1800*, Paris, 1993, pp. 63-66.

en l'employant une fois, il donne une excellente définition, certes peu développée mais révélatrice du fait que la « petite guerre » est ancrée dans les mœurs militaires du temps et qu'elle existe en théorie comme en pratique<sup>5</sup>. La « petite guerre » ne correspond pas vraiment dans l'esprit des hommes de guerre du temps à une très bonne pratique de la guerre car l'esprit de la « petite guerre » s'éloigne considérablement de l'esprit et de l'éthique chevaleresque de la guerre, encore bien présente dans les mentalités militaires du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Mais la « petite guerre » existe sur le plan tactique, elle est reconnue et elle se justifie ou se condamne de la main des hommes de guerre ou des chroniqueurs eux-mêmes. Peu appréciée par ceux qui subissent la guerre au quotidien et qui parlent de « petite guerre » pour dénigrer les exactions militaires des troupes ou de certains personnages précis abusant de leur statut de capitaines, paradoxalement, la « petite guerre » a fait évoluer les mentalités afin de rendre la guerre plus efficace sur le plan tactique, et les opérations relevant de la « petite guerre » sont très souvent privilégiées. Et en parlant de « petite guerre » comme une pratique unique et indivisible aux pratiques bien rodées, il faut être prudent, tant ses formes et ses missions varient de manières complexes et parfois inextricablement floues, prenant des formes plurielles, régulières et irrégulières. La « petite guerre » est la guerre quotidienne de la grande guerre, et quand elle est parfois imprévisible ou non prévue, il est difficile parfois d'en dessiner les contours.

Ainsi, Monluc définit la « petite guerre » de manière très particulière. En 1570, Monluc, de retour à Bordeaux, recevant les remerciements du président du parlement de Bordeaux, parle pour la première fois de « *petite guerre* », en employant le terme de « petite guerre », et met en avant sur ce point les répercussions tactiques : « *Monsieur le président Roffignac me fist les remerciements de par toute la cour, parce que nostre petite guerre avoit asseuré les chemins devers Sainctonge, de sorte que tout le monde pourroit aller et venir de Bourdeaux en France seurement ; d'autre part, je les avois mis en seureté du costé de la Dordogne, ayant le chasteau de Bridoyre, et du costé de la Garonne ayant prins levignac, Taillecabas et Padaillan, par ce que de ces costez ne pouvoit venir vivres ne hommes à Bourdeaux, sinon du costé de Gascongne (...). Voilà le succez des entreprises que nous fismes en cinq ou six jours* »<sup>6</sup>. Monluc justifie dans ce cas précis la « petite guerre » sur le plan tactique pour assurer les voies de circulation et pour couper court aux bandes qui sillonnaient la campagne, rançonnant par les chemins, tuant, pillant et saccageant, sortant des places fortes où ils se protègent pour effectuer leurs méfaits, ce à quoi Monluc a mis fin. La « petite guerre » est donc pratiquée au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle au sein des armées qui se battent contre des bandes armées, régulières ou irrégulières. Voilà une

<sup>5</sup> Pour la théorie, cf. un traité tactique du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle sur le gouvernement de la cavalerie composé par George Basta, comte du Saint Empire Romain en Husst et Marmaros, Libre baron et seigneur de Tropavie en Silésie, et de Sultz en Flandres, qui fut à la fin du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle gouverneur général en Hongrie et en Transylvanie pour l'empereur du Saint Empire Rodolphe II. Ce traité, traduit en plusieurs langues dont en français, fut édité en France dès le début du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle. Voir (G. ) BASTA, *Le gouvernement de la cavallerie légère. Traicté*, Rouen, 1616.

<sup>6</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 678-679.

chose extrêmement importante qui justifie pleinement une étude historique sur la « petite guerre » au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Cette mention, cette définition ou cette justification de Monluc de l'usage de la « petite guerre » ne sont pas uniques dans les sources du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, loin de là. Même si les mentions de l'expression « petite guerre » en tant que telle pour parler de comportements guerriers ou caractériser des opérations tactiques sont peu nombreuses dans les sources du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. La « petite guerre » n'est pas très appréciée en tant que telle, même si elle est sur le terrain le lot quotidien de la guerre. Comme Monluc dans ses Commentaires, ses contemporains de la Renaissance, s'attachent à faire l'histoire de leurs aventures et écrivent eux aussi sur le bout des lèvres et au fil de leur écriture l'expression « petite guerre ». Un contemporain de Monluc, La Noue, qui lui aussi nous a laissé ses mémoires, parle lui de « *noz petites guerres* » au temps des guerres de religion, et cela allègrement pour parler exclusivement de la guerre en petit, et caractériser la guerre au quotidien pratiquée par des troupes très peu nombreuses et aux objectifs tactiques et au financement médiocres<sup>7</sup>. Il caractérise également de « petite guerre » les exactions de soldats en tant de paix aux frontières qui peuvent rallumer la guerre : *Qu'est-il donc de faire pour abolir ces petites guerres qui se font en paix, et qui rallument les haines et relevent les partialitez (...). C'est d'attrapper cinq ou six de ces guerriers, afin que cinq ou six cens deviennent sages*<sup>8</sup>, dit la Noue. Il associe également à l'expression « petite guerre » les luttes intestines entre les princes du royaume de France. La Noue remet en cause les duels et les trahisons entre nobles et entre gentilshommes, ce qui donne parfois lors des guerres de religion de véritable guerre entre familles de la noblesse<sup>9</sup>. La Noue va jusqu'à qualifier la « petite guerre » de guerre nuisible sans aucun intérêt, « *qui n'est autre chose qu'une guerre de chats et de rats* »<sup>10</sup>. Cela montre à quel point à cette époque, les petites guerres sont peu appréciées au temps de Monluc, qui a combattu tout au long du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Enfin, à la fin du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, l'expression même de « petite guerre » est utilisée pour qualifier les préoccupations qui se désintéressent de la recherche de la défaite définitive de l'ennemi. Le chanoine Moreau, dans ses mémoires sur la Bretagne au temps des guerres de la Ligue, dit parlant du capitaine brigand La Fontenelle pendant les guerres de la Ligue en Bretagne à la fin du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle : « *Mais, plus habitué à la petite guerre, c'est-à-dire à ravager le bon-homme, qu'à envisager l'ennemi, La Fontenelle n'en faisoit pas grand état* »<sup>11</sup>. Une conclusion s'impose dès lors et renforce davantage la nécessité d'une étude importante sur la « petite guerre » en Europe au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, pour compléter celles déjà menées sur les siècles suivants, basés essentiellement outre sur quelques textes théoriques,

<sup>7</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981., p. 457, p. 463, p. 482, pp. 502-503.

<sup>8</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 132.

<sup>9</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 285.

<sup>10</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 502.

<sup>11</sup> (J. ) MOREAU, (chanoine), *Mémoires sur l'histoire des guerres de la Ligue en Bretagne*, chapitre XXXV, p. 218. Des travaux à grande échelle sur la terminologie de la *petite guerre* dans les sources du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle restent à être effectués.



sur des mémoires de capitaines et d'hommes de guerre, des écrits d'Historien du roi, et ceux des chroniqueurs du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Même si Monluc parle de la guerre au quotidien sans la qualifier systématiquement de « petite guerre » pour les raisons que l'on connaît, le vocabulaire utilisé est significatif et révélateur de l'esprit de Monluc et de son attachement aux opérations de la « petite guerre » sur le plan tactique. La richesse de la terminologie utilisée dans les sources pour caractériser la « petite guerre » rend compte de l'importante actualité de ce style de guerre indirect au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle au sein des pratiques de la guerre. Cependant, même si les récits de la « petite guerre » sont abondants et variés, il n'en reste pas moins que les mots techniques employés sont très nombreux et que la terminologie est plus ou moins floue. Monluc parle de ces « *petits faits de guerre* » par le moyen desquels « *quelquefois on fait beaucoup de profit* »<sup>12</sup>, de « *donner curée aux ennemis* » engageant les premiers combats pour tester l'ardeur de l'ennemi (p. 39), de « *s'amuser* »<sup>13</sup>, des troupes d'« *enfants perdus* »<sup>14</sup>. En outre, faire la « petite guerre » au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle était entre autre « *aller à la guerre* », « *mener à la guerre* », « *envoyer des troupes à la découverte* », « *envoyer à la guerre* »<sup>15</sup>, « *faire des courses* », « *harceler ou inquiéter l'ennemi* », « *s'amuser à attaquer à l'escarmouche* »<sup>16</sup> ou « *dresser l'escarmouche* »<sup>17</sup>, « *faire une cargue ou aller à la cargue* »<sup>18</sup>, « *Envoyer des troupes courir devant une place forte* »<sup>19</sup>, « *aller battre l'estrade* »<sup>20</sup>, exécuter des « *entreprises legeres* », comme pratiquer des combats tactiques particuliers, aux méthodes peu conventionnelles, basées notamment sur la ruse et la dissimulation. Toutes ces expressions désignaient la guerre menée à l'aventure, composée de petits affrontements non réglés. Des verbes également comme « *harrasser* »<sup>21</sup>, « *chatouiller* », « *desrober* » une ville<sup>22</sup> sont souvent utilisés malicieusement pour caractériser des opérations qui relèvent avant tout de la « petite guerre » et d'une tactique des accessoires.

Parfois, Monluc interrompt son récit ou ne raconte pas davantage les opérations, en précisant que ce n'est que trop de détails, ce qui est bien dommage pour ceux qui travaillent sur l'Histoire de la « petite guerre ». Mais parfois, il se laisse aller, sans oublier de signaler lui-même la faible importance tactique de certaines opérations dans l'esprit du temps, encore bordé par l'éthique et le code chevaleresque : *Or, je veux escrire cecy,*

<sup>12</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 39-40.

<sup>13</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 38, pp. 666-667.

<sup>14</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 44.

<sup>15</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 556.

<sup>16</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 129, p. 130.

<sup>17</sup> « dresser l'escarmouche » signifie ici « dresser l'embuscade » comme l'a dit Monluc quelques lignes auparavant.

<sup>18</sup> La cargue est le plus souvent dans les sources une charge de cavalerie légère donnant lieu à une soudaine, violente et vigoureuse escarmouche ; Lire (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 157, pp. 188-190, p. 245.

<sup>19</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 407.

<sup>20</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 197.

<sup>21</sup> « harceler ». Selon le Dictionnaire du moyen français. La Renaissance, Larousse, Paris, 1992.

<sup>22</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 216.

*encore que ce ne soit pas matière de combat, afin qu'il serve d'exemple aux capitaines* »<sup>23</sup>. La « petite guerre » dans les commentaires de Monluc est dite « petite », parce qu'elle reproduit avec un effectif réduit des opérations à petite échelle s'apparentant à celle de la grande guerre. Le terme de « petite guerre » désigne au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle selon les sources une guerre à petite échelle, comprenant toutes les opérations militaires tactiquement secondaires et n'entraînant pas la mobilisation générale de l'armée. Ensuite, la guerre est considérée comme petite, compte tenu de ses missions de moindre importance aux retombées assez minces sur les affaires générales de la guerre.

Et comment peut-on interpréter aujourd'hui la « petite guerre » peinte par Monluc ? D'un point de vue historiographique, sur le plan tactique, deux formes de « petite guerre » coexistent : la « petite guerre » régulière au service ou au sein de la guerre régulière et la « petite guerre » irrégulière en marge de la guerre réglée, ce que Monluc et ses contemporains nomment tout simplement « petite guerre ». La « petite guerre », sous sa forme régulière et irrégulière, désigne le hors-jeu de la guerre classique : cela concerne aussi bien les missions des troupes légères, que les entreprises des partis qui couraient la campagne sous l'autorité de gouverneurs de places fortes ou de d'autres chefs militaires, et toutes les formes spéciales d'affrontements, faisant intervenir des populations civiles, au sein ou en marge du conflit. Voilà autant de questions et autant de points de vue devant faire l'objet d'une étude relevant de la « petite guerre » en Europe au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle.

La « petite guerre » est dans les Commentaires de Monluc une notion protéiforme. C'est avant tout une guerre à échelle réduite dans laquelle le combat est mené par des formations régulières ou irrégulières, pratiquant des petits combats et utilisant un mode de guerre basé sur la ruse au service ou en marge de la guerre régulière. Ainsi, après avoir cerné les conceptions relatives à la « petite guerre » au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle à travers les mémoires de Monluc, analysons sur le plan tactique le phénomène de la « petite guerre » au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle dans les Commentaires de Monluc.

## *2. La guerre au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle par Monluc : une petite guerre au quotidien*

Comme cela a été dit, traiter minutieusement de la « petite guerre » vue par Monluc au sein de ses mémoires, ses Commentaires, est fastidieux et ne peut faire l'objet d'une démarche exhaustive dans un article. En attendant une publication complète d'une étude sur la « petite guerre » au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, je vous propose quelques morceaux choisis de ce qu'on peut appeler la petite guerre « monlucienne », la « petite guerre » à la Monluc.

De la « petite guerre » pratiquée au sein des armées en marche, correspondant aux missions des troupes légères et semi-légères, il faut distinguer la « petite guerre » pratiquée dans une guerre de places fortes, exercée par des troupes légères partisans postées en garnison.

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<sup>23</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 180.

## 2.1. Les missions des troupes légères

Comme le raconte Monluc dans son œuvre, la « petite guerre » régulière était avant tout considérée dans les armées comme les missions des troupes « légères », en campagne ou pendant la bataille. Le XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle était dominé sur terre par les manœuvres des armées, la bataille rangée ne pouvant avoir lieu que si les armées ennemies y consentaient, comme le souligne Monluc : « *Ceux qui savent que c'est de la guerre ont souvent expérimenté combien il est difficile de combattre un homme qui n'en veut point manger, mesmement quand c'est un soldat ou un capitaine rusé* »<sup>24</sup>. Devenus plus prudents notamment en France pendant les guerres de religion, les chefs des armées prêtaient davantage attention aux manœuvres permettant d'engager ou d'éviter le combat, ce qui représentait une bonne partie des opérations de guerre, ou plutôt de « petite guerre ». Les manœuvres des armées échappaient rarement à l'attention de la cavalerie légère adverse en reconnaissance. D'où les préférences pour les marches et contre-marches savantes ayant pour but d'empêcher l'ennemi d'atteindre ses objectifs, les sièges classiques représentant des actes majeurs de la guerre réglée. C'est dans ce cadre que la « petite guerre » prend tout son sens au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle lors des affrontements des armées.

Les opérations régulières de la « petite guerre » peuvent se confondre tactiquement en partie avec les missions des troupes légères, notamment de la cavalerie, qui avaient fonction de battre l'estrade devant l'armée régulière. Les troupes légères remplissaient dans cette perspective quelques vocations essentielles au service des forces principales de l'armée : éclairer, reconnaître, renseigner, surprendre, protéger. Dans les Commentaires de Monluc, toutes les expéditions menées par la cavalerie légère liées à la « petite guerre » régulière au XVI<sup>ème</sup> siècle peuvent être résumées en trois missions, avec des objectifs tactiques concrets pour le bien des armées en campagne. La première concerne la reconnaissance des positions ennemies et les déplacements des troupes adverses, l'action se résumant en une simple observation, ou plutôt en une vigilance<sup>25</sup>, bien réglementée cependant. Aussi primaire qu'il soit, le système d'avant-postes des armées assurait la liberté de mouvement de l'armée, lui évitait de perdre l'initiative et de subir la loi de l'ennemi, cela pouvant le retarder, et lui permettait enfin de couvrir ses mouvements et ses objectifs. Le système d'avant-poste était essentiel car les troupes effectuaient en marche un service de sûreté, pour éviter que l'armée tombe dans un piège, qu'elle soit attaquée par surprise, ou qu'elle soit bousculée par d'autres formations légères attaquant, disparaissant et ré-attaquant aussitôt, amusant l'ennemi en attendant les renforts. Les troupes légères tenaient donc le rôle d'éclaireur de l'armée, des troupes d'escorte<sup>26</sup>, relevant de la prévention. Pendant le déplacement des armées, les troupes de cavalerie détachées éclairaient le gros des troupes et chassaient les éclaireurs ennemis. Elles tentaient ainsi d'éviter le ralentissement des troupes par une surprise des ennemis. Elles permettaient également aux armées en déplacement de pouvoir se retirer en toute facilité, les troupes légères repoussant les contre-offensives de troupes légères ennemies opérant

<sup>24</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 668.

<sup>25</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 150, p. 154.

<sup>26</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 244-245.

lors de la « retraite »<sup>27</sup>. Parfois violente, la « petite guerre » relevait dans la plupart des cas de missions d'éclaireurs. La seconde revient à assurer les besoins vitaux des armées, à lui assurer également tous les soutiens nécessaires, qu'ils soient techniques, financiers ou logistiques. Les troupes légères servaient à assurer des missions au service d'opérations de la grande guerre. La troisième comprend des opérations tactiques offensives, comme le harcèlement de troupes ou de bandes ennemies, les embuscades ou la surprise d'un détachement<sup>28</sup>, la surprise d'une place forte, d'une avant-garde ou d'une arrière-garde, de fourrageurs...etc.

Ces missions laissent dans les commentaires de Monluc des pratiques de guerre significatives aux contours assez flous et complexes. En campagne, les missions principales des troupes légères et plus particulièrement de la cavalerie légère étaient de « prendre langue », d'éclairer l'armée, d'assurer et de tenir les passages, de pourvoir au ravitaillement, de fatiguer l'ennemi par des alertes continues, d'assurer le repos de l'armée, d'économiser la fraîcheur de la cavalerie lourde pour de plus grandes opérations, d'assurer de différentes façons une partie du renseignement de l'armée. C'est à la suite des missions de reconnaissance, missions des troupes légères, que les troupes régulières, pouvaient préparer et accomplir des opérations de guerre, en évaluant les dispositions et les intentions ennemies. Les missions des troupes légères, consistant à harceler l'armée ennemie, étaient pour cette dernière très éprouvantes car elles remettaient en cause le repos des hommes des troupes harcelées, constamment sous pression sous les actions offensives de petits détachements. Les avant postes se déplaçant autour des armées en déplacement permettaient de dévoiler les intentions des troupes ennemies en émuant leurs attaques et en les surprenant. La « petite guerre » régulière tendait aussi bien à préparer un engagement<sup>29</sup> qu'à l'éviter. C'est ainsi que la « petite guerre » s'insère dans la grande. D'après Monluc, ce système d'avant-postes permettait en outre à une armée face à l'armée ennemie de tenter de la contraindre à la bataille en une situation et un lieu avantageux<sup>30</sup> ou de réorienter l'armée ennemie par des « cargues » selon les intentions des capitaines, décision que prit un jour Monluc<sup>31</sup>.

Concernant les opérations tactiques de troupes légères parcourant la campagne autour d'armées en mouvement, les opérations régulières de la « petite guerre » étaient des combats périphériques et rapprochés. La « petite guerre » décrite par Monluc dans ses commentaires est un récit interminables sur le plan militaire d'opérations tactiques de surprises et d'embuscades, faisant référence aux harcèlements de la cavalerie légère ou semi-légère du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, aux escarmouches opérées par cette même cavalerie, aux

<sup>27</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 305.

<sup>28</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 100-101.

<sup>29</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp.150-151.

<sup>30</sup> Voir pour exemple les opérations régulières relevant de la petite guerre lors la campagne et la bataille de Cérisolles en avril 1544, auxquelles Monluc participa, dans (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 194, pp. 150-164.

<sup>31</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 257-258.

embuscades et aux attaques rusées qu'elle conduit, menées lors des missions de reconnaissance<sup>32</sup>.

Enfin, une autre question pour connaître l'efficacité du jeu des troupes légères pendant la confrontation finale entre les armées : cette même cavalerie légère, effectuant des missions de reconnaissance et de logistique lors des sièges, était-elle efficace lors des batailles engagées par les armées ? Souvent, elle provoquait la bataille, si les deux armées étaient prêtes à s'engager. S'agissant de l'avant-garde qui prépare et lance l'armée toute entière dans la bataille, Monluc nous laisse méditer la remarque suivante : « *C'est l'ordinaire à celui qui est victorieux d'avoir le cœur enflé et au battu de trembler de peur. Les petites pertes aux escarmouches, qui sont avant-courriers de la bataille, ne présagent que perte et dommage* »<sup>33</sup>. Voilà pourquoi la « petite guerre » est importante et que Monluc ne la sous-estime jamais dans ses Commentaires. Les escarmouches menées par la cavalerie légère sont essentielles pour les chefs de guerre qui conduisent les armées et sont souvent porteurs de victoires ou de défaites. Monluc lui-même prit bien souvent lors des batailles au cours de sa longue carrière la conduite de l'avant-garde. Ensuite, ne pouvant vraiment soutenir un engagement frontal pendant les combats, elle avait pour mission en utilisant l'arme à feu de nuire à l'efficacité des charges de cavalerie ennemie, de poursuivre l'ennemi dans sa retraite<sup>34</sup> et dans certains cas d'empêcher l'ennemi de se retirer à un endroit voulu afin qu'il soit totalement vaincu. Pendant la bataille, relevant de la guerre réglée, les troupes légères avaient également d'autres options, comme attaquer un camp ennemi vidé de ses soldats pendant l'action, et piller et faire du butin, vieille pratique héritée de la période médiévale. En tout cas, la cavalerie légère avait sa place au sein des armées, même si elle n'assurait que des missions secondaires mais au combien essentielles pour les armées.

Après avoir observé la place de la « petite guerre » régulière au service d'opérations de plus grande envergure relevant de la grande guerre, observons maintenant la « petite guerre » opérée menées par des troupes partisans en campagne, dans le cadre de guerre relevant de guerre de places fortes structurant le territoire.

## 2.2. Guerres de places fortes et la petite guerre

Lors des guerres au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, outre les sièges et les batailles menées par les armées en déplacement, d'autres opérations avaient ainsi lieu simultanément, dans le cadre de guerres de places fortes très actives. Ces opérations menées par des troupes régulières réparties dans les garnisons des places fortes constitue également la « petite guerre » régulière, au même titre que les missions des troupes légères au sein des armées. Monluc nous explique à travers ses nombreux récits comment la « petite guerre » au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle représentait quotidiennement une guerre de mouvement dans une guerre de sièges,

<sup>32</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 154-155.

<sup>33</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 268.

<sup>34</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 103.



représentative d'une guerre de places fortes, cette dernière étant le mode opératoire de toutes les guerres européennes en ce temps là.

Avec la raréfaction des grandes batailles entre des armées de plus en plus puissantes au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, la « petite guerre » devient omniprésente aux dépens des activités militaires courantes de la grande guerre. Dans ces conditions, le rôle tactique des forces en présence était de tenir le terrain et de nuire à l'ennemi, tout en mobilisant sans cesse l'adversaire, qui devait toujours être sur ses gardes<sup>35</sup>. L'impossibilité d'obtenir une solution définitive dans une campagne favorisait la poursuite d'objectifs secondaires plutôt que la recherche de la véritable ruine des armées, consacrant la place grandissante de la « petite guerre » dans le cadre d'une guerre de places fortes. La « petite guerre » se professionnalisa, dans bon nombre d'opérations visant à harceler ou à nuire à l'ennemi, apparaissant comme une pratique de guerre judicieuse, appropriée et pertinente, répondant aux conditions des guerres que menait l'armée du roi de France au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Les récits des campagnes militaires du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle par Monluc comportent essentiellement pour la guerre régulière la description de sièges, et les faits d'armes retenus au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle mettent souvent en avant des affrontements en campagne près de places fortes où sont installées des garnisons, ou sur les remparts des villes à prendre ou à défendre. Les escarmouches, petites ou grosses sont d'ailleurs l'essentiel des opérations dans la guerre vécue par Monluc. Mis à part quelques rares événements en France que Monluc commente plus ou moins, celui-ci fait remarquer à juste titre : « *tout le reste de la guerre n'estoient que de petites escarmouches, au pris de ce qui se faisoit là et de ce qu'il falloit qu'à l'avenir s'y fist* »<sup>36</sup>. Monluc écrit également que ses mémoires ne révèlent pas toutes les opérations secondaires relevant de la « petite guerre » auxquelles il a participé : « *Voilà tout ce que je fis en Piedmont pendant que je demeuray près monsieur monsieur le mareschal de Brissac. Que si je voulois escrire toutes les escarmouches ausquelles je me suis trouvé, il me faudrait double papier pour l'escrire* »<sup>37</sup>. Cela montre l'omniprésence et l'importance de la « petite guerre » dans les activités militaires du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Dans ses commentaires, Monluc évoque constamment la « petite guerre » et la définit selon ses propres choix tactiques en matière de guerre. Concernant les opérations de guerre régulière, les campagnes militaires du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle décrites par Monluc se déroulaient en général prudemment, de places en places. Cette guerre, où on enlevait méthodiquement les places fortes ayant une importance tactique et stratégique, s'opéra dans une stratégie des accessoires et releva d'une tactique de la même sorte, où la « petite guerre » vit sa place croître tout au long du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. D'où les guerres très lentes qui composèrent la majeure partie des guerres en Europe au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, dues à la nécessité de ne pas laisser des places fortes actives derrière soi, même de faible importance, et d'effectuer des sièges rapidement qui retardent les avancées des armées et les objectifs tactiques prioritaires, même si les places fortes n'opposaient pas de véritables résistances.

<sup>35</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 264.

<sup>36</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 569.

<sup>37</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 247.

C'est dans ce cadre que la guerre dans la seconde moitié du XVI<sup>ème</sup> siècle, étant essentiellement une guerre de places fortes, consacre la « petite guerre » comme guerre de mouvement et moyen de guerre offensif, notamment de la part de bandes partisans sortant des garnisons et effectuant des entreprises en campagne pour nuire à l'ennemi. Ainsi, pour illustrer ce propos, on peut se référer au récit de la prise de Lanzo par les troupes du maréchal de Brissac en 1551<sup>38</sup> : *« Au bout de quelques jours qu'ils furent arrivez, monsieur le Mareschal dressa une entreprinse pour aller prendre le chasteau de Lans, qui portoit grand dommage sur le chemin de Suze à Thurin, à cause d'une vallée qu'il y a depuis Lans jusques au grand chemin ; et les soldats dudict Lans estoient presque tous les jours là, ayant un petit chasteau à moitié chemin pour leur retraicte »*. Dans la guerre de places fortes, face à la lenteur de certaines opérations des armées en marche ou lors des sièges, la « petite guerre » en tant que guerre de mouvement prend toute sa forme, où l'on tient à supprimer à l'ennemi des places fortes, points de chute importants pour des troupes, qui postées en garnison, maîtrisent par des sorties fréquentes leurs alentours. Un objectif majeur pour les troupes légères postées en garnison était de contrôler la campagne et les alentours de la place, en tant normal comme en particulier lors de la prise d'une place<sup>39</sup>. Voilà un cadre idéal où s'exerce la « petite guerre », une « petite guerre » de partisans, sortant des places fortes pour occuper les lieux, frapper les troupes ennemies de passage, et écumer les environs. Cette guerre composée de prises de places fortes sans bataille est tactiquement vitale pour les troupes du roi de France qui souhaitent repousser l'empereur et occuper le terrain. *« Cette prinse osta beaucoup de commodité à nos ennemis et nous servit fort pour ceste guerre »*<sup>40</sup>. C'est ce que Monluc explique sur le plan tactique également à propos des guerres de religion : *« pour ce que je me mettrois en campagne, ils se retiroient dans les villes et tanières qu'ils tenoient : le droict de la guerre, en laquelle ils se faisoient sages tous les jours, le vouloit. La moindre place qui m'eust faict teste me pouvoit arrester, et d'espérance de les trouver en la campagne, je n'en avois pas »*<sup>41</sup>. Puis il ajoute : *« tout le reste de la guerre n'estoit que petites escarmouches, au pris de ce qui se faisoit là et de ce qu'il falloit qu'à l'advenir s'y fist »*<sup>42</sup>. La guerre au XVI<sup>ème</sup> siècle fut une guerre de places fortes et une guerre de siège, donnant toute sa place à la « petite guerre » qui devint très vite le quotidien de la guerre.

Dans cette guerre de places fortes aux conditions particulières, les forces ennemies en présence s'étudiaient, s'observaient et ne décidaient rien sans reconnaissance. La philosophie moderne de l'art de la guerre au XVI<sup>ème</sup> siècle, consacrée à ce que l'on définit aujourd'hui comme la « petite guerre », consistait à obtenir de grands résultats ou des avantages substantiels, avec peu d'hommes et sans trop d'effusion de sang. On retrouve ce

<sup>38</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 198-207.

<sup>39</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 774.

<sup>40</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 207.

<sup>41</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 655.

<sup>42</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 656.

caractère dès le début de la carrière de Monluc au sein des armées du roi de France<sup>43</sup>. Ainsi, la guerre des armées prenant le visage de guerres de places fortes sur le plan tactique, la « petite guerre » provoqua un émiettement important des opérations de guerre. La « petite guerre » constitue l'ordinaire des activités militaires de la guerre au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, l'été comme l'hiver, de jour comme de nuit<sup>44</sup>. Chaque forteresse fonctionnait sur un territoire comme une embuscade permanente d'où jaillissaient des « partisans ». Ces troupes en campagne, ces partis, prenaient souvent lors de leurs expéditions des prisonniers pour « avoir langue » d'eux. Dans les sources, cette « petite guerre » composée d'escarmouches et de surprises est si abondante que les expressions « aller à la guerre », ou encore « mener » ou « envoyer à la guerre », reflètent ces actions partisans menées par des détachements de troupes, qu'ils soient réguliers ou irréguliers. Cette guerre de partis, partant des forteresses, servait notamment à nuire à l'ennemi. Les méthodes des troupes légères « envoyées ou menées à la guerre » sont bien identifiables dans les Commentaires de Monluc. Comme tactique offensive, la « petite guerre » regroupait les surprises, pendant lesquelles on enlevait un poste ennemi par la ruse et l'irruption, impliquant l'utilisation de stratagèmes et de ruses supplantant la force, et les embuscades, pour harceler et surprendre les troupes ennemies dans leur marche<sup>45</sup>. Par sa mobilité et sa rapidité d'action, les troupes légères par l'embuscade, inquiétaient et harcelaient l'ennemi, et par la surprise enlevaient de force ou par la ruse une place forte. Le choix de son intervention était d'ordre tactique (attaque/défense, offensive/défensive/contre-offensive) : l'embuscade permettait de piéger l'ennemi en restant camper sur ses positions ; la surprise permettait quant à elle de piéger l'ennemi en allant le provoquer.

Dans le cadre de la guerre de places fortes, Monluc relève tous les stratagèmes au service ou non de la grande guerre, stratagèmes qui relèvent bien de la « petite guerre ». Cela concerne les divers moyens d'épier l'ennemi, la corruption, et l'intelligence ou la conspiration dans une ville, ainsi que les différents moyens d'engager l'ennemi dans un combat, les escarmouches pour désorienter l'ennemi et désorganiser ses lignes, les surprises par intelligence, le caractère particulier des surprises de petites forteresses, la défense d'une brèche, les ruses pour calmer les soldats mécontents...etc. Cela concerne également le fait d'empêcher l'ennemi de sortir d'une place et de prendre toutes les dispositions pour nuire à son ravitaillement, le fait de passer sûrement les rivières, celui d'utiliser la ruse pour dissimuler ses opérations, le fait de compromettre ou de rompre les desseins de l'ennemi, de lui faire quitter un poste avantageux, celui de surprendre un pays, de se sauver et de se garantir de situations dangereuses, de connaître l'état d'une place, le fait d'empêcher l'arrivée de secours, et tout simplement le fait d'« amuser » l'ennemi... Les ruses dont parle Monluc étaient multiples pour prendre une ville par surprise ou pour prendre des troupes en embuscade. Les sources mentionnent aussi bien la dissimulation de soldats dans des charrettes de foin, les petites troupes de soldats qui s'agitent devant l'ennemi pour attirer l'ennemi au combat et les faire tomber dans une embuscade, la

<sup>43</sup> Lire « l'expédition des moulins d'Auriol » conduite par le jeune Blaise de Monluc, dans (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 63-72.

<sup>44</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 196, p. 216.

<sup>45</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 188-189, pp. 243-244.

circulation de fausses instructions qu'on laisse prendre par l'ennemi pour qu'il se mette en campagne et qu'on puisse plus facilement surprendre une place, que bien parlementer lors d'un siège pour détourner la vigilance de l'ennemi et le surprendre quand il s'y attendra le moins.

La « petite guerre » est une pratique multiforme de la guerre et son analyse peut s'avérer complexe du fait du caractère régulier et irrégulier, et de nature différente, des opérations qu'elle recouvre. La « petite guerre » fondait sa réussite sur la surprise, la ruse, la dissimulation et le stratagème. Les « ruzes et finesses »<sup>46</sup> de guerre étaient monnaie courante et furent à la base de bon nombre d'opérations de guerre, petites ou moyennes. Monluc lui-même, alors capitaine, joua le rôle d'espion sur ordre de ses supérieurs, se déguisant en cuisinier<sup>47</sup>. Les ruses de guerre étaient des stratagèmes plus ou moins développés, basés sur le secret des opérations, sur la dissimulation et la tromperie<sup>48</sup>.

Les hommes de guerre pratiquant la « petite guerre » comme moyen de guerre pour une rançon du succès à petit prix, utilisaient également au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle des guides, des messagers, des « espies », des intelligences, et des faux messagers, mêlant des civils à la guerre et aux préparatifs d'opérations de guerre. Monluc signale que les gouverneurs de places fortes ont des espions, qui leur communiquent les déplacements et les conditions des troupes ennemies. C'est de cette sorte que Monluc décida de surprendre les impériaux sur le chemin de Marennes<sup>49</sup>, dans une guerre de places fortes faite de surprises et d'embuscades et consacrant la « petite guerre » au quotidien. Monluc aime la « petite guerre » car elle est comme lui : vive, surprenante et efficace dans les conditions qui lui sont favorables. Au capitaine qui la mène de faire en sorte que les conditions soient bonnes. Monluc est véritablement dans la première moitié du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, un artisan et un ardent défenseur de la pratique la « petite guerre ».

On se doit souligner chez Monluc l'impact psychologique naturel et recherché de la « petite guerre » dans la formation des soldats et l'apprentissage de celle-ci. Au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle d'après Monluc, les troupes combattaient souvent l'ennemi pour s'exercer ensemble à la « petite guerre » et pour apprendre à se connaître que par véritable nécessité. C'est le caractère régulier de la guerre, la guerre au quotidien relevant de la « petite guerre ». Le capitaine Monluc, préparant sous son commandement ses soldats à la « petite guerre » et à la valeur de l'ennemi pour minimiser ces risques, livre ses méthodes : « *je les eusse souvent mis au mains des ennemis. J'ay tousjours tasché à ne laisser les soldats ou gendarmes croupir, et, forts ou faibles, les mettre aux prises avec les ennemis, pour les faire recognoitre. Il faut y aller prudemment, pour ne perdre* »<sup>50</sup>. Le hasard dans la « petite guerre » est accrue du fait de la volatilité des opérations et des situations dans lesquelles sont menées les opérations de guerre. La réussite et l'échec tiennent à peu de choses et le hasard est à la fois un atout et un désagrément. Dans toutes ces données psychologiques et tactiques, le commandement du capitaine assure l'équilibre. Les

<sup>46</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 109.

<sup>47</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 78.

<sup>48</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 708.

<sup>49</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 119.

<sup>50</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 421.

détachements obéissaient à un capitaine dont la bravoure, la clairvoyance, et la rapidité étaient des qualités essentielles. On peut s'interroger d'après les Commentaires de Monluc sur les caractères personnels et militaires des capitaines pratiquant la « petite guerre ». La bravoure, la clairvoyance, la rapidité l'amour de l'entreprise et du danger, la maîtrise de bon nombre d'éléments tactiques, l'esprit de jugement et de décision étaient des qualités essentielles, caractérisant la pratique de la « petite guerre ». L'efficacité exigeait une forte cohésion des troupes et un esprit de commandement et de décision vif et rigoureux, les détachements devant surprendre et pouvant être surpris à tout moment par des troupes avancées ou même par l'armée ennemie. L'initiative, la promptitude, la vivacité, la résolution étaient des atouts considérables. Le capitaine chez Monluc pratiquant la « petite guerre » doit être au cœur des intentions et de l'action ; il doit se surpasser constamment et mener sa troupe de manière adéquate, tout en se mettant toujours à la place de l'ennemi par rapport à ce que l'on sait de l'évolution de la guerre<sup>51</sup>. Bref, le meilleur des capitaines doit être pour ses soldats un visionnaire juste et courageux, compris de tous en toutes circonstances. La ruse, les stratagèmes, l'esprit large pour se sortir de situations périlleuses ou dangereuses, l'intrépidité, le tempérament vif, le coup d'œil juste et rapide pour éliminer ou contourner tout danger étaient indispensables au commandement pour contourner les effets hasardeux de la « petite guerre ».

Les exemples historiques sur le plan militaires donnés par Monluc au cours de toutes guerres du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle auxquelles il a participé, ne manquent pas pour étayer un très grand nombre d'analyses. Les guerres d'Italie et celles menées dans le nord de la France tout d'abord de 1494-1559, tout comme les guerres de religion en France à partir de 1562, telles qu'en parle Monluc dans ses commentaires, furent des guerres de places fortes entremêlées bien souvent. De grandes villes fortifiées structuraient le territoire, entre lesquelles se trouvaient des villes moyennes remparées ou fortifiées avec des garnisons, et entre celles-ci de nombreux petits forts. C'est dans ce cadre que s'exprima la « petite guerre » qui prit toute sa place au service de la grande guerre comme moyen et comme mode de guerre.

Deux exemples historiques nous interpellent dans les commentaires de Monluc pour traiter de la « petite guerre » dans le cadre des guerres des places fortes. L'expédition des moulins d'Auriolle est un excellent exemple de la petite guerre « monlucienne »<sup>52</sup>. En août 1536, alors que l'empereur, qui réside à Aix attendant l'arrivée de renfort et notamment de canons, s'apprête à envahir la France, le roi François I<sup>er</sup>, arrivé à Avignon, *« fut avertit que si l'on brusloit quelques moulins que l'empereur tenoit vers Arles, et mesmes un, qui estoit à quatre lieux de Aix, nommé le moulin d'Auriolle, le camp des ennemis seroit bien tost affamé. Il fit faire l'execution du bruslement desdits moulins, qui estoient vers Arles, par le baron de la garde (...). Et neanmoins les espions raportoient tousjours au Roy qu'il falloit brusler ceux d'Auriolle, d'autant qu'ils nourrissoient ordinairement toute la maison de l'Empereur et les six mille soldats vieux Espagnols,*

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., pp. 129-130.

<sup>52</sup> Le récit sur quelques pages est intéressant pour analyser un acte de petite guerre préparé et accompli dans sa totalité, au service de la grande guerre, les retombées tactiques étant de premier plan. Voir (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 63-72.

*lesquels il tenoit toujours près de sa personne* »<sup>53</sup>. Le Roi donne l'ordre de brûler ces moulins mais personne ne veut exécuter cette mission, hasardeuse et extrêmement risquée sur le plan tactique. Et le 19 août 1536 a finalement lieu l'expédition des moulins d'Auriolle, commandée par Monluc. Monluc raconte son expédition avec tous les détails intéressants pour traiter des conceptions « monluciennes » de la « petite guerre », qu'il s'agissent de considérations tactiques théoriques ou pratiques. La vision « monlucienne » de la « petite guerre » prend encore tout son sens en décembre 1543, lors de la « marchandise »<sup>54</sup> de Barge, un exemple aussi significatif que le précédent, opération menée par Monluc et basée sur la ruse et la dissimulation, où Monluc pratique la « petite guerre » en tant que capitaine rusé et expérimenté<sup>55</sup>.

Chaque conflit au XVI<sup>ème</sup> siècle offre le recours de la « petite guerre » adaptée à ses structures (politiques, géographiques, militaires). Les guerres civiles étaient notamment au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle propices au recours à la « petite guerre ». Ainsi, les formes tactiques prises par la « petite guerre » sont loin d'être simples. Soutien d'une armée dans le cadre de la guerre classique adossée aux missions des troupes légères, véritable mode de guerre de partisans pour des objectifs militaires et financiers lors des guerres de religion en France, la « petite guerre » fut l'objet de toutes les attentions, notamment tactiques dans le cadre d'une guerre d'usure. La « petite guerre » permettait d'occuper le terrain et d'occuper l'adversaire si celui-ci n'était pas plus décidé à en découdre. D'un point de vue tactique tactique, la « petite guerre » était la forme la plus maniable de violence.

#### *L'autre visage de la guerre : la petite guerre irrégulière*

La « petite guerre » comprenait au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle la politique de la terre brûlée (champs piétinés, culture brûlée, habitats brûlés, bêtes tuées) et de la destruction tactique programmée des moyens de production et des infrastructures (routes, moulins, ponts...etc.). L'étude de la « petite guerre » régulière menée dans une guerre de places fortes peut être une piste de recherches fructueuses pour comprendre dans quels cadres les opérations de destruction tactique, opérées par les armées régulières et relevant de la « petite guerre » dite « régulière », pouvaient apparaître dans un but défensif ou offensif. Les vivres, l'argent, les hommes et les munitions étaient les nerfs de la guerre et la « petite guerre » permettait de détruire ou de substituer ces éléments à l'ennemi. Dans ses Commentaires, Monluc préconise la politique de la terre brûlée lors des sièges, pour contraindre l'ennemi à se rendre par la famine, indiquant : « *Mais cependant vous, qui aurez la charge d'attaquer et boucler les places, lorsque vous voudrez par la fin renger et forcer les assiegez, si vous voyez que vous ne puissiez du tout les empêcher d'emporter*

<sup>53</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 62.

<sup>54</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 110. « Marchandise » signifie « intrigue », « pacte », « marchandage », « trahison ». « Faire marchandise de quelque chose » signifie « en tirer un avantage peu honorable ».

<sup>55</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 108-117.

*des bleds voisins, donnez-y le feu ; car, leur desrobant ceste commodité, les voilà bien en peine* »<sup>56</sup>. Cela montre bien les conceptions et les pratiques de la guerre au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. D'une manière générale, comme l'indique Monluc, il était de bonne guerre de saccager les vivres de villages où s'approvisionnent les ennemis, résultat d'une guerre de partis, sortant des forteresses, servait notamment en cas de siège à « faire le dégast » chez l'assiégeant.

### 3.1. La petite guerre irrégulière : exactions des soldats et misères de la guerre

Au delà des destructions tactiques, la « petite guerre » avait mauvaise réputation dans la société. Ils appelaient la « petite guerre » « *la picorée* », pour désigner les comportements des soldats déviants allant à l'encontre de la discipline militaire à observer. La discipline militaire telle qu'elle est proclamée n'est pas vraiment une réalité au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, les chefs de guerre laissant les soldats, peu et irrégulièrement payés et faisant parfois la guerre dans des conditions difficiles, piller et saccager les villes ennemies, puis les villes amies et leurs environs. Supportant la présence des troupes dans les villes et les villages logeant chez l'habitant, les civils désignaient par le terme de « petite guerre » les exactions et les violences commises par des bandes régulières de soldats à l'encontre des populations, notamment à l'encontre des paysans. C'est pendant les guerres de religion en France, du fait d'un affaiblissement du commandement militaire ou du fait d'un manque d'effectifs, que la « petite guerre » irrégulière se développa considérablement, atteignant parfois une dimension provinciale ou régionale.

Le « sac » était une pratique courante et admise, pratiquée pour différentes raisons. Monluc raconte qu'il conseilla au duc de Guise de se déplacer avec ses troupes en s'éloignant de la ville de Thionville prise en 1558, pour éviter le pillage, ajoutant qu'« *ils méritoient qu'on leur donnast le sac* »<sup>57</sup>. Alors que le duc de Guise et son armée se dirigeait avec Monluc en avant-garde vers la ville d'Arlon, selon Monluc, le duc de Guise « *vouloit donner ceste ville à sac aux soldats en recompense de Thionville* »<sup>58</sup>, ce qui fut exécuté après la prise de la ville le 8 juillet 1558, les soldats faisant du butin en ravageant les maisons<sup>59</sup>.

C'est surtout au temps des guerres de religion que la violence de la guerre va considérablement se développer du fait d'un affaiblissement de la discipline militaire. « *Et commenceray à escrire les combats où je me suis trouvé durant ces guerres civiles, lesquelles il m'a fallu, contre mon naturel, user non seulement de rigueur, mais de cruauté* », écrit même Monluc<sup>60</sup>. Monluc déplore également les horreurs de la guerre à la fin de ces mémoires et fait son mea culpa : « *La nécessité de la guerre nous force, en despit de nous-mesme, à faire mille maux, et faire non plus d'estat de la vie des hommes que d'un poulet. Et puis les plaintes du peuple qu'il faut manger en despit qu'on en aye,*

<sup>56</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 236.

<sup>57</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 445.

<sup>58</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 448.

<sup>59</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 448-450.

<sup>60</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 470.

*les veuves et les orphelins que nous faisons tous les jours, nous donnent toutes les maledictions dont ils se peuvent adviser (...). Moy doncques bien heureux, qui ay le loisir de songer aux pechez que j'au commis, ou plustost que la guerre m'a faict commettre, car de mon naturel je n'estois pas addonné à faire le mal, et sur tout tousjours esté ennemy du vice, de l'ordure et vilennie, ennemy capital de la trahison et desloyauté (...); Mais il est impossible de faire ses charges sans faire mal, si ce n'est que le Roy ait ses coffres pleins d'or pour payer ses armées; encor y aura-t-il prou à faire »<sup>61</sup>, dit Monluc.*

### 3.2. La guerre « partisane » : bandes armées autonomes et capitaines brigands.

Au service de la guerre et en marge des armées, la « petite guerre » regroupait les actions de bandes armées partisans et de bandes paysannes.

Les bandes paysannes constituaient des troupes non régulières, très difficiles à contrôler, inexpérimentées et mal équipées mais nombreuses et extrêmement utiles. Les chefs de guerre comme Monluc se servaient ainsi des « communes » à l'occasion<sup>62</sup>. Ce fut surtout un trait marquant des guerres de religion en France dans la seconde moitié du XVI<sup>ème</sup> siècle, pendant lesquelles la guerre fut essentiellement une « petite guerre », pouvant aisément être assimilée à une guerre de partis, une guerre de partisans. Bien souvent, les interventions paysannes dans les opérations tactiques avaient des mobiles peu glorieux, celles-ci allant jusqu'à dépouiller les morts sur les champs de bataille désertés par les armées<sup>63</sup>. Autrement, les bandes paysannes, catholiques et protestantes, s'attaquaient à des troupes armées du parti contraire en retraite, comme le raconte Monluc dans le pays de Foix en mai 1562<sup>64</sup>, ou encore dans la région de Toulouse, lors du « combat de Vergt »<sup>65</sup>. Monluc nous signale la présence de bandes paysannes aux côtés de troupes régulières pendant des sièges, la « petite guerre » irrégulière se retrouvant au service de la guerre régulière.

Parfois, ces bandes paysannes se réunissaient au son du tocsin et se rassemblait sous l'autorité d'un chef de guerre, souvent un noble de second rang ou même un ancien capitaine, piégeant les troupes régulières pas assez nombreuses devant la multitude ou au contraire étant massacrée par des troupes régulières mieux armées et plus expérimentées à la « petite guerre ». Même si elles connurent quelques succès momentanés, avec comme avantage tactique le poids du nombre et l'avantage de la surprise, ces bandes de paysans furent vaincues à long terme, car mal armées et désorganisées, elles ne purent compenser par leur nombre leurs différences et leur infériorité en matière d'armement, d'instruction au fait d'arme, d'organisation, de cohésion et de méthode.

<sup>61</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 822.

<sup>62</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 774-775.

<sup>63</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 104.

<sup>64</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 505.

<sup>65</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 569.



La « petite guerre » irrégulière regroupait également les actions de troupes de soldats pratiquant le brigandage, des « *coquins* »<sup>66</sup> selon Monluc, commandées par un capitaine brigand, tantôt servant militairement les opérations militaires de son parti, tantôt menant sa propre guerre afin de faire du butin. Les bandes de brigands sévissaient également par les chemins et effectuaient des opérations militaires contre les populations civiles amies ou ennemies, étant souvent pourchassés en France tout au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle sur commandement militaire par des bandes régulières. Pendant les guerres civiles et religieuses en France de 1562 à 1598, l'utilité de la « petite guerre » n'est plus seulement militaire. Plus qu'une guerre de jeunesse, la « petite guerre » était aussi la pratique de capitaines ou de capitaines brigands cherchant à faire du butin, livrés à eux-mêmes et devant parfois assurer leur défense contre de nombreux ennemis (troupes régulières, capitaines brigands, bandes paysannes). Détachés du véritable commandement des chefs militaires et des partis politiques, les capitaines brigands menaient des bandes de soldats déserteurs ou des civils désœuvrés, en petits groupes pour des raisons de mobilité, pouvant aller cependant de quelques centaines de personnes à quelques milliers d'hommes. Rassemblés dans des villes ou des lieux en ruine qui constituaient de véritables repaires, les capitaines brigands et leur bande étaient pendant les guerres civiles des acteurs à part entière lors des affrontements, pratiquant la « petite guerre », de manière sauvage et désorganisée, comme un moyen de guerre et de défense.

Pendant les guerres en Europe de la première moitié du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle dans lesquelles Monluc combat dans les armées du roi de France, la discipline militaire est en général respectée et Monluc le signale avec discernement, notamment dans les armées du roi de France commandées par le maréchal de Brissac<sup>67</sup>. Malgré tout, face aux bandes armées autonomes commandées par des capitaines peu scrupuleux, Monluc reçoit l'ordre de déloger les bandes capitaines brigands qui sortent des places fortes pour ratisser les environs et faire du butin. Par exemple, Monluc fit prendre le château de Lévignac et demanda à ce que le château de Bridoire soit assiégé. Dans le château de Bridoire, « *il y avoit quatre vingt ou cents autres huguenots, conduits par un nommé Labaune. C'estoit le lieu où Geoffre, cest insigne voleur, qui a fait tant de maux, se retiroit. Aux choses que ce villains a faittes, il a montré qu'il avoit du cœur et du courage, et qu'il estoit homme d'exécution. Je leur mandai qu'ils les enfermassent, et assiegeassent le chasteau de si près qu'il n'en eschappast rien ; car dès que j'aurais fait à la Roche, je tournerois tout court avec les canons à eux ; et si monsieur de la Noue nous venoit combattre, qu'il falloir qu'ils abandonnassent tout et qu'ils vinssent jour et nuict pour se trouver au combat* »<sup>68</sup>. Monluc se chargea dans le coin d'éradiquer les bandes de capitaines brigands qui sévirent dans les places fortes. Ces activités militaires relèvent pleinement de la « petite guerre » et est caractéristique de troupes qui pendant qu'ils nuisent à l'ennemi de temps à autre sur ordre de leur chef, cherchent à faire du butin, n'épargnant personne au passage et pillant les entourages autour de la place forte, se retranchant au moindre danger. Monluc ne peut s'empêcher d'intervenir contre ces capitaines-brigands. Toujours

<sup>66</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 640.

<sup>67</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 251.

<sup>68</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 673-674.

dans le même registre, Monluc raconte la prise du château de Levignac et les événements de Bridoire : « Voilà la charge de messieurs de Leberon et de Madaillan, lesquels enlevèrent le chasteau. Il est prou fort pour batterie de main, et n'en pouvoient venir à bout, car les ennemis se deffendoient fort, et cognoissoient bien que l'on leur feroit une mauvaise guerre, à cause des grands cruautés et meschancetez qu'ils avoient fait autour de levignac. Monsieur de lauzun leur presta une collevrine ; et firent un trou par lequel pouvoient passer deux hommes, et les uns avec leschelles par le costé de la basse-court, et les autres par les trous donnoient, et les emportarent. Il ne se sauva que trois prisonniers, et tout le reste fut mit en pièces »<sup>69</sup>. Face à ces bandes qui diffusent le malheur et la misère, les soldats de Monluc n'ont aucune pitié. Tout le monde est massacré et il n'y a pas de prisonnier. Monluc ne parle pas de « petite guerre », mais de mauvaise guerre.

Les bandes de capitaines brigands se multiplièrent au temps des guerres de religion, jusqu'à devenir hyperactives et insupportable pour les populations comme pour les chefs militaires à la fin des guerres de religion<sup>70</sup>. Durant les guerres de religion, Monluc en tant que capitaine est sollicité par exemple pour déloger une troupe de cents à cent vingt soldats retranchés dans la place forte de la Roche-Chalais, qui pillent et saccagent les environs, malmenant les populations, et attaquant par les chemins, surprenant tout ce qui passe de Saintonge à Bordeaux. Monluc fait le récit de l'entreprise de La Roche-Chalais en février 1570 à laquelle il participa : « Or, ne faisant rien à Sainte-Foy, je vins jusque à Agen, où monsieur de Monferran me manda que le sieur de la Roche-calais et le capitaine Chanteyrac estoient dans la Roche avec cent ou six vingt huguenots, qui couroient tout le pays, faisant mille maux, de sorte qu'il ne pouvoit venir personne de saintonge à Bourdeaux ; et que, si je voulois aller à la Roche, nous serions prou gens pour faire l'entreprinse »<sup>71</sup>.

Parfois, les capitaines des armées avaient des méthodes semblables à celles qu'avaient les bandes armées autonomes. Une pratique commune très répandue était de pratiquer la « petite guerre » pour faire prisonnier des gens riches et de leur demander en échange de leur vie ou de leur liberté une très forte rançon, servant à financer la guerre et à s'enrichir. En 1556, Monluc envisagea lui même de faire prisonnier un seigneur romain, car dit Monluc, « il me va à l'entendement que facilement je prendrois prionnier ce seigneur romain, et que, si je le pouvois attrapper, j'estois riche à jamais ; car pour le moins, j'en aurois quatre-vingt mille escuz de rançon, qui estoit son revenu d'un an. Ce n'estoit pas trop. Je vais discourir en moi-mesmes que monsieur de la Molle viendrait avec moy, menant trois cens arquebuziers seulement, et les laisseroit à moitié chemin, auprès d'une tour, où il y avoit des cabanes pour retirer le bestail (car j'avois recogneu le chemin, allant et retournant à belistres) ; et que je prendrois le capitaine Ambros, lieutenans d'une compagnie du duc de Paliane, avec vingt cinq chevaux des meilleurs et les plus courants de sa compagnie ; et que j'empruntois au seigneur Aurelio Fregouse son lieutenant et sa cornette, avec trente cinq sallades seulement des meilleurs qu'il eust, et les meilleurs

<sup>69</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 674.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. (L. )RAVAILLE, *La violence en Bretagne au temps de la Ligue (1589-1598)*, maîtrise, Nantes, 2000,

<sup>71</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 672.

*chevaux ; et que je laisserois à une portée d'arquebuz de La Molle, tirant vers marin, le capitaine Ambros avec les vingt cinq sallades, et moi je m'en irois avec celle du sieur Aurelio me mettre en embuscade auprès de marin, soubz les vignes et un peu à main gauche du grand chemin ; et que j'envoyerois six sallades donner l'alarme un peu devant le jour à Marin ; et qu'estant Marc-Antoine jeune et plein de bonne volonté, il ne feroit point de faute de sortir. Je faisais estat que, à point nommé, il sortiroit au point du jour, et que les six sallades l'amèneroient à nostre embuscade, et que je prendrois fuitte avec les sallades à sa veue, et qu'il me suivroit à toute bride, voyant une cornette, laquelle luy feroit joye de la pouvoir prendre, pour avoir plus de reputation de sa victoire »<sup>72</sup> ». Monluc justifie lui-même ces pratiques : « Et si le Roy eust fait payer les compagnies, je n'eusse permis en ces guerres de introduire les rançons qui ont entretenu la guerre. Mais le gendarme ny le soldat n'estoit payé. Il est impossible d'y pourvoir, encores n'y en eust-il guères ; c'est cela sans doute qui a entretenu la guerre. Ce n'est pas comme aux guerres estrangères, où on combat comme pour l'amour et pour l'honneur ; mais au civiles, il faut estre ou maistre ou valet, veu qu'on demeure sous mesme toit. Et ainsi il faut venir à la rigueur et à la cruauté ; autrement la friandise du gain est telle qu'on désire plustost la continuation de la guerre que la fin »<sup>73</sup>. Voilà pourquoi la « petite guerre » s'impose tellement en France pendant les guerres de religion, qu'elle soit régulière ou irrégulière, souvent au service de la grande guerre, mais de plus en plus au détriment ou en marge de celle-ci, tout comme nous le montre les actions militarisées des capitaines brigands et de leurs bandes.*

En lisant Monluc, on se rend compte à quel point étudier la « petite guerre » est un concept essentiel pour comprendre l'art de la guerre évoluant au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. Elle était pour les autorités politiques et militaires de l'époque un moyen d'assurer le jeu entre la conciliation et la dispersion, imposée dans une guerre de places fortes par le ravitaillement et la concentration des forces selon les objectifs tactiques. Tactiquement, la « petite guerre » devient au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle une pratique courante et indispensable à la bonne marche de la guerre.

Monluc prône sa vision de la guerre et favorise la « petite guerre ». La vision « monlucienne » de la « petite guerre » favorise la guerre de ruses suivant les circonstances, elle innove tactiquement, et elle participe par son expérience empirique au déclin de la guerre chevaleresque du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle. C'est l'avènement de la « petite guerre » au service et en marge de la grande guerre, qui la supplante la plupart du temps ; c'est cela aussi la renaissance tactique de l'art de la guerre du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle.

Dans l'œuvre de Monluc, la « petite guerre » apparaît tantôt comme un moyen de guerre dans une guerre de places fortes où les grandes batailles sont rares et les sièges plus fréquents. Cette guerre de sièges permet aux troupes régulières comme aux troupes irrégulières de pratiquer la « petite guerre » comme un mode de guerre. On s'aperçoit dans les récits de Monluc que dans les guerres du places fortes qu'il raconte, la « petite guerre » passe au premier plan, ne se contentant plus d'être des petits faits de guerre, mais devenant un moyen de guerre au résultats tactiques recherchés et intéressants, notamment

<sup>72</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 378.

<sup>73</sup> (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 519.

pour les partis qui parcourent la campagne. Entre les grands sièges et les batailles qui mobilisent de très grosses forces et l'essentiel des armées, pour un résultat long, hasardeux et parfois décourageant, sans résultat réels sur le plan stratégique, la « petite guerre » offre une alternative valable pour nuire à l'ennemi en un point, avec peu de force, sans mobiliser l'armée et la mettre par conséquent en danger. Ainsi, progressivement au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, la « petite guerre » devient la constante de la guerre et l'essentiel des activités militaires, au sein ou en marge de la guerre régulière.

Dès le début du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, les capitaines des guerres d'Italie au service de grands personnages, dont faisait parti Monluc, profitant de l'expérience des anciens, ont intégré et enrichi par expérience leurs pratiques de la guerre par la « petite guerre ». Plus tard, ils mirent cette expérience au service des guerres civiles en France dans la seconde moitié du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle, lorsqu'ils devinrent de grands capitaines et des chefs de guerres renommés aux qualités reconnues<sup>1</sup>. La « petite guerre » devint en France dans la seconde moitié du siècle le quotidien de la guerre, une tactique adaptée aux conditions tactiques et dépendant des caractères des hommes, faisant de certains d'entre eux des hommes intrépides et ingénieux et des capitaines brigands aux qualités militaires incontestables.

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<sup>1</sup> Monluc, donnant aux cours de ces commentaires de très nombreux témoignages, conseils et remontrances, notamment aux capitaines explique : « Je ne vous écris point ceci sans expérience : j'ay appris ces leçons sous feu monsieur de Lautrec, estant un bon régent (...). J'ay continué mon apprentissage sous messieurs les maréchaux de Strossi, de brissac et autres », dans (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, pp. 571-572. A travers ses commentaires, il livre le but didactique de ses écrits, insistant particulièrement qu'ils permettront aux gens de guerre, aux capitaines et aux gouverneurs de provinces, « de faire leur apprentissage aux petits faits d'armes » et de « prendre exemple au bien, s'il y en a, et laisser le mal ». (B. de) MONLUC, *Commentaires, 1521-1576*, Paris : Gallimard, 1981, p. 681.

## *L'intégration est-elle possible?*

La situation des Arabes et des musulmans en France

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### *Introduction*

Le but de cet article est de présenter le mode de vie et les intégrations possibles des arabes, des musulmans et des maghrébins vivants en France, et également les difficultés provenant des différences culturelles entre ces peuples et les européens. Avant tout il est nécessaire de définir la différence entre « arabe », « musulman » et « maghrébin ». Le terme « d'arabe » renvoie au peuple, tandis que le terme « musulman » signifie l'appartenance à la religion musulmane. « Maghrébin » est le nom des arabes vivants en Afrique du Nord, notamment les habitants du Maroc, de la Tunisie et de l'Algérie. Ces pays étaient colonisés par la France jusqu'à 1956, 1962, d'où leur relation ambiguë avec la France.

Etant donné qu'une loi de 1872 interdit en France toutes les questions concernant l'appartenance ethnique ou religieuse lors des recensements de la population, le nombre des musulmans et des arabes vivants en France n'est qu'une estimation. Ce chiffre varie souvent et peut être aussi contradictoire, car on a confondu fréquemment les donnés sur les musulmans avec ceux des arabes ou tout simplement avec ceux des immigrés. C'est ainsi qu'est né l'idée qu'en France vit cinq millions de musulmans et /ou d'arabes. Pour avoir une estimation plus proche de la réalité il faut mener une grande enquête sur les affiliations et les pratiques religieuses des Français. Il n'y a eu jusqu'ici que trois études statistiques publiées sur ce sujet : une en 1927, une autre en 1942 et la dernière en 1986, menée par Michèle Tribalat, démographe de l'Institut National des Études Démographiques (INED). A cela s'ajoute une autre enquête de Michèle Tribalat, « Famille », de 1999 dans laquelle la démographe a introduit une question sur le pays d'origine des parents. On a pu ainsi disposer, pour la première fois, de données précises sur trois générations. D'après ces études, contrairement aux données officielles, il n'y aurait que « 3,7 millions de personnes susceptibles d'être musulmans » et « un tiers d'entre elles ont moins de 18 ans ».<sup>1</sup> Cela semble être logique, car le plus grand flux migratoire d'Afrique du Nord a eu lieu après la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, notamment entre 1945 et 1975. La France a eu besoin des travailleurs après la guerre, ce qui a encouragé l'immigration des maghrébins. Après l'indépendance du Maroc en 1956 et de

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<sup>1</sup> Charles Gilbert, Lahouri Besma, "3,7 millions de musulmans en France; Les vrais chiffres", *L'Express*, le 4 décembre 2003.

la Tunisie en 1962. plus d'un million de pieds noirs et de harkis a été obligé d'immigrer en France.

### *I. Les différences culturelles entre les deux cultures*

Les deux cultures, c'est-à-dire la culture musulmane et la culture européenne ont des normes, des valeurs très différentes, ce qui vient des traditions de ces deux religions en question. La culture européenne est basée sur les valeurs de la religion judéo-chrétienne. La société française est individualiste, et laïque. La séparation de l'Eglise et de l'État a été déclarée par la loi de 1905. L'attitude de la société envers la religion a beaucoup changé, mais bien évidemment la composition de la société a changé également. Aujourd'hui la religion musulmane est devenue la deuxième religion la plus importante en France, pourtant elle n'est pas conforme à la loi de 1905. Cela pose de nombreuses difficultés en France. Le renforcement de la religion musulmane, et l'intensité de leurs demandes envers l'État français se fait sentir de plus en plus.

L'une des questions opposantes l'Etat et les musulmans est la construction des mosquées, car depuis 1905 l'Etat ne fait plus construire d'églises. Les musulmans « disposent d'environ 1 500 lieux de culte, en majorité de simples salles de prière (...). Une dizaine d'entre elles, seulement, peuvent accueillir plus d'un millier de personnes. »<sup>2</sup> Le fait que les musulmans veulent construire des mosquées en France, est interprété par chacun des parties concernées de différente manière. Les politiques françaises y voient le renforcement de l'islamisme, tandis que les intellectuels musulmans l'expliquent comme la volonté de l'établissement et de l'intégration des musulmans en France.

La majorité des mosquées est financé par l'Arabie Saoudite, qui a financé entre autre la mosquée d'Evry, et la plus grande partie de la construction des mosquées de Lyon et de Mantes<sup>3</sup>. Mais l'administration française craint une influence saoudite trop importante et cette peur semble être justifiée si l'on pense à l'attitude de l'Arabie Saoudite envers les pays européennes.

Une autre demande des musulmans envers l'Etat français est la formation d'imams en France, car la France n'a pratiquement pas d'instituts pour la formation des imams. Selon les musulmans il serait nécessaire que ce travail soit faite par des personnes connaissant bien les valeurs républicaines, pour aider l'intégration, car le rôle de l'imam n'est pas seulement religieux, mais également pédagogique. Et de ce point de vue aussi la France aurait l'intérêt de former des personnes qu'il peut ensuite contrôler. Mais cette procédure serait également contraire avec la loi de 1905. Les imams viennent pour la plupart du Maroc, du Sénégal ou du Liban, et parfois ils parlent à peine le français. « Ils n'ont pas de contrat de travail et leur carte de séjours n'est valable qu'un an. (...) Pour l'heure, il n'existe en France qu'un centre de formation d'imams. Il dépend de l'Union des organisations islamiques de France (UOIF), que certains estiment trop proches des Frères

<sup>2</sup> Festraets Marion, « Mosquées; Les fidèles manquent de place », *L'Express*, le 14 décembre, 2000.

<sup>3</sup> Fesraets, Marion, « Mosquées; Les fidèles manquent de place », *L'Express*, le 14 décembre 2000.

musulmans, mouvement de réislamisation d'origine égyptienne. »<sup>4</sup> Ces guides religieux, souvent radicaux, qui, contrairement aux lois françaises, vivent en polygamie et prêchent la soumission totale de la femme à l'homme, empêchent plutôt l'intégration des musulmans de France, qu'ils ne la servent. C'est ainsi, que les années passées de nombreux prédicateurs musulmans ont été expulsés de France, comme c'est le cas de l'imam de Vénissieux, Abdelkader Bouziane, partisan de la lapidation des femmes en cas d'adultère et adepte de la polygamie.

Selon un sondage paru dans *Le Point*, 62% des Français interrogés estiment que les valeurs islamiques ne sont pas compatibles avec celles de la République<sup>5</sup>. Pourtant, dans ce même sondage près d'un Français sur deux est favorable à la construction de mosquées dans les grandes villes (ils étaient 43% dans une enquête *IPSOS-Le Figaro* de mai 2000). Et le droit de vote aux élections municipales pour les étrangers hors l'Union Européenne serait accordé à 61%. Ces données prouvent une ouverture des Français face à l'islam.

Bien sûr la relation des musulmans, face à l'islam change également au cours des années, et la différence entre les générations est perceptible. Mais cette attitude face à la religion diffère aussi selon les pays d'origine. Selon une étude de Michèle Tribalat, paru dans le bulletin mensuel d'information de l'INED : « la plus grande pratique régulière est celle des Mandés d'Afrique Noire (65%). (...) Les immigrés d'Algérie sont les moins pratiquants. Leurs enfants nés en France (âgés de 20-29 ans) montrent une indifférence religieuse égale à celle des autres Français du même âge : non croyants et non pratiquants y sont aussi nombreux (près de 70% des hommes et 60% des femmes) et la fréquentation des lieux du culte est rarissime. Dans ce cadre, leur attachement au respect du ramadan et des interdits alimentaires (environ deux tiers des jeunes d'origine algérienne déclarent jeûner pour le ramadan et ne pas manger de porc ; la moitié déclare ne pas boire de l'alcool) reflète plus une fidélité aux origines et aux parents qu'une assiduité religieuse. »<sup>6</sup>

## II. La famille

La famille musulmane est basée sur l'autorité du père de famille, mais ce sont les femmes qui sont les plus subordonnées au père, puis au mari. Les inégalités entre les deux sexes se font encore de nos jours sentir. Les femmes musulmanes portent même en France souvent un foulard, cachant leurs cheveux. La famille entière veille sur la virginité des jeunes filles, et les mariages arrangés persistent.

Une des particularités de la religion musulmane est la polygamie, interdit par le droit français, pourtant pratiqué, bien qu'en un nombre relativement restreint de fidèles. Selon une étude de Michèle Tribalat : « l'existence des ménages polygames ne s'observe en France que parmi les Mandés qui représentent un peu moins du quart de la population

<sup>4</sup> Fesraets, Marion, « Mosquées; Les fidèles manquent de place », *L'Express*, le 14 décembre 2000.

<sup>5</sup> Sondage *IPSOS-LCI-Le Point*: « Islam, inquiétude des Français », *Le Point*, n. 1627, le 21 novembre 2003, p. 72.

<sup>6</sup> Michèle Tribalat, *Population et société*, n. 300, avril 1995, p. 4. [www.ined.fr/publication/pop-etsoc/-pes300/pes300.pdf](http://www.ined.fr/publication/pop-etsoc/-pes300/pes300.pdf) (1e juin 2004)

venue d'Afrique Noire. »<sup>7</sup> Mais il est extrêmement difficile de connaître avec précision le nombre des familles polygames. « La Direction des populations et des migrants du ministère des Affaires Sociales avance prudemment quelques évaluations : entre 8000 et 15 000 ménages pratiqueraient la polygamie en France. Au cabinet du ministre de l'Intérieur, on estime qu'ils seraient entre 10 000 et 20 000. »<sup>8</sup> Les familles polygames vivent dans des HLM surchargées, dans des conditions misérables, surtout en Ile de France, notamment en Seine-Saint-Denis, dans les Yvelines et dans quelques arrondissements parisiens; mais également dans les quartiers périphériques de Marseille, Lyon et en Normandie.

Mais la polygamie n'est pratiquée que par une partie mineure des musulmans vivants en France, et le mariage monogame présente une évolution. Selon une étude de Michèle Tribalat : « les pratiques matrimoniales traditionnelles et notamment celle du mariage préférentiel dans la parenté subissent une déstructuration importante dans les populations originaires d'Algérie et du Maroc. Elles restent au contraire vivaces chez les jeunes des familles turques en partie scolarisés en France. (...) [Les unions mixtes] sont loin d'être exceptionnelles chez les jeunes des familles originaires d'Algérie ou du Maroc et progressent avec la génération née en France : la moitié des garçons et le quart des filles d'origine algérienne vivent avec leur conjoint français, né de deux parents nés en France. Cependant, la pression sociale et familiale s'exerce encore fortement, surtout sur les jeunes filles, notamment celles d'origine algérienne : les femmes qui ne vivent pas en couple mais ont un "petit ami" choisissent encore, dans deux cas sur trois, un jeune homme de même origine, soit né en Algérie, soit né en France de parent(s) né(s) en Algérie. Une résistance au modèle familial traditionnel cumulée à des difficultés d'insertion professionnelle se traduisent par un retard important à la mise en couple. »<sup>9</sup>

### III. La formation

L'école française est depuis 1887 obligatoire, gratuite et laïque. Les élèves musulmans fréquentent pour la plupart des écoles françaises, car une seule école musulmane a été créée, en 2003. Les échecs scolaires sont fréquents, car les difficultés langagières s'associent souvent avec le manque des conditions adéquates pour le travail scolaire, c'est-à-dire appartement surchargé et bruyant, manque de bureau pour écrire tranquillement et/ou l'incapacité des parents à aider l'enfant dans l'apprentissage.

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<sup>7</sup> Michèle Tribalat, *Population et société*, n. 300, avril 1995, p. 3. [www.ined.fr/publication/pop-etsoc/-pes300/pes300.pdf](http://www.ined.fr/publication/pop-etsoc/-pes300/pes300.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> Lahouri Besma, « Polygamie; Cet interdit qui a droit de cité », *L'Express*, le 15 janvier 2004.

<sup>9</sup> Michèle Tribalat, *Population et société*, n. 300, avril 1995, p. 3. [www.ined.fr/publication/pop-etsoc/-pes300/pes300.pdf](http://www.ined.fr/publication/pop-etsoc/-pes300/pes300.pdf) (le 10 juin 2004)



Selon l'enquête de Michèle Tribalat : « les performances scolaires de[s] filles ne sont que légèrement supérieures à celles des garçons. Elles font moins bien en moyenne que les filles d'ouvriers en France (52% des filles âgées de 25-29 ans ont suivi une filière technique courte contre 32%), alors que leurs frères sont proches des autres enfants ouvriers (55%).<sup>10</sup>

Les valeurs laïques, apprises à l'école sont souvent contradictoires à celles de la famille, provenant de la religion et des traditions; et cela peut mener aux diverses confrontations chez les jeunes. C'est pour cette raison qu'il arrive que les jeunes musulmans refusent d'assister aux cours de biologie, philosophie ou encore d'éducation physique, en faisant référence à l'islam.

Cette opposition entre les valeurs laïques de l'école et la religion musulmane s'est faite également sentir dans l'affaire du voile. Dans certaines écoles sur l'influence croissant du radicalisme, de plus en plus de jeunes filles musulmanes ont commencé à porter le voile et ont refusé de l'enlever même après des demandes explicites des enseignants et du directeur. Ainsi, pour interdire le port de signes religieux dans les écoles publiques, l'Assemblée Nationale a adopté une loi, qui a fait beaucoup de bruits. « La loi du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics, interdit expressément le port "dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées publics, [...] de signes ou tenues par lesquels les élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance religieuse." »<sup>11</sup>

L'enseignement peut, ou pourrait aider les jeunes musulmans à s'intégrer dans la société française, car c'est justement à l'école qu'ils ont l'occasion de connaître le mieux la culture française, bien que le niveau des écoles des banlieues est nettement inférieur à celui des autres quartiers. De plus, un jeune se laisse toujours influencer d'avantage par ses amis que par l'école.

## *V. La vie dans les banlieues*

Les arabes et les musulmans vivent dans la plupart du temps dans les HLM des banlieues des grandes villes, car dans les années '60 quand le grand flux migratoire est arrivé en France, le gouvernement a fait construire des « habitations à loyer modéré » pour pouvoir héberger un grand nombre de travailleurs. Mais ces HLM se sont depuis détériorés, ainsi les personnes y vivent dans des conditions misérables, dans des appartements encombrés- surtout s'il s'agit d'une famille polygame.

La deuxième génération, née déjà en France, a la nationalité française, pourtant même la quatrième génération est constamment confrontée au mépris de la société dû à son origine ethnique.

<sup>10</sup> Michèle Tribalat, *Population et société*, n. 300, avril 1995, p. 4. [www.ined.fr/publication/popetsoc/pes300/pes300.pdf](http://www.ined.fr/publication/popetsoc/pes300/pes300.pdf) (le 10 juin 2004)

<sup>11</sup> <http://education.assemblee-nationale.fr/site-jeunes/laicite/fiche-dates/fiche-2004/fiche.asp>, (le 10 mai 2005)

Comme les personnes des banlieues sont coupées du reste de la société, et l'intégration est de ce fait très difficile, les jeunes délaissent souvent l'école et préfèrent de « s'intégrer » dans leur milieu. C'est ainsi que de nombreux gangs se forment, où les jeunes créent leurs propres lois, proche de l'islam, mais dans une interprétation radicale, qui engendre une agressivité extrême.

Les actes antisémites commis dans les années passées ont été dans la majorité accomplis non par des néonazis, les personnes arrêtées ont été des jeunes islamistes des cités. Selon la communauté juive de France le nombre des actions antisémites a augmenté sensiblement depuis le début de l'Intifada palestinienne. L'influence des prédicateurs radicaux, l'éloignement de la société et aussi le désespoir dû au chômage, dont le taux est très élevé dans ces quartiers provoquent dans ces jeunes une grande haine et xénophobie.

## *VI. Le travail*

La majorité des arabes et des musulmans occupe des emplois physiques, non qualifiés et peu valorisants. Pendant les Trente Glorieuses la France avait besoin de beaucoup de travailleurs, c'est pourquoi elle a encouragé une immigration forte venue du Maghreb. Il est valable même jusqu'à notre jour que la plus grande partie des personnes originaires du Maghreb travaille dans l'agriculture, la restauration et le bâtiment.

Le travail peut devenir un lieu de conflit de civilisations, comme c'est le cas par exemple du boucher musulman devant travailler avec de la viande de porc. A cela s'ajoute le cas de ceux qui font leurs prières obligatoires pendant le temps du travail, ou ceux qui demandent des nourritures « halal »<sup>12</sup> à la cantine. Durant le ramadan les accidents du travail sont plus fréquents, car les travailleurs sont plus affaiblis. Pendant cette période la durée du travail est plus courte dans les pays musulmans, mais il est impossible de prendre en considération cela dans un lieu de travail français.

Le taux de chômage est nettement plus élevé parmi les arabes et les musulmans, et « la situation ne s'améliore pas avec l'âge comme elle le devrait, surtout chez les personnes d'origine algérienne. A 35-39 ans, entre un quart et un tiers des hommes d'origine algérienne étaient encore chômeurs en 1999, soit de 3,5 à 5 fois plus que ceux d'origine française. »<sup>13</sup> L'insertion professionnelle des jeunes filles musulmanes est légèrement mieux que celle des garçons.

## *Conclusion*

La question musulmane est très importante pour tous les partis politiques et divise la société française, car elle représente une force majeure lors des élections. La coexistence de ces deux cultures tellement différentes engendre des conflits, et il faut bien

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<sup>12</sup> halal: préparé selon les prescriptions musulmanes

<sup>13</sup> Gilbert Charles, Besma Lahouri, « On a sorti d'un chapeau 5 millions de musulmans », entretien avec Michèle Tribalat, *L'Express*, le 4 décembre 2003.

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naturellement après de nombreux compromis encore des compromis. Il est bien évidemment extrêmement difficile de traiter la question objectivement et de trouver des solutions acceptables pour les deux côtés. L'intégration est un processus long, qui ne signifie pas assimilation. Le peuple intégré garde ses traditions, qu'il garde avec lui dans le pays d'accueil. La base et également la condition d'une intégration réussie, efficace, est la tolérance, l'ouverture d'esprit et le compromis.



## *The Ideas of Federalism in the Greek Political Thinking in the second part of the Nineteenth Century*

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From the point of view of the nineteenth century Greek political thinking the join of the Balkan territories to the European trade and in this way to the capitalist development was the determining issue. The Greek economic development was supported by geographical and political factors such as the commercial privileges given by the Ottoman authority<sup>1</sup>. At the end of the eighteenth century the Greek maritime commerce went through under a significant development but at that time the influence of the Constantinople centered fanariots was the strongest. With the consolidation of these groups the social structure changed together with strengthening of the church and the patriarch of Constantinople<sup>2</sup>. In the point of view of the social transformation the most significant current of thought in the nineteenth century, the Enlightenment, cannot be disregarded as it was spread on the Balkan Peninsula by the Greeks who lived in a cultured European diaspora or by means of trading got in touch with it and influenced the birth of those movements leading to the modern nationalism which resulted the striving for independence in the nineteenth century. Parallel to the appearance of the national consciousness of the Balkan nations basically two national policy outlined in the nineteenth century. The one that rooted in the glorious past aimed to establish a great national state – the examples for this are the Serbian's Nacertanije and the Greek's Megali Idea "the Great Idea" presented in the political way of thinking<sup>3</sup> – to take up arms against the expansive foreign policy of the contemporary multinational empires – the Ottoman Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Russia. The other idea set up from the recognition that a small Balkan nation cannot be a match for the military and economic potency of an empire even the declining Ottoman Empire. Therefore a common,

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<sup>1</sup> The Treaty of Kucuk-Kajnardzsa after the Russian-Turkish war between 1768-1774 entitled the the Greek merchants to trade sailing under the Russian banner on the Black Sea, enjoying significant privileges, and to join in the Balkan trade as ottoman citizens representing the Ottoman Empire until Vienna. It was not a coincidence that as the result of this privilege the first Greek diaspora, dealing only with commerce, arrived in our country.

<sup>2</sup> The patriarch of Constantinople became the leader of all ortodox Christian religions in the middle of the eighteenth century after the Ohrid-centered Bulgarian and the Pec centered Serbian autocephal church was taken under his authority. See: Barbara Jeleovich: A Balkán története I. (History of the Balkan), Osiris, Budapest, 1996, p. 54. With this his role became more important in the religious life of the Christians living under the authority of the Ottoman Empire.

<sup>3</sup> This ideas will be detailed further in the essay.

organized action can give hope and this led to the conception of the Balkan union and the idea of the federation or confederation. According to the political thinkers urging the federalist reorganization of the Balkan, the conception would have helped not only the liberation and obtaining independence but also the form of a functioning state. The idea of a federation was not an isolated thought in the nineteenth century. Almost every country in Eastern Europe drafted up similar conceptions each applying its own special political and geographical features. Most of the Balkan federation plans admitted the political autonomy of the nations and considering the right of nations to self-determination would have organized the new state. The two state constituent conceptions appeared rivaling, oppressing and sometimes interweaving throughout the nineteenth century. Even in the twentieth century, just before the beginning of the Balkan wars, impressed by the constitutional government of the Young Turk revolution in 1908 the idea of federative union appeared once again.

Rigas Velestinlis (1757-1798) was the first one who tried to apply the principles of the French revolution in the relation of the Balkan and worked out a particular constitution plan for uniting all the Balkan nations. His republic would have based on equality with the participation of all Balkan nations that is the reason why he can be considered as the forerunner of the federative plans and conceptions of the Balkan. Though the dominance of the Greeks appeared in his works which can be explained by the important mediator role of the Greek language at that time as all the orthodox ceremonies were celebrated in Greek and the language of the education was Greek, too. Up to the present days among the researchers it is a controversial question that some of them regard him the forerunner and the father of the panhellenic ideas partly because he called his state Greek republic and because he prescribed the use of the Greek language. On the other hand the other part think that the principles of the equality of all Balkan nations was presented at Rigas, his republic would have based on national sovereignty that is the reason why he was respected as the first representative of the federative ideas. According to Todorov's<sup>4</sup> state Rigas imagined a multinational state form that based on democratic grounds realizing the equality of all nations. In their opinion the interpretation of the word Greek should be treated very carefully because at that time in Europe "Greek" was also the synonym of Eastern orthodox Christian. The ideas of Enlightenment mixed with the old fashioned legitimization rooted in the Greek dominance of Byzantine and Macedonian Empire. The latter mentioned empires showed how long time the people of the East had lived in a multinational state and at this point of view the Balkan had one entity<sup>5</sup> that would have directly continued in the Republic which would not have been realized by a revolution

<sup>4</sup> Varban N. Todorov: *Greek Federalism during the Nineteenth Century (Ideas and Projects)* East European Quarterly, Boulder, N.Y. 1995, p. 7

<sup>5</sup> This can be proved with the use of the word Greek-Turkish from the 1960s which is a political phenomena and means the interweaving of the Greek and Turkish interests presenting from the eleventh century. On the other hand inside the political phenomena it is a firm idea with the aim of establishing a common Greek-Turkish state. For more details see: Balogh Ádám: *A görög-török együttműködés lehetősége a Balkán háborúk előtt* (The Possibility for a Greek-Turkish Co-operation Before the Balkan Wars). In *Acta Historica CXVIII*, Szeged, 2003, p. 38-39

overthrowing the Turkish but with their integration. He used the word “Greek” as orthodox, eastern, he did not intend to suggest that the other – not Christian – nation would have been second-class after the Greeks so they would have been lower in the state.<sup>6</sup>

With the break out of the Greek war of independence<sup>7</sup> and the form of the independent Greek state – February, 1830, London Contract – gave the conception of the federalist transformation a new stimulus. From 1830 the independent Greek kingdom and the attained Serbian autonomy opened the way to emancipation of the other nations of the region. At this time the idea of federalism appeared parallel with the idea of national liberation<sup>8</sup>. Then again in the conception of federalism ideas there was a withdrawal compared to the ideas of Rigas at many authors. One of these plans was in connection with the Greek Kingdom in April, 1821 worked out and published by Pavel Ivanovich Pestel, which imagined the federation consisted of ten autonom regions. The ten regions would have been: Vallachia, Bulgaria, Romania – Rumelia –, Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Thessalia, Albania, Levedia, Morea. Moldavia would have belonged to Russia, and Constantinople in neutral, external status would have been the center of the federation or as an integrated part the capital<sup>9</sup>. At the establishment of the independent Greek state the most marked problem was the national question. The new state included only the some parts of the Greek or inhabited by Greek majority territories<sup>10</sup> and millions of Greeks remained outside of the borders. Furthermore those who lived outside the borders, under the authority of the Ottomans were economic and cultural ascendancy, lived in the commercial centers of the Turkish Empire – Thessaliniki, Constantinople, Smyrna. Therefore after Athens became the capital in 1834 many of them considered temporary and waited for the moment when Constantinople took over this role. In this atmosphere the Megali Idea was born. The expression was first used on 14<sup>th</sup> January, 1844 when Joannis Kolettis<sup>11</sup> outlined it in front of the National Assembly. With this he drafted a new program: the realization of the national union, the liberalization of the Greeks living under the Turkish authority and their integration into a great Greek state. In this period it was only a slogan a program without appropriate strategy and without the means necessary for the realization. In it the propaganda encouraging the Balkan union mixed with the

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<sup>6</sup> Todorov p. 9

<sup>7</sup> The beginning of the war of independence is regarded to the symbolic act of Germanos, the Archbishop of Pathras, who set up the flag of the uprising to the top of the church of Pathras on 25<sup>th</sup> March, 1821.

<sup>8</sup> Χασιωτης, Α.: Η Ανατολική Ομοσπονδία: δυο Ελληνικές φεντεραλιστικές κινήσεις του 19ου αιώνα, Βανασ, 2001, (Hasziotisz: The Eastern Association: Two Greek Federalist Plan in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century), 9–15. ο.

<sup>9</sup> Todorov: p. 19

<sup>10</sup> The territory of the Independent Greek Kingdom was about 500,000 square kilometers – on the Peloponesos Peninsula and around Athens – had 700,000 – 800,000 habitants. The population of Athens were 8,000 – 10,000 comparing to the population of Constantinople which was 700,000, including 200,000 – 300,000 Greeks.

<sup>11</sup> Between 1835-1843 Kolettis lived in Paris as Greek Ambassador then between 1844-1847 the Prime Minister of Greece.

elements of Greek nationalism arising at that time. More and more the latter swelled out: an attitude of union with Greek supremacy and oppressing the other nations became the determining element of the idea until its existence, the Greek – Turkish population exchange in 1923. The Megali Idea was a nationalist idea which aimed that the Greek state conquered the eastern and western coast of the Aegean Sea enlarging with the city of Constantinople. Its system of arguments stood on three pillars: on historical, which emphasized the several-hundred-year-old Greek past of the Byzantine Empire, on ethnic, which exaggerating the importance of Greek presence<sup>12</sup>, and on the security strategy of Greece according to it the security of the country could be guaranteed only with the Greek control over the eastern and western costs of the Aegean Sea.<sup>13</sup>

As in many parts of Europe on the Balkan the nationalist ideologies neutralized the attempts of the different nations for peaceful cooperation and forming a federative state organization. This duality led to the form of the temporary unions of the Balkan Peninsula and to pursue a policy of disintegration<sup>14</sup>. After Greece gained its independence Thessalia, Epiros, Macedonia, Crete and other isles on the Aegean Sea went on their fight for independence, the former rebels arranged armed bands and crossed the Turkish borders. Many secret organizations, committees and brotherhood societies formed with anti-Turkish aims. One of them was Janis Makrijanis' organization, "For the Liberalization of the other part of Turkey" or the other one was the "Philortodox Organization"<sup>15</sup> led by Georgias Kapodistrias, the younger brother of Joannis Kapodistrias who was the first governor of the modern Greece. The flare up of the eastern crisis between 1839-1841 was a good opportunity to solve or at least to attempt to solve the Greek national question. At this time Alexandros Rangavis tried to unite the Greek conceptions with the intention of reciprocal agreement among the Balkan people and became the representative of the Balkan Federation. His ideas were similar to Rigas', in a proclamation he also turned to all "Greek outside" who lived in Thessalia, Ipiros, Trachea, Macedonia and also to the Albanian Christians and all the Muslims under the rule of the Ottoman Empire to unite for fighting for freedom. The fight would have struggled for forming a sovereign state on the Balkan of which citizens would have been equal apart from their national and religious affiliation<sup>16</sup>. The two conditions, to make the orthodox religion official and to introduce Greek language would have resulted Greek dominance in the state. It can be clearly seen

<sup>12</sup> At the end of the nineteenth century 2,5 – 2,7 million Greek lived under the authority of the Ottoman Empire. Except for the European territories most of them could be found in Constantinople and its surroundings, in Smyrna and its surroundings and on the southern costline of the Black Sea. As to the whole territory of Asia Minor the rate of Greek population was lower, it was not even close to the relative majority that was the reason why the exaggeration of the real facts was needed.

<sup>13</sup> For more details about the Great Ideas see:

Διμήτρι Κιτσίκι: *Συγκροτική Ιστορία Ελλάδας Τουρκία στο 20.ο αιώνα*, Αθήνα, 1978, (Dimitri Kiciki: *Compiler Greek-Turkish History in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*), pp. 135-145.

Ελλην Σκοπετεια: *Το Προτυπο Βασίλειο και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα*, Αθήνα, 1988, (Elli Skopotea: *The 'Type Kingdom' and the Great Idea*), pp. 249-361.

<sup>14</sup> Hasiotis: p. 20

<sup>15</sup> Todorov: p. 33

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* p. 35



that although officially these plans would have been realized on the basement of national and religious equality the Greek leading role was not questioned. The Big Brotherhood was established in 1843 with the intention of the liberation of the people of the peninsula and creating the Balkan federation. The organization activated again during the revolution wave of 1848 to realize the federative state of all Christians living in the Balkan and this would have been orthodox. The anti-Muslim attitude is shown in the motto of the organization: Ortodoxia against Islam – cross against the half-moon, and its emblem the Saint Grail holding by two hands symbolizing the unity of the Greeks and Serbians<sup>17</sup>. The Brotherhood of the Announced existed between 1849 and 1853, its aims were similar to Rigas' Declaration of Human Rights but in the ways of realization it was much more radical than Rigas, according to it the liberation of the people of the peninsula was considered to achieve with weapons. From 1851 special armed corps were set up, called the "Battalion of the Immortals"<sup>18</sup>. Their aim was to attain the freedom of all Greeks, but it was not determined who belonged to this "all Greeks" group. Probably it meant the whole Balkan so "Greek" was a geographical definition. Many Eastern European emigrant, who arrived in Greece after the revolution of 1848-1849 was defeated, joined to the organization. In that way Middle Eastern European federalist ideas had a direct effect to the Greek political thinking such as Giuseppe Mazzini or the idea of the Danubian Federation.

Summing up it can be said that the federalist ideas of the first part of the nineteenth century had general deficiencies and weakness for example they did not clearly define the geographical borders, the ethnic structure of the federation and the geographical terminology was mixed with those one that related to national, besides they did not determine who would have been equal in the state. All the Greek federative plans of the 1840s thought that the Greeks had the right to obtain the role of leaders over the united nations of Balkan<sup>19</sup>. The 1850s was a turning point in the Greek policy, after the Greek king Otto I and the highest diplomats oriented to Russia, thanked to the activity of the "Russian Party"<sup>20</sup> coming to power in 1848. Since that point the realization of the Great Idea came to front, the Greek press and essay writers wrote about the rebirth of the Byzantine Empire that was justified with "historical facts", such as the continuous presence of the Greek since the ancient times up to nowadays.

The direction of the Greek policy offered neutrality in wars and with the help of the Western European great powers tried to realize a great Greek state which would have

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid. p. 37

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. p. 43

<sup>19</sup> So they failed to realize the Greek leadership based on the legitimization of the Byzantine Empire and the Macedonian World Empire of Alexander the Great and which, at this time, was combined with the Greek dominance of the orthodox religion and the important role of the Greek language in education and liturgy.

<sup>20</sup> After the establishment of the sovereign Greece the country had three protectors – Russia, Great Britain, France – who could intervene in the home affairs and put pressure on the political and economic life. Until the War of Crimea the political parties formed around the consulates of the three great powers in Greece – Russian Party, English Party, French Party – and with the help and the support of the three great powers tried to come to power at this time.

replaced the Ottoman Empire. Although with different background the conception would have given an answer to the Southern Slavic and Russian problems, too. The federalist ideas of the 1850s wanted to stop the Russian and Southern Slavic European expansion with the restoration of ancient Greek glory and empire. Of course it combined with the assurance of the Greek hegemony on the territories of the Ottoman Empire and the solving the Eastern Question. The proclamation published nameless in 1854 in the periodical *Ellinismos* with the title 'The Greeks and the Russian Dominance'<sup>21</sup> was a good example for this. Despite Russia, at least until the War of Crimea, was considered as the orthodox supporter of the Greek territorial demands, the enemy of the Ottoman Empire more and more the Russian foreign policy sharply thought that its Balkan influence could be increased with supporting the Balkan Slavs – Serbs, Bulgarians – so it took up the position against the Greek spreading<sup>22</sup>.

The common features in the conceptions of the '50s that without any condition they believed in the mission of civilization and history of the Greeks in Southeastern Europe at the expense of taking away the own national identity of other nations. Rattos' plan belongs to this groups of conceptions, he would have formed an Eastern Confederation uniting twelve kingdoms with Constantinople as free city in the center<sup>23</sup>. The twelve kingdoms are: the Turkish Empire – with Syria, Palestine, the Arabian Peninsula, Egypt, Tripoli, Tunisia, with Cairo or Alexandretta in the center – the Eastern Confederation – which unites the emergent small Minor Asian territories with Armenia – the Kingdom of Greece – Greece, Albania, Thessalia, Macedonia – the State of Moldova and Vlach – with sovereign prince – Serbia – with a sovereign prince; Bosnia-Herzegovina in one or two states with one or two princes; Montenegro, Bulgaria and Rumelia; Kingdom of Armenia with Erzurum; two small Greek kingdoms in Minor Asia: Pontus and the coastline of Minor Asia.

<sup>21</sup> Probably written by Konstantinos Dosios. See Todorov p 49

<sup>22</sup> The most important, continuously in phocus Russian foreign policy was the aspiration for gaining and possessing a warm sea harbour and control over the Straits to assure its hegemony on the Mediterranean Sea. Under the reign of Tzarina Catherine II 1762-1796 managed to get the harbour of Kerc on the Crimea Peninsula winning the Russian – Turkish war between 1768-1774. The Peace Treaty of Kucuk-Kajnardzsa they gained a warm sea harbour and its right of the Russian ships crossing the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and its protectorate over the orthodox living in Ottoman territory was recognized. This policy went on in the nineteenth century, in 1844 in London Tzar Nicholas I offered the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire to England – of course the Straits would have been possessed by Russia – and repeated it in 1852. After refusing the latter offer the War of Crimea broke out and Russia had an active Balkan foreign policy. For more about Russian foreign policy see: Gecse Gustáv: *Bizáncról Bizáncig. Epizódok az orosz pánszlávizmus történetéből* (From Bizanc to Bizanc. Pages from the History of the Russian Panslavism), Interetnica, Budapest, 1965, pp. 15-114.

<sup>23</sup> Todorov: pp. 55-58

The blockade of the great powers at Pireus prevented Greece from profiting from the Crimean War<sup>24</sup>, but because of the effects of this war the Hatt-I Humajun introduced in February, 1856 gave the right of citizenship to the Greeks living in the territory of the Ottoman Empire, after it in the field of economy they came to leading position on the Balkan. The federalist conceptions of the 1860s – 1870s followed the contemporary European tendencies as in this period many theories like this was born, especially in the Habsburg Empire, in Italy and on the Balkan, where the nationalist endeavors appeared very strongly such as the federative theories of Lajos Kossuth.

Since the end of the 1860s with the help of Garibaldi a group of the Greek rebels arranged different committees all over Greece and in the regions under the Ottoman Empire. The nets of these committees were established on the Ion Isles and had connections with Montenegrin and Hungarian groups<sup>25</sup>. At the beginning of the 1860s Ilija Garašanin<sup>26</sup> and the Greek nationalist thinkers had a conversation about a probable cooperation to form an Eastern, Christian state. The state would have consisted of four kingdoms: Greece – with Thessalia, Epiros, Macedonia and the isles of the Aegean Sea – Serbia – with Bosnia, Herzegovina, Upper Albania and Montenegro – Bulgaria – with indefinite borders – Deacon Kingdom – with Wallachia and Moldavia. Of course the controversies of the nationalist doctrine of the two partners made the negotiations difficult and finally the plan was not ratified<sup>27</sup>. The Serbian policy wanted to achieve a strong Serbian state on the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire, which could have been appeared against the exaggerated influence of the great powers. To realize it the agents continued their propaganda and their secret diplomatic activity in the Balkan provinces. Every act taken in order to realize this plan was against in one hand the spreading Greek policy and on the other hand the intention to form the Balkan Confederation. "The Serbian state was established, but it has to strengthen and spread. The roots of the state, the firm basis can be found in the Serbian Empire of the thirteenth and fourteenth century and in the rich and glorious historic past. It is well known from the Serbian history that the Serbian emperors started to break the rate of progress of the Greek empire and almost managed to defeat it. If it would have happened the a Serbian – Slavic Empire had replaced the destroyed Eastern Roman Empire. The great Tzar Dusan<sup>28</sup> took over the coat

<sup>24</sup> After the Crimean War the political parties which connected to the consulates of great powers in Greece were divided when the war proved that the great powers would not support the Greek aspirations to enlarge its territory.

<sup>25</sup> Todorov p. 64

<sup>26</sup> Ilija Garašanin 1812-1874 was the most significant politician of Serbia in the nineteenth century. In 1837 he became the chief commander of the Serbian army then he was the Minister of Interior between 1843 – 1852 and the Minister of Interior and Prime Minister between 1860 – 1868. In 1844 – in the same year when the Greek Great Idea was drafted – he introduced the secret documentary of Serbian national and foreign policy called The Plan – Načertanije.

<sup>27</sup> For more see later.

<sup>28</sup> Under the reign of Stefan Dusan 1331-1355 the Serbian state achieved its largest medieval expansion and its golden age. He managed to expand his reign to the Albanian territories, Macedonia, Ipiros, Thessalia and Serbia grew the largest state of the Balkan in this period. In 1346 he was crowned the Tzar and Emperor of the Serbians.

of arms of the Greek Empire. The turn up of the Turkish this change came to grief and for a long time this progress was slowed up. But now after the power of Turkish collapsed, it can be said destroyed, the same spirit must be revive and demand its right and the interrupted progress must go on."<sup>29</sup>

The federalist idea based on the cooperation of the Balkan nations, with the aim of gaining independence. In this time both Greece and Serbia admitted that separately they were not strong enough to against the military potency of the Ottoman Empire and they needed for the help of the other Balkan nations. The failure of the uprising on Crete between 1866-1869 led the official Greek policy toward the living peacefully side by side with the Ottoman Empire – just like during the Crimean war – and the tendency of confrontation with the Turkish Empire was pushed into the background<sup>30</sup>. This tendency was strengthen by since 1870s worse and worse relationship with Bulgaria. When the Bulgarian exarchate was established in 1870 it put an end to the religious dispute and led to the total break off of the Greek – Bulgarian relationship. Most of the Greeks were convinced by the official Greek foreign policy that the Great Idea only can be realized with the help of the Turkish, keeping the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire against the Slavic and Bulgarian endeavors. From this moment the Great Idea did not meant the reorganization of the Byzantine Empire but, first of all on the part of those conservative groups who lived under the Ottoman authority, to form a Greek – Turkish dualist state. It was considered as the most effective way of solving the problems of the Greeks<sup>31</sup>. Such a conception was the plan of Cleantis Scallieri, a banker of Thessaloniki, who imagined a multinational state from the nations of the Ottoman Empire, to be built on the principles of a Greek-Turkish integration and democracy.<sup>32</sup> The uprising in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1875 did not change the tendency of the Greek foreign policy and the Greek press continuously emphasized that the Greek interests wished to cultivate good relationship with the Turkish Empire and completed and supported this policy with an anti-Slavic campaign. In the point of view of the whole Greek society the Bulgarian uprising in April, 1876 and the declaration of war sent from Serbia and Montenegro to the Turkish Empire had bigger effect. Then the Greek press encouraged the revision of the Greek foreign policy and the rapprochement to Slavs demanding the participation in the anti-Turkish struggle. The reasons of the political change was that on the Greek side more and more people thought that the anti-Slav policy excluded Greece from the revolutionary events of the Balkan, and in the case of a Balkan triumph it would be impossible for Greece to realize its ambitions in the region. Because of these effects the official Greek policy had to maneuver between two tendencies. While King George I and the Greek

<sup>29</sup> Načertanije. A szerb nemzet- és külpolitika titkos dokumentuma (Document for the Serbian Secret Ethnic and Foreign Policy), Documenta Historica, Szeged, p. 13, Translated by Szajcsán Éva

<sup>30</sup> This peaceful living side by side with the Turkish Empire served the interest of the British foreign policy as the British wanted to keep the status quo on the Balkan and to protect the territorial integration of the Ottoman Empire first of all to stop the southeastern Russian expansion.

<sup>31</sup> The dualist idea was not the unique idea of the Greeks, at this time the Bulgarians also introduced a plan for a Bulgarian Turkish state.

<sup>32</sup> Todorov p. 88

government insisted on the western orientation, neutrality and good relation with the Porte, could not have left the demand of the Greek society to join to the Balkan revolution movements and to realize the Great Idea with armed clashes out of consideration. Therefore the Greek government, although it was not committed in a war against the Turkish Empire, supported the secret revolutionary organizations and their armed activity outside the borders of the country.

The federative conceptions of the 1860s-1870s appeared as the possible solution of the Eastern Question. After its founder plan in 1865<sup>33</sup> the secret organization, the Democratic Eastern Federation was formed in Belgrade with the similar aims. The aim of the organization was to found the federation of Montenegro, Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, the Turkish Empire and Armenia. The organization was founded after the conceptions of Guiseppe Mazzini, probably with his personal participation in Switzerland, where a period was published with the same title<sup>34</sup>. The period in June, 1869 published the official program of the organization and that took it. The aim was to establish an Eastern Confederation and it could be possible not with revolutionary, armed way, but with the natural democratization of the society<sup>35</sup>. The idea of the Balkan federation and generally all conceptions of European federation was very popular in the second part of the nineteenth century in Europe. Good example was the Paneuropean Congress in Lausanne in 1869 where the first article of the program drafted that creating a European United States was the only alternative to make peace on the continent. The Democratic Eastern Federation maintain relationship with Pasha Midhat<sup>36</sup> and in order to propagate his aims Panagiotis Panas founded the "Rigas Society"<sup>37</sup> in Athens in 1875.

In the last third of the nineteenth century the Greek foreign policy, adjusting to the possibilities of the new international circumstances, many times tried to approach through diplomatic channels to the other Balkan small nations<sup>38</sup>. Harilos Trikupis the Minister of Foreign Affairs of this period and Ilija Garašanin the Prime Minister of Serbia on 14<sup>th</sup> August, 1867 signed a treaty between Serbia and Greece about a possible division of the territories of the Ottoman Empire. In accordance with this treaty Serbia would have got

<sup>33</sup> Hasiotis p. 21

<sup>34</sup> Todorov pp 102-103

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. p. 103

<sup>36</sup> Pasha Midhat 1822-1883 helped to work out the new Ottoman administrative law in 1864 and during his second great *vezir*-ship the Constitution of 1876 was introduced. For more see: Csombor Erzsébet: *Kísérletek az Oszmán Birodalom megmentésére a 20. század elején* (Attempts to the Survivorship of the Ottoman Empire on the Beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century). In *Limes*, 2000/2-3, p. 245

<sup>37</sup> Panagiotis Panas 1832-1896 was the most influential member of the Democratic Eastern Federation and published a period called Rigas to propagate his national ideas. For more about the Rigas Society see: Todorov: *Greek Politics in the '70s of the Nineteenth Century and the Idea of the Balkan Federation* pp. 108-110; Hasiotis pp. 24-31

<sup>38</sup> For more details about the foreign political attempts see:

Λαζαράκις, Σ. Θ.: *Διπλωματική Ιστορία της Ελλάδος, 1821-1914*, Αθήνα, 1947. (Lazarkis: *Diplomatic History of Greece 1821-1914*) pp. 120-215.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Greece Ipiros and Thessalia<sup>39</sup>. A complementary protocol was also signed as Crete would join to Greece. This was the first time when the Christian states of the Balkan tried to realize their national endeavor with joining their forces. According to the treaty the war against the Ottoman Empire should have been started in March, 1868. Trikupis thought that a war like this would activate the Bulgarians, too, so a Greek-Serbian-Bulgarian alliance could be formed against the Turkish. And this alliance could be enlarged with Montenegro and Romania. In 1867 the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs traveled to Bucharest in order to negotiate about a possible alliance but he did not succeed. The reconciliation with Serbia was much more successful, in February, 1868 a Greek-Serbian military treaty was signed, although the Serbian king, Michael I changed his mind soon and did not wished to cooperate with the Greeks any more.<sup>40</sup> In the 1890s Trikupis as a Prime Minister<sup>41</sup> continued his policy started in the 1860s, tried to realize the Greek-Serbian alliance but to compensate the anti-Greek activity of the Bulgarians. At that time Serbia had serious territorial claims, and he expressed it when Trikupis visited Belgrade in 1891. On the negotiations Serbia recognized the rights of Greece to the city of Thessaloniki and its surroundings but demanded Monstir, Bitola and Castoria in exchange for it.<sup>42</sup> The Serbian king, Alexander I visited Athens in 1896 but at this time there was a change in the Greek policy, for Delijannis, the Prime Minister and for Alexandros Skouzes, the Minister of Foreign Affairs the Cretan question had priority and they did not have the opportunity of making an alliance with Serbia with which they let the opportunity of the settlement of the Macedonian territories. After the beaten Greek-Turkish war in 1897 Skouzes changed his foreign policy and tried to make a Greek-Turkish alliance, which had real result, in 1903 the two countries signed a commercial contract.<sup>43</sup> To have closer relationship with Serbia was prevented by the change of the inner and foreign policy, as after Milan Obranic came to power, who was against the Greek interests with his Russian friendly policy and made the rapprochement difficult between the two countries. At this time Greece tried to get as much support as it was possible and to set conflict with negotiations so in this context there were negotiations with Romania, too. The Romanian-Greek rapprochement came to its realization in 1900 with signing a commercial contract and in May, 1901 George the

<sup>39</sup> Treaty of Voslau, Lazarkis pp 121-122 Both partners moderated their claims for territories, later they aimed to gain new territories.

<sup>40</sup> The importance of the treaty, despite it was not realized, was that it first put a contract between two nations down and the endeavors are similar to the pre Balkan War diplomatic manoeuvre on the Balkan. Lazarkis pp. 187-188

<sup>41</sup> Harilaos Trikupis (1832-1896) was the Prime Minister of Greece seven times: 1878; 1880; March, 1882 to April, 1886; May, 1886 to November, 1890; 1892; 1893-1895. In his program he emphasized the inner development in opposition of his rival Theodoros Deligiannis. The British government supported Trikupis policy, which was based on the status quo. Deligianis 1826-1905 was the Prime Minister of Greece between 1885-1887; 1890-1892; 1902-1903; 1904-1905, his program based on foreign political activity, he aimed the territorial growth and the realization of the Great Idea.

<sup>42</sup> Lazarakis pp. 187-188

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. p. 204

King of Greece and Charles the King of Romania discussed the improvement of the bilateral relationship. Unfortunately it was not successful because there was a strong Vlach propaganda in Macedonia with the support of Romania. Because of the Vlach conflict Romania abrogated the commercial treaty of 1900 and Athens broke off the diplomatic relations with Bucharest.<sup>44</sup> So by the end of the nineteenth century, at the beginning of the twentieth century in spite of every diplomatic trials the Greek diplomacy was isolated and came up against the foreign political endeavors of the other Balkan nations, and these facts made the revision of the foreign policy necessary.

At the end of the nineteenth century the most urgent task of the Greece foreign policy was still to set the national affair, which concentrated in the Macedonian question and led to draft many political programs in the Greek political thinking. After the Greek leaders recognized that they cannot defeat the declining but still strong Ottoman Empire, many possibilities and policies turned up as alternatives in the Greek political thinking. It was one possibility to bide the its time when the change of the policy of the great powers in the Eastern Question would help the realization of the Greek national interests. The thought of approaching to one great power emerged and that great power would support the change in the status quo of the Balkan Peninsula, certainly with taking consideration the Greek interests. Finally one possible solution cooperation with the other Balkan nations omitting the great powers would have set the ethnic questions in the region. Up to the international situations and adjusting to the international balance of forces one or the other policy came to the front, was emphasized. In the consequence of the Congress of Berlin<sup>45</sup>, 1878 and the unambiguous policy of the great powers to remain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire the Greek policy propagated the reconciliation with Turkish. Parallel with it in the 1880s, 1890s the conceptions in connection with the great idea was still the part of the official Greek policy. The ideological elements of the idea went through changes and it did not mean the establishment of a Byzantine Empire replacing the Ottoman Empire any more as it was mentioned above, but it worked out a limited program concerning on Athens and region around Aegean. This also meant that with drawing up a more real national aim the support of the idea increased significantly. The policy of forming the Balkan federation were never been able to capture as much support and popularity as the great idea, thus it influenced some parts of the Greek society, first of all the intelligentsia. The new circumstances after the crisis of the mid 1870s impressed the representatives of the federation and they reshaped the content of the theory. There was no connection between the movement of national-liberalism and the followers of the federation any more. The establishment of the sovereign Bulgaria changed the situation, the thought of the union, the fight against the "public enemy" disappeared. It can be seen clearly from the above

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid. p. 208

<sup>45</sup> The conference after the Balkan Crisis 1877-1878 got together first in San Stefano in March, 1878 where the establishment of Great Bulgaria was announced. With the establishment of the southern Slavic state the influence of Russia woul have increased in the region therefore in July, 1878 another conference got together in Berlin where the former treaty was revised and Bulgaria was divided into three parts. Even the possibility of the establishment of a southern Slavic state evoked violent feelings in Greece and strenghtened the rapprochement to the Porte.

mentioned facts impressed by the actual foreign political constellations and change of balance of forces the Greek foreign policy reacted immediately, so it is possible to talk about official foreign programs and endeavors but these appeared together and it is difficult to draw a dividing line between them. In opposition with Greeks living in the Greek Kingdom the Greeks who lived on the other side and had democratic attitude supported the idea of the Balkan federation, because they saw the solution of the Eastern Question in it. In this relation the most significant organization of the end of the nineteenth century was founded in Paris with the leadership of Pavlos Argyriades called Federative League of the Balkan<sup>46</sup>. The league would have condensed Greeks, Bulgarians, Romanians, Serbs, Albanians, Armenians. The aim was to overthrow the Ottoman Empire on Balkan and in Minor Asia and form a sovereign Eastern Federation consisted of nine federative states. The nine states were: Greece with Crete; Bulgaria; Romania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Montenegro; Albanian-Macedonia; Trachea with Constantinople as a free city and the capital of the federation; Armenia; Minor Asia with the coastline. According to the thinkers of this theory a federation like this would be able to protect the sovereignty and political autonomy of the states of the Balkan and Minor Asia from an expansion from the west or the east. They expected the solution of the ethnical conflicts from this federation. That is the reason why they would have formed a sovereign Albanian Macedonia of which division would turned the neighboring nations and countries against each other but it seemed to be avoidable if it was a sovereign state and the other nations could gather around it. They emphasized the principles of equality, each state would get own inner autonomy and own government while the common problems would be solved in Constantinople by a common body of delegates sent by every states. The main role of this body of delegates would be to maintain the relationship among the states and to protect from the intervention of the foreigners. The league did not existed for a long time and did not influenced the policy of the Balkan states as it popularized the idea of the Balkan federation in Western Europe.

The form of the Albanian-Macedonian<sup>47</sup> state as the sovereign, equal member and core of a federative union was also imagined by the most important society of the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the Oriental Confederation with Dimitrios N. Bocaris<sup>48</sup>, presidency and Leonidas Voulgaris' influential activity. The society was founded in

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<sup>46</sup> Todorov, 1995: pp. 117-119

<sup>47</sup> After the Congress of Berlin of 1878 the ethnic questions of the Balkan were partly solved – the establishment of the Bulgarian Principality, the emergence of Serbia and Romania, the territorial growth of Greek with Thessalia and some parts of Epiros in 1881 – therefore ethnic conflicts could become more acute in connection with the territories under Ottoman authority waiting for the liberation such as Macedonia, Trachea, and the Albanian territories. The peaceful division of the mixed populated Macedonia seemed unimaginable that was the reason why the conception of sovereignty was born. The Balkan politicians fought in two fronts: on one hand against the Ottoman authority and on the other hand against the other Balkan state for the forming and gaining sphere of influence based on ethnic, language and religion. The latter led to bloody events on the Balkan at the beginning of the twentieth century.

<sup>48</sup> Previously Bocaris was the Minister of War and the king's aide-de-camp.



Athens in August, 1884<sup>49</sup> and for more than one decade it had been the most remarkable representative and supporter of the Balkan federation. About the foundation of the society first people could read in the *Ustavnost*<sup>50</sup> a Serbian period of Belgrade, which in the issue of 13<sup>th</sup> September, 1884 informed about the publishment of a period of Athens called the Oriental Confederation<sup>51</sup> and some days later it wrote about the foundation of a society with the same name. The rules of the society was accepted on 29<sup>th</sup> October, 1884. The central committee resided in Athens presided over a big, general organization, over the Oriental Confederation which would unite small societies similar to this in Greece, on the Balkan and elsewhere. The first article of the constitution defined the aspirations of the society: "The total agreement with other similar societies, the cooperation in efforts to found an Oriental Confederation society among the states of the Balkan against foreign authority".<sup>52</sup> The society would like to realize its aims without uprisings and clashes, to diffuse its conceptions with publishing and distributing issues and declarations. The president of the society was Dimitrios N. Bocaris, the seal of the society was an eagle holding a snake in its talons and a ribbon in its bill which said "In Union There Is Strength".<sup>53</sup> The leaders were active, influential Greek intelligentsia having political past and did not support the aggressive policy of the economically important groups which intended to solve the home and foreign political problems with power. The society had influential Bulgarian, Montenegrin, Serbian and Romanian politicians among its members, too<sup>54</sup>. They would have liked to solve the Balkan conflicts from above with convincing through the press: the second step with developing an agreement among the governments of the Balkan states the treatment of the ethnic, national and territorial questions could be executed. Their final aim would have been to form a Paneuropean federation:

"You, Greeks, Albanians, Serbs, Romanians, Bulgarians, You, Greek, Slavic, Latin, Tartar People who live on the lands bordered by three seas – the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Adriatic Sea – and are dispersed from the Alps and the Carpathians to Crete and Cyprus, Unite!"<sup>55</sup>

The society was in contact with among others influential Serbian, Bulgarian, Romanian and Montenegrin politicians. The society sent agitators to the Albanian, Macedonian territories to popularize its program focused on Balkan union and to distribute its issue. The actual Prime Minister Harilaos Trikupis distanced himself and the official Greek policy from the Oriental Confederation of which members, in his opinion, tried to form an anti-Turkish alliance turning to, above all, Macedonia and Albania. The

<sup>49</sup> Hasiotis p. 52

<sup>50</sup> The period was published from 1884 to 1886 edited by Sime Popovic. For more information see: Todorov, Varban: *The Society „Oriental Confederation”* p. 532

<sup>51</sup> Todorov, 1995: p. 120

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* p. 121

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.* p. 122, Todorov: *The Society „Oriental Confederation”* p. 530

<sup>54</sup> For example the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pasić 1845-1926 and the Romanian Prime Minister Ion Brătianu 1860-1910 were the members. Hasiotis p.55

<sup>55</sup> Todorov: *Greek Politics in the 70s of the Nineteenth Century and the Idea of Balkan Federation*, p. 107

Porte as a subversive activity banned the publishing and the distribution of its issue in the European province. Meanwhile in December, 1885 H. Rumbold the English Ambassador in Athens sent an information to his government about the meeting of Vulgaris, the leader of the society and Theodoros Deligiannis, the Prime Minister of Greece and their negotiation about a campaign of forming an alliance of Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro against the Turkish Empire.<sup>56</sup> The Prime Minister of Greece denied it and the report were not confirmed from other sources so it was forgotten. In many speech and declaration the society emphasized that the Eastern Question was getting farther and farther from the solution because the problems were set with wars and dynastic ambitions. In their opinion the solution would be if a Balkan federation was realized which assured freedom and sovereignty to the small Balkan states.<sup>57</sup> The great Balkan federation would be a match for the expansion of the great powers and would force back their expansive policy in the region. They saw it very clearly that their plan could be easily impeded by determining great powers of region, like Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the Turkish Empire, Russia that was the reason why in their each issue they endeavored for emphasizing their aggressive, offensive with the interest of the Balkan states and nations policy. Among the great powers the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy was considered the most dangerous because of its Balkan interests. The article published in 1885 proved this as it reminded of the imminence threatening the members and the sympathizers of the society – persuasion and the arrestments – from not only the Ottoman Empire but showed the difficulties that revealed from Austria and the certain groups of Greece against the society.<sup>58</sup> It refused the attacks of the Austrian and Greek press which stated that the society prevented from the realization of their successful Balkan policy. The article ended with an appeal “every noble thinking and freedom loving people” to join to the society and to support totally the Balkan federation.<sup>59</sup> The society was in need of supporters as its ideological and political program was frankly against the aspirations of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire conflicting endeavoring to consolidation and enforcement on the Balkan. It was not a coincidence that the period of the Oriental Federation was banned by the Ottoman authorities in Macedonia and Albania after three issues.<sup>60</sup> Parallel with it the Greek government circles sharply criticized the activity of the society. They had ambivalent attitude in connection with the Ottoman Empire on one hand they openly condemned the policy of the Porte which excited the conflicts among the nations of the Balkan on the other hand in a declaration the society turned to the Turkish Empire offering cooperation and assuring its position in the alliance if it changed its policy. In their opinion in the alliance the Turkish Empire could assure its sovereign existence while

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<sup>56</sup> Todorov, 1995: p. 125

<sup>57</sup> It cannot be left out of consideration that the political thinking of the nineteenth century thought only the large expanded states viable. That is the reason why in the period there were so many federative conceptions which would guarantee the appropriate expansion and also the sovereignty and the autonomy of the nations.

<sup>58</sup> Todorov: The society „Oriental Confederation” p. 531

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. p. 531

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. p. 535

in other case it could get under the influence of Austria and the other great powers whose aim was to control and divide its territories. In 1888 the society appealed in which the idea of agreement of the Serbs, Romanians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Albanians, Turkish was emphasized to solve peacefully the Macedonian question. In their activity they laid stress on avoiding any Balkan states becoming dominant. When they were talking about the federation of the Balkan states the nations living under the Ottoman authority did not escaped their attention, their conception was not restricted to only the independent states of the Balkan. The society supported the freedom movements of any nations inside the Ottoman borders.<sup>61</sup> Following the political developments of the contemporary Europe the Balkan federation was not only an idea but also a drawn up political program. All the states would have preserve its national character and would have had a political autonomy in the federation. It would have been possible to follow its own tendency in foreign affairs but the federation would have functioned as a military union, too. In the structure of the future federation the states would have been politically independent with inner autonomy and only the common "incomes and outcomes" would have determined with common decision.<sup>62</sup> The Committee established local offices all over the Balkan – Sophia, Belgrade, Bucharest, Athens – and arranged regular meetings in the capital where they discussed the constitution plan of the federation and they got to the model of the system of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy as an example to follow with common parliament but with the assurance of the preservation of the national identity and the political autonomy.<sup>63</sup> Although the Oriental Confederation made difference between "state" and "nation" but it did not use these definitions unambiguously and the official deed of foundation talked about the federation of the states of the Balkan but in their social appeal it talked to the nations of the Balkan.<sup>64</sup> The role of the Turkish Empire could come up if it could be acceptable as the member of the federation, or its leader and it is a question of which an unambiguous answer is difficult to give, but the Turkish nation participated in the appeal as a possible member. The destiny of Macedonia was also problematic as it was

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. pp. 532-533

<sup>62</sup> Todorov, 1995: pp. 129-130

<sup>63</sup> Todorov: The Society „Oriental Confederation” p. 532

<sup>64</sup> The society took consideration those Balkan nations which lived under the Ottoman authority not only the independent ones. Using these definitions it cannot be left out of consideration that at the thinker of the nineteenth century – at least in this region – some definitions such as „federation” and „confederation” were mixed, were not clearly divided.

Federation: alliance of states which memberstates established a new states. They independently conduct their home affairs, justice, education and taxes but gave up their sovereignty as their foreign, war and financial affairs get under common conduction. The citizens of the federated states are the citizens of the federation and not the members of each state.

Confederation: the allied states keep their sovereignty, the executive branch is made up with members delegated by the memberstates and not confederative government above all memberstates. The people who live on the territory of the confederation are not citizens of the confederation but the citizens of their own sovereign states. Cf. Mérey Gyula: *Föderációs tervek Délkelet-Európában és a Habsburg Monarchiában 1840-1918* (Federative Plans in South-Eastern Europe and the Hapsburg Monarchy 1840-1918). Kossuth Kiadó, Budapest, 1965, p. 14.



the source of conflict among the nations of the federation. The conceptions emerged one with a common agreement about the division of Macedonia and another with integrating Macedonia as an equal member.<sup>65</sup> The first conception would sharpen the oppositions of territorial interests of the Balkan states and easily led to war that was the reason why the latter one was supported in order to avoid the possible conflicts. In the 1890s the Balkan union of the Oriental Confederation was welcomed on Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania and the Turkish Empire. Its political program was worked out by the Greek intelligentsia who were against the nationalist policy of the Greek government and also against the expansive Balkan policy of the great powers. They wanted to assure the political stability in the region with a viable, large territorial state. They were aware of the ambitions and plans of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy and the Turkish Empire that was why under the certain political conditions the society could not achieve political leadership even in the context of the Balkan and generally the European reality of the end of the nineteenth century the plan could seem utopistic. Anyway, it fits in the contemporary political way of thinking which considered the realization of the survive and assurance of sovereignty of the small nations with federative or confederative change against the ambitions of the states which were large territorial, politically and economically ranked among great powers and had active and expansive foreign policy and were determining in Middle and Southeastern Europe.

The beginning of the twentieth century created a new situation in the relation of the Balkan. The deadlock of the Macedonian question and the bloodier and bloodier appearance of it laid stress not on the federative form. The situation changed with the triumph of revolution of the Young Turks in 1908 and with the introduction of the Turkish constitution of 1876 again when for the last time once again the possibility of the union above the nations emerged with the reform of the Ottoman Empire. Unfortunately the in-depth study of this question exceeds the course of this essay.

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<sup>65</sup> The latter would have meant the establishment of a sovereign Macedonian-Albanian state as it was mentioned many times previously, around which the other states would have gathered.

## *Socialist standpoint in the Kuwait question, 1961-1963*

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Kuwait was not independent state until 19 June 1961, because Great Britain dominated its foreign affairs. However, the political changes of the region and the recovery of Kuwait's economy have made the agreement of the protectorate, signed in 1899 with Great Britain, obsolete by this time, which made the founding of the total sovereignty possible. The permission of the independence triggered out a conflict with Iraq, which influenced the international valuation of the new state in the Middle East.

The aim of the essay is to set forth the brief preliminaries of the independence, the events led to the sovereignty and the contracts made on this occasion, as well as to show the claims and the reasons of Iraq on Kuwait, and the reactions of Great Britain on these claims. Moreover, the essay is aimed at showing the standpoint of the socialist states – first of all that of the Soviet Union – on the conflict and their role in its solving.

### *Status of Kuwait until 1961*

Until 1961 the political life of the Emirate has dominated by the agreement between Great Britain and Kuwait signed in 1899. The treaty was signed on 23<sup>rd</sup> January by Sheikh Mubarak as-Sabah and Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm John Meade who was the political representative of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf.<sup>1</sup> According to this the Ruler of Kuwait

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<sup>1</sup> Mubarak as-Sabah Sheikh applied for defence by the British Government on 5<sup>th</sup> September 1897 because of the menacing Ottoman invasion. Although Great Britain had never recognised the claims of the Ottoman Empire on Kuwait, it decided to supply non-intervention policy. Its standpoint has changed only at the time when it became known Russia's desire to establish a coaling depot in the Kuwait-Basra area and build the Tripoli-Kuwait railway in Syria which was planned to continue through Iran to Russia. This plan, if it had been fulfilled, had made it possible for the rivals of Great Britain to get out through the buffer zone created around India. On the one hand the British intervention had been supported by the claim on the winding up of all kind of influence of Russia or other foreign powers; on the other hand the questioning of the Ottoman sovereignty in the area, the realisation of a closer control of piracy and slavery and the geographical conditions of Kuwait – it was a fair harbour, a possible railway terminus and a trade-route crossing point. Alghanim, Salwa: *The Reign of Mubarak Al-Sabah*. I.B. Tauris Publishers & Co. Ltd., London, 1998, pp. 39–81. Anscombe, Frederick, F.: *The Ottoman Gulf, The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1997, pp. 99–112; Busch, Briton Cooper: Britain and the Status of Kuwait 1896–1899. *Middle East Journal*. 21 (2) 1967, pp. 187–199; M. Szabó, Imre: *A véres gyöngyszem Kuvait*. Riportok, dokumentumok, Budapest, 1990, pp. 179–180.

committed himself in the name of his own and his descendants without the previous sanction and consent of the British Government:

- 1.) not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government at Kuwait or at any other place within the limits of his territory;
- 2.) not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, and give either for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power.<sup>2</sup>

Until the middle of the 1940s Kuwait was an economically underdeveloped territory where the inhabitants lived under miserable circumstances. The new era started on 30<sup>th</sup> June 1946 in Kuwait when Abdullah as-Salim as-Sabah Sheikh, Ruler of Kuwait, permitted to the companies from abroad to develop the oil of the country which meant that capital could inflow from abroad to Kuwait. Due to this, the amount of oil-exploration has reached 84 million tonne a year by 1960 according to which Kuwait has become the fourth greatest country of the world in oil-exploration after the USA, Venezuela and the Soviet Union.<sup>3</sup>

The prospering economical state of Kuwait made way for the independent leading of political affairs. On the one hand, before the 1960s the countries of the Arab League had attempted several times to achieve the joining of Kuwait to the organisation without any success. On the other hand, the ambitions of the Arab countries made it unambiguous for the government of Great Britain that some paragraphs of the contract of the protectorate had lost validity in the given situation and these are needed to be loosen.<sup>4</sup> Due to this that by 1960 the jurisdiction over the foreigners and several rights concerning the foreign affairs of the country felt within the competence of the government of the Emir.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> A letter from Lieutenant-colonel Malcolm John Meade to Sheikh Mubarak had been attached to the contract, in which the political representative informed the Ruler that the 15.000 rupees will be paid from the treasury in Bushire after the ratification of the Agreement, in the sense of the previous concord. At the end of his letter, Meade reminded the Sheikh that the details of the Agreement should remain secret or without the British Government's knowledge and assent could not be published. The contract had been ratified on 16<sup>th</sup> February 1899 on Great Britain's side. Agreement between the British Government and the Sheikh of Kuwait, 23 January 1899. In: *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents*. Edited by: Lauterpacht, E. CBE. – Greenwood, C. J. – Weller, Marc – Bethlehem, Daniel. Cambridge International Documents Series, Volume I., Cambridge, Grotius Publications Limited, 1991. pp. 9–10.

<sup>3</sup> The exploitation of the oil began in 1946 in the quarry in Bourgan-Magouaban, south from the capital. The total production was 12,4 million tonne in 1949, 69,5 million tonne in 1959 and in the first three month of 1961 it was 20,9 million tonne. His oil-reserve was estimated to 8,5 thousand million tonne, which was the equivalent of the 21% of the known world petroleum reserves. *Journal de Genève: Kuwait gazdasága. Cikkek a Nemzetközi Sajtóból*. VI. 53. p. 78.

<sup>4</sup> Kuwait joined an international organisation in April 1959 for the first time. By 13 June 1961, the country had been a member of six international organisations. M. Szabó, *A véres gyöngyszem Kuwait*, p. 176.

<sup>5</sup> Loesch, H. v.: Kuwait válaszüton. *Cikkek a Nemzetközi Sajtóból*. V. 81. p. 13.

*The refusal of the independence and the announcement of the claim of Iraq*

On 19<sup>th</sup> June 1961 Kuwait gained independence formally, too.<sup>6</sup> The note of W. H. Luce, the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, addressed to the Emir, constituted the formal basis of the independence. According to this, the government of Kuwait assumed responsibility for the leading of the home and foreign affairs of the country therefore:

- a) The Agreement of the 23<sup>rd</sup> of January, 1899 had been terminated because of its inconsistency with the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait,
- b) The relations between the two countries had to be governed by a spirit of close friendship in the future too,
- c) When appropriate the two Governments had to consult together on matters which concern them both,
- d) Her Majesty's Government affected his readiness to assist the Government of Kuwait in the future to the request of the Ruler of Kuwait.

Moreover, it had been announced that the contract loses validity 3 years after one of the contracting parties claims its cancellation.<sup>7</sup> The Emir accepted the conditions above in his reply note, which he sent back on the same day.<sup>8</sup>

After the declaration of independence, however, Kuwait came up against the neighbouring revolutionary country, Iraq.<sup>9</sup> On 24<sup>th</sup> June 1961 Abdul Karim Qassem Iraqi

<sup>6</sup> Although the control of the way towards India had been ignored for decades because of the need for the insurance of the routes, necessary for the exploitation of the oil in some newly discovered quarries in the Persian Gulf, the British troops must be allowed to garrison in the area. Due to this, for the defence of Kuwait and the other emirates, military garrison was stationed in Gibraltar, Malta, Benghazi, Cyprus, Nairobi, Aden and Bahrain. The maintenance of these was a huge financial burden and it caused an increasing deficit in the budget for Great Britain. To avoid the deficit there was only one possible way; the overseas bases had to be gradually wound up. Sablier, Édouard: *Úgy látszik Nagy-Britannia beletörődött a kuvaiti kérdés "arab megoldásába"*. *Cikkek a Nemzetközi Sajtóból*. VI. 63. p. 40.

<sup>7</sup> Exchange of Notes between Kuwait and Her Majesty's Government, 19 June 1961. In: Lauterpracht–Greenwood–Weller–Bethlehem, *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents*. pp. 50–51. o.

<sup>8</sup> Immediately after the signing of the new agreement between Great Britain and Kuwait, it has started the founding of the independent leading of the internal affairs. A Caretaker Government was established, a Constituent National Assembly gathered and it was decided that there will be an elections by January 1963. About the results, the constitution and the policies see more: Hopwood, Derek: *The Arabian Peninsula. Society and Politics*. London, 1972. pp. 37–40; M. Szabó, *A véres gyöngyszem Kuvait*, pp. 30–34. o.

<sup>9</sup> The Iraqi Republican Government had no territorial claims towards Kuwait between 1958–61. Moreover, it regarded Kuwait as an independent state, if it was about foreign affairs. The following facts served as evidence of all these: in December 1958 the Iraqi Government requested for the contribution of the Kuwaiti Government to establish a consulate and they put it clearly in the official letters to the government that Kuwait had never been part of Iraq. The two countries made a commercial agreement and published a common declaration – referring to the good relations between the two states – a month before the speech of Qassem in June 1961. The delegate from Iraq

president laid claim to Kuwait as it was the part of the South-Iraqi Basra province until the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. They claimed that the Agreement of 1899 concluded by the British Governor in Bushire in return for 15.000 rupees paid to the Kuwaiti Sheikh, was illegal so could not be considered as valid having been concluded without the knowledge of the Sultan of Istanbul. Due to this: „The Republic of Iraq has decided to protect the Iraqi people in Kuwait and to demand the land, arbitrarily held by imperialism, which belongs to the province of Basra ... We shall accordingly issue a decree appointing the Shaykh of Kuwait as a qa'imaqam of Kuwait, who will come under the authority of the Basra province ...”<sup>10</sup>

The claim of the Government was put down in form of an informing note and was sent to all of the foreign delegation residing in Iraq. It emphasized that:

„The Government of Iraq announces disclosing these facts to the Arab and international public opinion that Kuwait belongs to Iraq; furthermore, the Government confirms its resolution on the fight against the imperialism and by doing so, it expresses its conviction that the imperialism will be wipe out in Kuwait and in the other Arab countries. Moreover, the Government declares its certain decision to consistently insist on the founding of the unity of the Kuwaiti and Iraqi nations and the Government will not give up doing so until the realisation of the aim.”<sup>11</sup>

The ideological reason formulated in the speech could have served the resolution of three major problems from the Iraqi's side:

- 1) The demand on Kuwait had served the foundation of a stable state of the internal affairs, rather than some aims of foreign affairs;<sup>12</sup>
- 2) According to the New Statesman, 30 June the reason of the Iraqi measures was evoked by the stagnation of the oil-market, which went back to 1957, and the planned public nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company;<sup>13</sup>

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proposed to admit Kuwait in the International Labour Organisation, two weeks before the announcement of the Iraqi leader. On the initiative of Iraq, Kuwait was among the founding states of the Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries. Baghdad – within the Arab League – take part in the foundation of the Arab Bank and the Arab Airlines. Trevelyan, Humphrey: *The Middle East in Revolution*. London, 1970. pp. 183–184.

<sup>10</sup> Khadduri, Majid-Ghareeb, Edmund: *War in the Gulf, 1990–1991*. Oxford, 1997. p. 65.

<sup>11</sup> *Kuwaittal kapcsolatos iraki követelés*. 1961. augusztus 14. MOL KÜM TŰK XIX-J-1-j Irak 1945-64. 3. d. 5/bf-005692/szig.ttk/1961.

<sup>12</sup> After the revolution of 14 July 1958 vanished the previous hope in connection with the functioning of the new Iraqi Government. The formally made promises were not fulfilled: as for the internal affairs the offered agrarian reforms were performed only partially, the cost of leaving increased, the trade unions were either dissolved or merged with the unions founded and co-ordinated by the Government, the strikes were suppressed violently, the freedom of speech, gathering and the press had been previously premised, were withdrawn. The banning of the Communist Party led to the charge of the imperialism. The Kurd minority who at the beginning were ready to co-operate with the government turned against them. After the refusal of the joining up to Cairo, the groups supporting Nasser turned against the Iraqi Government. Under these conditions the issue of Kuwait was a great opportunity of not considering the tensed situation in the internal politics and to establish a national unity days before the third anniversary of the revolution. Rouleau, Eric: A kuwaiti ügy: időzített bomba. *Cikk a Nemzetközi Sajtóból*. VI. 58. pp. 77-78.



- 3) President Qassem has not given up with his ambition to become the leader of the whole Arab World or at least the part of it. For the sake of the cause, he did his best to appear to the whole Arab World to be the most committed follower of the fight against the imperialism.<sup>14</sup>

On 28<sup>th</sup> June – whereas the speech of Qassem was not more warlike than the other standpoints concerning Kuwait which are on the agenda since the 1930s<sup>15</sup> – the Emir has decreed extraordinary condition and mobilisation. On 30<sup>th</sup> June asked for military assistance from the British Government referring to the contract of Great Britain and Kuwait, after previously having informed the Arab Governments on the danger threatening his country. The fact of the coming attack from Iraq was questioned because:

- 1.) In so far as President Qassem had had the intention of annex Kuwait with violence, he could have done parallel to the press conference of 25 June by facing Great Britain with a *fait accompli* so the British Government could not have fulfilled its obligations to assistance they took on in the sense of the declaration of independence;

<sup>13</sup> The economy of Iraq depended exclusively on the incomes from the oil-exploitation fulfilled by the Iraq Petroleum Company as this was the single financial source of the government which could meet the increasing deficit in the budget and the realisation of the forced development plans. Therefore, the Iraqi Government put constantly pressure on the company to increase its share from the profit and influence of the IPC on the oil-market at Great Britain's expense. The lack of an independent industry hindered the break with Great Britain as an embargo led to an economic catastrophe in the country. The oil in Kuwait was not expensive, was near the sea, there were great reserves of oil; the exploitation and the refinement went on at the greatest speed in the area. It was economically highly important for Iraq to gain control over the oil industry on the one hand, the oil in Kuwait not being expensive, was menacing for Iraq, on the other hand, the control over the oil industry had secured a strong financial background, which made possible to diminish the dependence on the Western countries and to realize the development plans. Ligetfalvi, Gábor: *Petroleum and the interest of Great Powers in Iraq. Méditerran Tanulmányok/Études Sur La Région Méditerranéennes*, Vol. VIII. Université József Attila, Département d'Histoire Moderne et des Études Méditerranéennes, Szeged, 1998. pp. 13–14; New Statesman: *Mi az indítéka a kuwaiti ügynek? Cikk a Nemzetközi Sajtóból*. VI. 54. p. 74.

<sup>14</sup> Iraq previously gave financial assistance to Algeria and Oman to support revolutions there, which caused serious problems in the economy of the country. Qassem made several aggressive statements concerning the liberation of Palestine and the military training of hundreds of Palestinian soldiers in Iraq. *Kuwaittal kapcsolatos iraki követelés*. 1961. július 1. MOL KÜM TŰK XIX-J-1-j Irak 1945-64. 3. d. 5/bf-005692/szig.titk/1961.

<sup>15</sup> President Qassem – unlike his predecessor, Nuri Said – did not talk about the war, but emphasized the two states were depending on each other and that it would be of advantage from several points of view if the two countries were united. Among others, he offered his aid to supply Kuwait with drinking water: „Kuwait has always been a dry territory. We have offered several times to bring fresh water to Kuwait through pipeline but the imperialists never allowed the Sheikh to make use of it as they planed to bring some special machines and equipments to distil the sea-water. Kuwait ... is being the inseparable part of Iraqi Republic. As for the drinking water the Republic would solve the problems of Kuwait, moreover, it plans to establish schools and hospitals in Kuwait.” Wigg, George: *Mi az igazság Kuwait körül? Cikk a Nemzetközi Sajtóból*. VI. 58. p. 19.

- 2.) President Qassem was aware of the fact that supposing that his campaign is successful and he manages to occupy the territory, it would be avenged by Great Britain.<sup>16</sup>
- 3.) The President of Iraq was conscious of the fact that he could not count on any help from abroad if he began with a military activity or laid territorial claims. The danger of a possible confrontation with Great Britain ruled out all kind of assistance from the side of the Western Countries'. He could not count on the help of China or the Soviet Union, either, whose relations to Baghdad were quite stretching. Moreover, it was clear that it could not depend on any help from the countries in the Arab region as Qassem's rivalry with President Nasser for the leadership in the Arab World grew into a personal conflict. King Saud was friend and ally of the Emir of Kuwait and Hussein, king of Jordan could not have put up with the strengthening of the neighbouring anti-Hashemite Iraq.

In spite of this, Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, reacting on the Iraqi threatening and on the request of the Kuwaiti Emir stated: „Military strengthening and transport of weapons goes on in the district of Basra, according to several reports coming from various sources on 29<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> June. Under such circumstances, the ruler of Kuwait felt it being his obligation to make use of the urgent help from Great Britain in the sense of our exchange of notes. He did so in the morning of 30<sup>th</sup> June ... We had no other chance but to do as we did on that Friday.”<sup>17</sup>

Some of the troop movements began on 28<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> June, and finally on 1<sup>st</sup> July the more than six thousand strong British troops occupied the country, at the same time Saudi Arabia led a 1200 strong military group to the border of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia next to Iraq to the junctions of Hafr al-Batin and Vadi al-Auya. However, it never came to clashes, neither at this time, nor later.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Kuwait provided Great Britain with 40% of its oil needs, the ruling family invested £300 million in the British economy, furthermore he invested 56% of the output of the British Petroleum in the country. Ashton, Nigel John: British Intervention in Jordan and Kuwait. *The Historical Journal*, 40 (4) 1997. p. 1072.

<sup>17</sup> Wigg, George: Mi az igazság Kuwait körül? *Cikk a Nemzetközi Sajtóból*. VI. 58. p. 19.

<sup>18</sup> The size of the English forces helping the Kuwaitian gave to some guessing in the press. It was unambiguous that President Qassem would have fulfilled his threatening and occupied Kuwait before Great Britain had ordered the mobilization of the troops, if he really had intended to do so. Later on, seeing the great number of the British troops in the area, the real intentions of Great Britain were questionable. According to experts, it would have been sufficient to order a battalion of British soldiers serving in the region to the area; if Great Britain had solely intended to demonstrate that it would intervene supposing that Iraq invaded Kuwait. However, a small number of British troops, supporting the forces in Kuwait, would have been unable to stop an occasional attack from Iraq's side. In connection with this, according to some assumptions, Great Britain wanted to put pressure on Baghdad using of the conflicts in Kuwait to hinder the nationalization the Iraqi oil fields owned by oversea companies. Wigg, George: Mi az igazság Kuwait körül? *Cikk a Nemzetközi Sajtóból*. VI. 58. p. 18.

*The approach of the socialist countries to the conflict*

The declaration of the independence of Kuwait in June 1961 had no effect on the Soviet foreign affairs. The Ruler of Kuwait was not considered to be conquered, or as a monarch who intended to gain independence for his country.<sup>19</sup> This opinion of the Soviet Union was confirmed by the existence of the contract between Great Britain and Kuwait, which was regarded as a signal of the neo-colonialism. Due to this the Soviet Government did not send a greeting telegram to the Ruler of Kuwait and the event was only briefly mentioned in a provincial newspaper which informed that Great Britain managed to retain its position in the country. The speech of Qassem and Nasser's aimed to impede this claim of Iraq, complicated the position of the Soviet foreign affairs. During the short period between the speech and the British intervention, the Soviet newspapers criticized Qassem's politics, but no exact standpoint has been taken.

It came to a change after the joining up of the British troops on the request of the Emir. On hearing this Nikita Khrushchev sent for Sir Frank Roberts, the British Ambassador in Moscow, who informed him that the intervention occurred according to a previous undertaking of obligations of Great Britain. He expressed his assumption that the Soviet Union had done the same in this situation. He added that Great Britain would intend to withdraw its troops when Kuwait's safety was guaranteed. Khrushchev asserted the British Ambassador that he just enquired and he ensured even if he had not done it without any reason, neither he, nor his state would take steps in this matter.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> The events in Kuwait before the bursting out of the conflict were not been precisely published in the Soviet press. They hardly acknowledged the Young Movement of Kuwait, that have claimed reforms since the 1930s, they forgot about the protests against the intervention of Jordan and Lebanon, and the warning of the advancing public opinion that requested to break of the protectorate contact with Great Britain and the nationalization of the Kuwait Oil Corporation. The foundation of the Department of Financial and Oil Affairs was hardly been taken into consideration just like the establishment of the Kuwait Oil tanker Corporation in 1959 or the talking of the control over the jurisdiction of the foreigners in Kuwait from the British authorities by the Kuwaiti authorities. Neither the visit of the Soviet ship, *Izhevsk* in Kuwait in August, nor the establishment of a national oil company in 1960 for the control of the details of the production and sale of the oil were been taken into account. However, the first meant on the side of the Soviet Union the assistance of the sovereignty of the subordinate country and the second was been valued by the Soviets as the first step towards the achievement of the economic independence of the oil producing countries in Afro-Asia. Page, Stephen: *The USSR and Arabia*. London, 1971. p. 52.

<sup>20</sup> The asking for references of high degree on the Soviet Union's side could be elicited by the crisis in Suez in 1956. The Soviet Union intended to know whether Great Britain was satisfied with the fulfilment of their duties, taken in the contract, or did they want to make further step against Iraq. However, the relations between Great Britain and Iraq were not that bad as the press suggested. Supposing that Great Britain had planned steps against Iraq, the Soviet Union would have – most probably – committed itself to support the Arab issue. When the British troops declared that they would not cross the Iraqi border, the Soviet Union was pleased with the British joining. Jakovlev, the Soviet Ambassador in Baghdad, called the British politics on the day of the joining in Kuwait 'extremely foolish' in the presence of Trevelyan, his British colleague. They did it with the intention

The Soviets did not intend to take part in the conflict and did distance from taking any menacing steps. However, the British occupation and Qassem's announcement as a reaction on this, which revealed that he wished to go on with his fight for the returning of the Kuwaiti territories to Iraq, with the help of peaceful means, made it possible for the Soviet Union and – for a certain period of time – for Egypt to take an ideological offensive, declaring the conflict between the Arab people as a fight against the imperialists and colonialists.<sup>21</sup>

In this sense, the change of the contract in 1961 was regarded as a simple manoeuvre, as a collective ambition of Great Britain and Kuwait to confirm their colonial reign and to retain their position in the Middle East in order to prevail over the progressive Arab states – like Iraq and the United Arab Republic – and the national liberation movements. They ignored the claim of Iraq, which based on questionable historical rights and they solely concentrated on the British landing that they considered as illegal.<sup>22</sup> They denied the validity of the piece of news that there are Iraqi troops on the Kuwaiti border made ready for an attack. This was said to be a fairy tale that made the occupation of Kuwait possible again. On the other hand, by this means pressure could be put on the Iraqi Government, to withdraw the law of December 1960 that was made after the British–Iraqi negotiation on

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to make the Arab World turn against Great Britain. Joyce, Miriam: *Kuwait 1945–1996. An Anglo–American Perspective*. Frank Cass, London, Portland, 1998. pp. 10–107; Trevelyan, *The Middle East in Revolution*. p. 198.

<sup>21</sup> The soviet standpoint concerning the Kuwaiti issue was formed by the intention to save the relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union rather than by the principles and objections laid to the Emir and the new republic. In addition to the economic arguments it was also decisive that they wanted to be in the neighbourhood a friendly state and they did not want that a cordon like the one in the Baghdad Pact to be established there. Furthermore, the Soviet Union took into consideration that without the Soviet support the stressing of Iraqi aims could lead to actions on Great Britain's and U.S.A.'s side like those in Lebanon and in Jordan in 1958 which further could lead to a right wing change in politics and the downfall of the republic in Iraq. A proof of this is that in 1962, when the relation between the Soviet Union and Qassem became tensed, the 'feudal rulers' of Kuwait and other principalities in the Persian Gulf were accused – in the press – of being imperialists while they were doing their best to retain their social privileges and to hinder the liberation movements. The author supported this statement through the example of Kuwait: „The experience of Kuwait in gaining formal independence, however, shows that self-government alone is not enough. State sovereignty is largely illusory as long as the oil monopolies retain control of the entire economy of the sheikhdoms.” Andreyanov, Y.: *The Oil Monopolies in the Persian Gulf Colonies. International Affairs*. Moscow, 10. October, 1962. pp. 78–79; Page, *The USSR and Arabia*. p. 61.

<sup>22</sup> The Soviet Union would have considered the standpoint of the Iraqi Government as acceptable, if it had came out in favour of liberation of Kuwait from the British influence and if had not laid claim on the annexation of Kuwait. Furthermore, the crisis deepened the decision of Iraq to name the ruler of Kuwait for administrative official in Iraq and to impose sanctions so that they were obedient. A similar announcement was formulated and published by the Communist Party in Iraq. According to this, the people in Kuwait should have decided the issue. They considered the correction of the proposal in the issue and the encouragement to the fight against the imperialism, as their duty. *Kuwaittal kapcsolatos iraki követelés*. 1961. augusztus 15. MOL KÜM TÜK XIX-J-1-j Irak 1945–64. 3. d. 5/bf–005692/szig.titk/1961; *A Kuwaiti kérdés*. 1961. augusztus 21. MOL KÜM TÜK XIX-J-1-j Irak 1945–64. 3. d. 5/bf–005692/1/szig.titk/1961. – 272/szig. titk./1961.o

the oil and that deprived the Iraq Petroleum Co. from its concessions.<sup>23</sup> The Soviet Union and, following its example, the other Socialist countries did not intend to the acceptance of the sovereignty of Kuwait, which got a further political confirmation when Qassem broke with diplomatic relations to those countries – except for China – that took stand on the independence of Kuwait, after his speech.<sup>24</sup>

### *The debate on the Kuwaiti question in the Security Council*

On the same day the British troops joined up in Kuwait, the Security Council of the United Nations assembled to discuss the situation. On the next day Adnan Pachachi, the UN Representative of Iraq, supported by the Soviet Union, demanded the withdrawal of the British troops. This claim had no effect, moreover, Great Britain, supported by the USA and France, submitted a proposal to the Security Council, in which it called upon the member states to accept the independence of Kuwait and its territorial integrity, referring to the request of the Emir, and to establish together peace and calmness in the area. The ambition of Great Britain has been totally supported by the Kuwaiti Government whose Representative declared: his country contributed to the withdrawal of the British troops on condition that the UN guaranteed it would give a helping hand in case of any kind of aggression on Iraq's side and he demanded that Kuwait be admitted to the UN.<sup>25</sup>

Zorin, the Representative of the Soviet Union, expressed his protest on occasion of the gathering of the Security Council against the participation on the meeting of the

<sup>23</sup> The Soviet Union denied both the report on the concentration of troops in Iraq and that the British troops joined on the request of the Emir. In connection with the second report, they referred to the statement of the Kuwaiti Ambassador in Egypt, which showed that for not being in danger Kuwait did not want to ask for any assistance from Great Britain. Fatisov, V. Gunboat Tactics Again. *International Affairs*. Moscow, 2. February, 1962. p. 94; Ljubavin, A.: Mi történik Kuwaitban? *Nemzetközi Szemle*. V. 8. sz. 1961. p. 68.

<sup>24</sup> It surprised diplomats of many countries that China had sent a greeting telegram on occasion of the independence of Kuwait before the Soviet Union and other socialist countries made a statement on the issue. Representatives of India and Iraq considered this as a manifestation of the conflict between China and the Soviet Union, while representative of Oman supposed that China misinterpreted the situation. However it is fact that China consequently supported Kuwait to become member of the world organisation – after the country had gained membership in the Arab League – referring to the roles of the country in certain international organisations and asserting that the sovereignty of Kuwait was acknowledged by several countries. We had to add that no sooner had there been diplomatic relations between China and Kuwait than Kuwait became member of the UN. It came to diplomatic relations between the two countries in November 1963. *Brit mesterkedések a kuvaiti kérdés körül*. 1961. július 9. MOL KÜM TÜK XIX-J-1-j Egyiptom 1945-64. 12. d. 11/f-005872/szig.titk/1961. – 248/szig. titk./1961.

<sup>25</sup> *Kuvaiti emirátus* MOL KÜM TÜK XIX-J-1-j Jemen 1945-64. 2. d. IV-130. sz.n. More about the speech of Dean, British representative in the UN on the meeting of the Security Council on 2<sup>nd</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> July, about the answer given to this by Pachachi, Iraqi representative in the UN and about the speech of Hussein, Kuwaiti representative on 5<sup>th</sup> July see: Lauterpracht–Greenwood–Weller–Bethlehem, *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents*. pp. 51–54.

delegation of Kuwait, as – according to him – after the occupation of Kuwait the British authority has dominated the local administration. In this situation, the country could not been regarded as an independent state. Because of this he vetoed the proposal put forward by Great Britain. Furthermore, in his statement on 5<sup>th</sup> July he drew attention on the fact that Iraq had no intention to get its way in Kuwait by force and that the peace of the area is only be menaced by the presence of the British troops and ships. Because of this, he demanded the Security Council to take the necessary steps, which force the British Government to withdraw its troops. He emphasized that it would be a basis for the solution of the matter in dispute, which should have been done in harmony with the charter of the UN, by peaceful measures, rather than violence.<sup>26</sup>

The delegation of the United Arab Republic in the UN – together with the Soviet Union – had not recognised the sovereignty of Kuwait yet, while it took stand on the claim of Iraq to annex the oil-sheikhdom. His standpoint has been determined by two factors:

- 1) Not wishing that Kuwait – being part of Iraq – strengthened its rival, the delegation emphasized in the press that the unity of the Arab countries could not been brought about by force against the will of the inhabitants.
- 2) Taking advantage of the fact that the British troops arrived in Kuwait, the Egyptian propaganda stressed on the doubtfulness of the independence of Kuwait. The propaganda regarded the fact that an Arab country made use of the assistance of an imperialist state Great Britain as treason. Moreover, it condemned Saudi Arabia because of its military co-operation with Great Britain.<sup>27</sup>

It put forward a proposal, supported by the Soviet Union as well, according to which the withdrawal of the foreign troops was demanded. The proposal was not been accepted for lack of sufficient number of votes.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Ljubavin, *Nemzetközi Szemle*. p. 69; Page, *The USSR and Arabia*. p. 61.

<sup>27</sup> There has been a public opinion in Damascus in connection with the conflict according to which it would have been the best if Iraq had occupied Kuwait without having announced it. They thought it had met the interests of the Arab people as by this means an imperialist base would have come to end in this region. However they agreed with the common opinion that the disorder beginning after the announcement of Qassem served the interests of Great Britain as it made the realisation of the most important aim of Great Britain possible. Great Britain intended to strengthen the British military positions in Kuwait even after the independence of the country. It was made possible that Great Britain intended to secure the division of the Arab countries. If the Arab countries had unanimously committed themselves to the independence of Kuwait it would not have come to ambitions on the Arab countries' side to occupy Kuwait. *Brit mesterkedések a kuvaiti kérdés körül*. 1961. július 9. MOL KÜM TUK XIX-J-1-j Egyiptom 1945-64. 12. d. 11/f-005872/szig.titk/1961. – 248/szig. titk./1961.

<sup>28</sup> President Nasser referred to the issue of Kuwait in his speech on 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1961 on the occasion of the 9<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the revolution in Egypt: „Let us now tackle another problem in the Arab world, namely that of Kuwait. (...) We announced our attitude at the outset, based on the principles already declared. Our sentiments were all the time with the people of Iraq and the people of Kuwait, knowing that only the imperialists would benefit and take advantage of the crisis. (...) The peoples of Kuwait and Iraq are Arab peoples belonging to the Arab nation. We, in the United Arab

At the same time, the Arab League placed the issue on the agenda on 5<sup>th</sup> July in spite of the Iraqi protest. The request for the membership of Kuwait, handed in on 27<sup>th</sup> June, was discussed. Furthermore, they sought for a solution for the given conflict. At the end of the negotiations – on 19<sup>th</sup> July 1961 – the following decisions were taken:

- 1) The Government of Kuwait undertakes to request the withdrawal of British forces from Kuwaiti territory as soon as possible,
- 2) The Government of the Republic of Iraq undertakes not to use force in the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq,
- 3) The Council undertakes to support every wish Kuwait may express for a union or a federation with other countries of the Arab League in accordance with the League's pact,
- 4) The Council decides to welcome the State of Kuwait as a member of the Arab League,
- 5) To assist the State of Kuwait in joining the United Nations,
- 6) The Arab states undertake to provide effective assistance for the preservation of Kuwait's independence, upon its request, and the Council confers upon the Secretary-General the power to take the necessary measures for the urgent implementation of this resolution.<sup>29</sup>

The Emir of Kuwait and Muhammad Ali Hassouna, the General Secretary of the Arab League agreed on the issue of composition of the Arab troops, on 11<sup>th</sup> August 1961.<sup>30</sup> Next day the Emir sent a letter to Sir William Luce in which he officially demanded the withdrawal of the British troops from Kuwait.<sup>31</sup> On 10<sup>th</sup> September arrived the first units

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Republic, had no alternative to adherence to principles, not only for the sake of safeguarding those principles but also for the safeguard of the solidarity of the Arab nation. The future of the Arab nation cannot be made dependent on manoeuvres. Manoeuvres are the means of realising Arab aspirations; on the contrary, they might cause the collapse of Arab aspirations, and the return of imperialism and the British, as happened in Kuwait. This Republic can never accept that the policy of annexation governs relations between the Arab peoples. We have been announcing for years that we support unity and reject annexation. We support unity, if based on the unanimous will of the people. Our objective now, as it has always been, is to rid ourselves of colonialism and foreign occupation. Our objective, now after the Kuwait crisis and the return of the British, is the evacuation of the British, so that the independent people of Kuwait may enjoy security." *President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press-Interviews*. January–December, 1961. pp. 157–158.

<sup>29</sup> Agreement on the Status of the Arab League Security Force in Kuwait, 12 August 1961. Lauterpracht–Greenwood–Weller–Bethlehem, *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents*. p. 55; Khadduri–Ghareeb, *War in the Gulf, 1990–1991*. p. 66.

<sup>30</sup> The letter of Hassouna sent to the ruler in this issue and his answer, sent to the Secretary-general of the Emir see: Note addressed by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to H. H. the Prince of the State of Kuwait, 12 August 1961. és Letter from H. H. the Prince of the State of Kuwait addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, 12 August 1961. In: Lauterpracht–Greenwood–Weller–Bethlehem, *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents*. pp. 55–56.

<sup>31</sup> Great Britain met the request only on 19<sup>th</sup> October because of the new threatening on Iraq's side on 21<sup>st</sup> August. Mostyn, Trevor: *Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula 1945–1990*. Facts On File, New York, Oxford, 1991. p. 76.

of the military force, which consisted of united troops of five Arab states: United Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Sudan and Tunisia.<sup>32</sup>

In the middle of July, Moscow seemed to separate from the issue and to let the Arab countries to solve the matters in dispute while hoping moral support to Iraq that was not dynamic anymore would not influence its relations to the United Arab Republic. Thus, the Arab League's recognition of Kuwait's independence was not been reported; nor was the replacement of British by Arab forces mentioned until early 1962.<sup>33</sup>

The unchangeable Soviet standpoint in the issue was strengthened by the fact, that on 30<sup>th</sup> November, 1961 the United Arab Republic proposed a motion to recognise Kuwait as a member of the UN. The Soviet Union took a stand on the postponement of the issue, as according to her Kuwait could not be considered as an independent state without any doubt. As an explanation, it was emphasized that the withdrawal of the British troops did not establish the sovereignty of Kuwait so the Soviet Union would not recognise the sovereignty of Kuwait as long as the contract with the United Kingdom was valid.<sup>34</sup> In this sense the Soviet Union did again veto the membership of Kuwait in the UN which it took back only after the downfall of the Qassem Government.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>32</sup> The troops of the United Arab Republic were withdrawn on 12<sup>th</sup> October 1961, because Syria and Egypt permanently broke off their relations and Syria resigned from the UAR on 28<sup>th</sup> September. According to the diplomats the UAR had no interests anymore in supporting Kuwait as its rich oil fields remained in the hands of Great Britain. Furthermore, the Egyptian did their best in order that it came to situation in Syria similar to that before the membership of the country in the Union. To achieve this it was ready to support Iraq even if it happened hidden and unspoken. The Saudi Arabian, Jordanian and Sudanese units of the contingent remained in the region until February 1963, when the Baathists in Iraq banned Qassem through a coup. *Az EAK csapatainak visszarendelése Kuvaitból*. 1961. december 27. MOL KÜM TUK XIX-J-1-j Egyiptom 1945-64. 12. d. 11/f-001789/szig.titk/1961. – 619/szig. titk./1961.; Joyce i.m. 108. o.; Khadduri-Ghareeb, *War in the Gulf, 1990–1991*. p. 66; Lenczowski, George: *The Middle East in World Affairs*. London, 1982. p. 667.

<sup>33</sup> The soviet press emphasised in August 1961, that „the tragedy of Kuwait is worsen by the constant conquering intention of Great Britain.” Another article attached the social status of the Emir and accused him of „having betrayed his people by letting in the foreign conquerors”, so the autonomy of Kuwait became illusory. „Kuwait.” *International Affairs*. Moscow, 9. September 1961. 113–114. o.; Page, *The USSR and Arabia*. p. 62.

<sup>34</sup> Zorin, the Soviet delegate, declared in his speech, that „The Ruler of Kuwait is directly dependent upon the United Kingdom Government, for the existing economic and political ties ... clearly set the stage for the exertion of influence on the Ruler ... The maintenance of Kuwait in a state of de facto dependence on the United Kingdom enables the latter at any time to send in as many troops as may be needed ... for any aggressive action against the independent Arab states of the area. Kuwait continues to play, in the far-reaching plans of the United Kingdom in the Near East, the role of a pawn, of a springboard for possible future aggression. The continuing and complete political dependence ... is reinforced by the absolute predominance, in Kuwait's economy, of British and American oil monopolies ... Kuwait essentially remains a British colony.” Page, *The USSR and Arabia*. p. 62.

<sup>35</sup> The Soviets were equally sceptical about the status of Kuwait and about all the reforms that were intended to introduce in the sheikhdom by the Emir. A sarcastic article was published in the soviet press in April 1962 in connection with the establishment of the Constituent Assembly and the



*The acceptance of the UN membership of Kuwait*

The coup of 8<sup>th</sup> February, 1963 and the overthrow of president Qassem called forth radical changes in the Kuwait question. Although the administration of the new republic under the leadership of Abd as-Salam Aref did not make a definite declaration on the Kuwait question, a few days after the coup many ministers stated that they do not intend to go on with Qassem's politics regarding Kuwait, and that they regarded the people of Kuwait likewise the inhabitants of other independent Arabic countries as brotherly Arabic people.<sup>36</sup>

During the unsettled months of February and March Baghdad took a number of steps (the launch of airlines, the abolishment of restrictions on visa requirements, the restoration of economic relationships, the reception of an unofficial Kuwaiti government delegation between the 21<sup>st</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> of March, etc.) in order to normalize the relationship of the two countries. This indeed suggested that Iraq, according to the statements of the first days, would to relinquish claim of Kuwait even without openly declaring it. At that time to the

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appointment of the provisional government. The article analysing the reforms and referring to the inhabitants who had a few right to vote and to the composition of the first Cabinet – 11 of the 14 Ministres were members of the royal family – the author concluded, with a glance at the recent purchases of arms from Britain that Kuwait was being used, and the cooperation of the Emir with Great Britain, made the country to a "stronghold in the struggle with the growing national-liberation movement of the Arab peoples". The attacks of the Soviets against Kuwait had diminished by 1962. The Soviet Union took the reforms, carried out by the Government of Kuwait, the building of several industries and houses and the foundation of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development – which began its functioning with a lending to Algeria – into consideration. It was also taken into account that the government put pressure on the Kuwait Oil Company: a law was made on the introduction of the governmental control on the export of foreign oil-companies on the one hand, and the KOC had to hand over about the half of its concession territories. Another signal of the gradual disappointment in Qassem's politics was that he was publicly criticized several times. The revoking of the Contract of 1899 was considered as a merit of the national movement and the Emir was not accused of co-operating with Great Britain anymore. Because of all these, the Soviet Union invited Kuwait to participate in a conference dealing with modern procedures of the fishing sent an official delegate to the Soviet Union. This was the first step towards the recognition of Kuwait's independence and towards the establishment of commercial relations between the two states. Page, *The USSR and Arabia*. p. 62.

<sup>36</sup> On 13 February, Shabib, Foreign Minister of Iraq answered on a question, put by foreign journalists on occasion of his first press conference: „On the issue of Kuwait, a satisfactory compromise is possible.” On 19<sup>th</sup> February Aref, President of the Republic made a statement to the journalists of the newspaper of Cairo, „Al-Ahram”, in which he emphasized that „the relation of Iraq to Kuwait is not a private issue, but it is a global issue of the Arab nations. The issue must be managed in a way that is sufficient for the whole Arab World, as there's no separated nation of Iraq and Kuwait. The nation of Kuwait does not differ from that of Iraq. If Kuwait does not want to join our country, our country will be united with Kuwait.” *Iraki-kuvaiti viszony alakulása*. 1963. október 16. MOL KÜM TÜK XIX-J-1-j Irak 1945-64. 3. d. 5/bf-004524/1/szig.titk/1963. – 266/szig. titk./1963.

socialist countries it seemed that, finally, in the radically changed situation, for the contentment of all the concerned parties, the conflicts would be solved. There was an increasing demand in the socialist camp to re-examine the previous dismissive standpoints. They judged the establishment of contact significant primarily from an economic point of view and in this concern judged the diplomatic recognition of Kuwait by all means justified.<sup>37</sup>

However, with the consolidation of the new government and the appearance of extremely severe financial problems allusions were made regarding the necessity of Kuwait's integration into Iraq which they wished to accomplish in a peaceful way without particular international reverberations. Yet, the effort failed not only because of the reassessment of the socialist standpoint in February but also due to the anti-communist and anti-Soviet politics of the Iraqi leaders by which it practically turned against itself its greatest supporters up to that point. As one of the results of the deterioration of the Iraqi-Soviet relations, following the departure of the Arabic League in February 1963, the Soviet Union immediately adopted the motion of the Kuwaiti government for the establishment of diplomatic relations. On the 13<sup>th</sup> of March the Soviet Union officially acknowledged the Kuwaiti government with the aim of compelling Iraq to reconsider its politics up to that point.<sup>38</sup>

In April they have announced that Morocco is making efforts for acknowledgement of Kuwait as a United Nations member and as a result, they have summoned the Security Council to discuss the issue. The Security Council's assembly was preceded by many weeks of internal discussion, during which Iraq was trying for the question not to be put on the agenda yet. They could not start an open campaign, which was doomed to fail anyway, with such an objective after the statements of the 8<sup>th</sup> of February. Thus at the beginning of May, during their talks with the foreign ambassadors deputed to Iraq the ministers – especially Mr. Shabib, the Minister of Foreign Affairs – wanted to persuade the UN representatives to vote down the Kuwaiti membership application.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>37</sup> *A Kuwaiti kérdés.* 1963. február 23. MOL KÜM TŰK XIX-J-1-j Kis országok 1945-64. 3. d. /Kuvait IV-10-002229/szig.titk/1963. -63/szig. titk./1963.

<sup>38</sup> The conviction and execution of the Iraqi communists in large number caused displeasure not only among the leaders but also among the inhabitants in the Soviet Unions. The fact that a mass of 1500 protested in front of the embassy of Iraq in Moscow on 14<sup>th</sup> March, proved this. They protested against the anticommunist politics of Iraq. On 6<sup>th</sup> May the Communist Party of the Soviet Union assured the curd soldiers in the Pravda that the Soviet Union would support them in their fight for the autonomy. Mostyn, *Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula 1945-1990*, p. 85.

<sup>39</sup> When Shabib, Foreign Minister of Iraq questioned Jakovlev, the Soviet ambassador in Baghdad, why the Soviet Union altered its opinion, Jakovlev emphasised in his answer that the announcement of the Iraqi Government after 8 February and the behaviour of Iraq against Kuwait the conclusion could be drawn that the country did not lay claim on the annexation of the Emirate to Iraq anymore. The government did not deny this so it is incomprehensible why it changed its standpoint on the issue. Foreign Minister Shabib told the Soviet ambassador in confidence that Iraq did not consider Kuwait as an independent state as the country was established by the imperialists first of all by Great Britain. Firstly, they intended to exploit the oil in Kuwait and they could do it in a legal way.

By that time due to the previously mentioned reasons the Soviet Union's standpoint regarding Kuwait, had already changed and it was keenly advocating Kuwait's admission to the UN.<sup>40</sup> Besides the Soviet Union, among the socialist countries Kuwait only requested support for its application from Poland and Hungary. Hungary was chosen in order to increase the importance of its participation in the General Assembly.

The General Assembly of May 14<sup>th</sup> unanimously accepted its admission to the UN. Morocco welcomed the new member on behalf of the Arabic countries. Algeria, who was taking the floor for Somalia and Iran, as a return for the special Kuwaiti aid given for the country during the independence struggle, ensured the Emirates of its support. Kuwait became the 111<sup>th</sup> member of the UN.<sup>41</sup>

Besides the failure in foreign policy, the economic deterioration also posed a serious problem in Iraq. The Western countries declined providing loans and instead suggested Iraq to turn to Kuwait possessing significant amount of spare fund. The Kuwaiti did not remain aloof but stated that the only possibility for a loan would exist if the Iraqi government avowed Kuwait as a sovereign Arabic state, acknowledged its borders and undertook a responsibility of unconditioned respect to it. Thus the Kuwaiti conflict, which prolonged for 2 years, was totally settled on the 4<sup>th</sup> of October 1963 when Iraq and Kuwait delivered a common announcement stating:

- 1) „The Republic of Iraq recognised the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait with its boundaries as specified in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21. 7. 1932 and which was accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10. 8. 1932;

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Secondly, they wanted to deprive the anti-imperialist country, Iraq of a potential source of power, like the control over the oil in Kuwait. Moreover, they were aimed at establishing a direct bridgehead for the British–American army in case of an attack against Iraq. On the basis of these Shabib asked Jakovlev to inform the Soviet government about the facts mentioned above and to make them know that Iraq hopes that the soviet delegate considering the „real situation” will veto Kuwait's application for admission in the Security Council. *Iraki–kuwaiti viszony alakulása*. 1963. május 20. MOL KÜM TÜK XIX-J-1-j Irak 1945-64. 3. d. 5/bf-004524/szig.titk/1963. – 158/szig.titk./1963.; *Iraki–kuwaiti viszony alakulása*. 1963. október 16. MOL KÜM TÜK XIX-J-1-j Irak 1945-64. 3. d. 5/bf-004524/1/szig.titk/1963. – 266/szig. titk./1963.

<sup>40</sup> Fedorenko, the delegate of the Soviet Union in the UN, emphasized in his speech on 7<sup>th</sup> May the importance of the development that had gone on in the foreign affairs of Kuwait since November 1961. In connection with this he referred to the strengthening of the existing relations between Kuwait and other Arab countries to the measure of the government, which forced the Kuwait Oil Corporation to give up the majority of the concessional territories to the state and furthermore he hinted at the diplomatic relations established between Kuwait and the Soviet Union. Page, *The USSR and Arabia*. p. 81.

<sup>41</sup> During the debate the delegation did not appear in the conference hall. The order of the speeches was Jordan, Morocco, India, Algeria, Japan, Liberia, Great Britain, Hungary, the U.S.A, Israel, Cameroon, Greece, Columbia and Kuwait. The Hungarian speech was well accepted by the participants, in which there were some new ideas. *Kuvait felvétele az Egyesült Nemzetek tagjai közé*. 1963. május 27. MOL KÜM TÜK XIX-J-1-j Vegyes 1945-64. 217. d. 13/004702: 26/h. – 148/szig.titk./1963.

- 2) The two Governments shall work towards reinforcing the fraternal relations subsisting between the two sister countries, inspired by their national duty, common interest and aspiration to a complete Arab Unity;
- 3) The two Governments shall work towards establishing cultural, commercial and economical co-operation between the two countries and the exchange of technical information;"

In order to realize all the foregoing objectives they decided to establish immediately diplomatic relations between them at the level of ambassadors.<sup>42</sup>

### *Epilogue*

Abdullah Salim Emir consequently emphasized in his speech in January 1963 on the first session of the National Assembly of Kuwait that his country is uncommitted and positively neutral in the issue of the Cold War. Kuwait intensively strove for the widening of its international relations after gaining independence. Due to this it came to diplomatic contacts with socialist countries and to enter into various contracts like commercial contracts, contracts of aviation and cultural contracts.

According to the motion Nr. 3190/1963, passed by the Hungarian Revolutionary Labour-Peasant Government on 16<sup>th</sup> May 1963, Hungary acknowledged the independence of Kuwait and announced its intention to the beginning of the negotiations on the issue of diplomatic contacts between the two countries. The embassies got into touch on 7<sup>th</sup> May 1964. After some measurements concerning this and the possibilities on the market several products of Hungarian firms (like Ikarus, Tungsram) appeared on the market of Kuwait. Furthermore, many Hungarian citizens contributed to the development of the country. The demonstration of the establishing of diplomatic relations and that of the role of the Hungarian companies in the Kuwaiti market could be the topic of another essay.

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<sup>42</sup> The protocol of the Agreement see: Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters, 4. October 1963. In: Lauterpracht-Greenwood-Weller-Bethlehem, *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents*. pp. 56–57.

## ***La riorganizzazione delle forze neofasciste nel dopoguerra: dalla clandestinità alla fondazione del Movimento sociale italiano***

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Nel panorama politico italiano, quello della cosiddetta "Seconda Repubblica" nata dalle rovine del passato sistema politico caduto sotto i colpi delle inchieste del pool dei giudici milanesi che sono riusciti in "quello che non era riuscito fino in fondo ai brigatisti rossi degli anni Settanta, di colpire lo Stato al cuore e farlo vacillare" e che invece "stava riuscendo alle inchieste della magistratura"<sup>1</sup>, troviamo in rappresentanza della destra non radicale un movimento che si chiama Alleanza nazionale.

Ufficialmente questo partito nasce il 30 gennaio del 1995 a Fiuggi, anche se da circa due anni era presente come cartello elettorale. Alleanza nazionale è, secondo un articolo critico di Edmondo Berselli, un partito che "nacque (...) sul filo di una fortunata ambiguità politica e culturale, che consentì alla grande maggioranza dei militanti del Movimento sociale italiano di riconoscersi nel nuovo partito, con qualche lacrima ma scontando solo la modesta diaspora di Pino Rauti. Le contraddizioni non sono mancate. Il leader di An, (Gianfranco Fini, N.d.R.) è stato proporzionalista contro i referendum elettorali, per trasformarsi in seguito in un irriducibile del maggioritario. Erede di una tradizione antieuropeista, si è iscritto fra i costruttori della nuova Costituzione europea. Al richiamo alla "libertà", categoria astratta, ha sempre aggiunto una naturale inclinazione al law and order. L'affabilità da piccolo schermo non gli ha impedito la faccia truce verso la diversità impersonata dal "maestro gay dichiarato", e l'apertura sul voto amministrativo agli immigrati non lo ha distolto da una legge proibizionista sulla droga. Ma proprio in questa estrema duttilità finiana consiste il segreto di An. Nel partito postfascista divenuto estemporaneamente antifascista avevano potuto convivere fin qui gli "esuli in patria" di Salò così come gli sbardelliani che nella Democrazia cristiana avevano presidiato il confine a destra; Insomma, il partito "patriottico, liberale, cattolico" ipotizzato da Fisichella e realizzato da Fini si è mostrato in realtà la formazione politica più autenticamente postmoderna presente nel nostro panorama politico"<sup>2</sup>.

Attraverso queste righe abbiamo avuto una piccola ma efficace descrizione di quello che rappresenta Alleanza nazionale e da dove proviene, ossia da un partito, il Movimento sociale italiano, che affonda le sue radici direttamente nel fascismo, quello della

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<sup>1</sup> G. Mughini, *Un disastro chiamato Seconda Repubblica*, Mondadori, Milano, 2005, p. 49.

<sup>2</sup> E. Berselli, *La svolta di Fini, leader postmoderno*, in "La Repubblica", 28 novembre 2003.

Repubblica sociale italiana. È proprio da quel periodo che dobbiamo partire per comprendere quale sia stato il cammino del neofascismo italiano, come si sia riorganizzato e in quali forme.

Dal 1943 fino alla fine della guerra, l'Italia fu terreno di una guerra civile tra i fascisti, alleati dell'invasore nazista, e le formazioni partigiane, guerra che si protrarrà anche dopo la fine ufficiale delle ostilità, il 25 aprile 1945.

Il primo studioso proveniente dalla Resistenza a scrivere un saggio sulla guerra civile è stato Claudio Pavone, docente universitario di storia contemporanea presso l'Università di Pisa<sup>3</sup>, ed ultimamente un altro scrittore dichiaratamente di sinistra, Giampaolo Pansa<sup>4</sup>, ha effettuato un approfondito studio proprio sulle stragi avvenute dopo il 1945, utilizzando materiali assolutamente sconosciuti al grande pubblico ma che erano invece assai conosciuti tra gli appartenenti al mondo del neofascismo<sup>5</sup>.

Nell'immediato dopoguerra, la quasi totalità delle organizzazioni clandestine che si richiamavano al fascismo è composta dagli appartenenti alla Repubblica sociale italiana, queste associazioni non avevano fondi e soprattutto all'inizio "non si vedevano al loro interno i vecchi gerarchi"<sup>6</sup>.

I clandestini si riunirono intorno all'ideologia dell'ultimo fascismo: "Italia, repubblica, socializzazione, e non aveva niente a che vedere col primo credo fascista, di netta derivazione dal nazionalismo corradiano: autorità, ordine, giustizia; ne con quello teocratico del periodo di mezzo della dittatura: credere, obbedire, combattere.

In realtà questi giovani si richiamavano alla Rsi (Repubblica sociale italiana), la quale nel nome come nel contenuto, datosi nel congresso di Verona, si allacciava più alla tradizione del socialismo massimalista che non al blocco di forze a carattere nazionalista che formò il fascismo nel Ventennio"<sup>7</sup>.

Il ritrovarsi di questi personaggi in realtà non era casuale, secondo Arrigo Petacco esiste una leggenda "ancora diffusa tra i veterani di Salò secondo la quale Mussolini, Pavolini e Mezzasoma sarebbero tornati a parlare delle *uova del drago* nel segreto dell'ufficio del Duce, nella prefettura di corso Monforte, a Milano, la mattina del 25 aprile. Sempre secondo questa leggenda, i tre uomini, in procinto di abbandonare la città sotto l'incalzare dell'avanzata alleata, si sarebbero preoccupati di affidare ad alcuni camerati giovani, capaci ed intelligenti, il compito, o se preferite, la fiaccola da tenere nascosta sotto il moggio in attesa di tempi più adatti per farla tornare a risplendere. La leggenda sostiene anche che questa fiamma è la stessa che campeggiava nell'insegna dell'Msi, e indica anche il nome di uno dei giovani cui fu affidata: Giorgio Almirante"<sup>8</sup>. Non esistono documenti scritti a conferma di questa storia, come non esiste un archivio completo del Movimento sociale italiano, distrutto negli anni Ottanta, ufficialmente, ma

<sup>3</sup> C. Pavone, *Una guerra civile*, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 1991.

<sup>4</sup> G. Pansa, *Il sangue dei Vinti*, Mondadori, Milano, 2003.

<sup>5</sup> G. Pisanò, *Storia della guerra civile in Italia 1943-45*, Centro Editoriale Nazionale, Roma, 1980.

<sup>6</sup> M. Tedeschi, *Facisti dopo Mussolini*, L'Arnia, Roma, 1950, p. 156.

<sup>7</sup> M. Tedeschi, *Facisti dopo Mussolini*, op.cit., p. 9.

<sup>8</sup> A. Petacco, *Il superfascista*, Mondadori, Milano, 1998, p. 187.

non credibilmente, per motivi di spazio e quindi anche questa leggenda è destinata a rimanere tale.

I fascisti che erano riusciti a salvarsi, o che erano usciti di prigione, cercavano quasi sempre di trovare città più sicure dove nascondersi, la meta più ambita era Roma.

Dal racconto di Ugo Franzolin, uno dei protagonisti di quei momenti, si può intuire come cercavano di organizzare la vita quotidiana questi personaggi: "Mi trovavo a Roma da poco tempo. Mi ero arruolato nella Decima, dopo l'otto settembre, e questo bastava perché la mia presenza non fosse tollerata dai partigiani del luogo. Ero uscito di prigione, dopo mesi trascorsi a San Vittore, il carcere di Milano, con l'imputazione di collaboratore del tedesco invasore. L'odio degli apparati non smobilitava, sebbene la stragrande maggioranza degli italiani volesse superare il passato e stesse dandosi da fare per riprendere a vivere. Roma era stato un rifugio (...). Alla sera la cena, si fa per dire, era assicurata. Con Pino e la sua signora, si scendeva in portineria, ospiti di due anziane sorelle che scodellavano una bella polenta. Pino portava un cartoccio di mortadella. Polenta, mortadella e acqua fresca è menù forse inconsueto e, probabilmente, da collocare nell'area della dieta mediterranea, come si dice adesso, ma allora andava benissimo, anzi potevamo considerarci toccati dalla provvidenza, in una città ancora isolata dai centri di rifornimento o servita saltuariamente"<sup>9</sup>.

Lo stesso autore continuando nei suoi ricordi, descrive gli incontri avuti con altri appartenenti alle forze armate fasciste: Giulio Concetti reduce del battaglione Barbarigo, e con Nino Buttazoni, raccontando e di come cercavano di vivere giorno per giorno<sup>10</sup>.

La maggior parte dei lavori che intraprendevano erano legati al mercato nero, al cambio di soldi davanti al Caffè Aragno o sotto la galleria Colonna, sempre a Roma, altri compravano e vendevano vestiti militari dai quali poi ricavare, dalla stoffa, cappotti o maglioni<sup>11</sup>.

In questo clima, nascono gruppi clandestini organizzati, uno dei più importanti è il gruppo 'Credere' composto da circa trenta persone, tutti ex appartenenti alla Repubblica sociale italiana, e non ancora stanchi di seminare terrore in Italia.

Una delle prime azioni a loro imputate risale al primo maggio 1946, quando entrano di forza in una radio di Roma III e obbligano i malcapitati operatori a mandare in onda l'inno 'Giovinezza', leggendo poi un farneticante proclama.

Uno dei partecipanti, Luciano Lucci Chiarissi, descrive quelle azioni come "realizzate allo scopo di tonificare le attese degli italiani che potevano essere sensibili alla nostra iniziativa, ossia, di fare quadrato e di porre il problema della loro presenza in termini risoluti. Il nuovo regime, infatti, non poteva non affrontare questa realtà: o aveva la forza di distruggerla tenendola nelle galere o nei campi di concentramento, o doveva trovare una forma di coesistenza"<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> U.Franzolin, *Nostra gente*, Settimo Sigillo, Roma, 1991, p.119.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, p.87

<sup>11</sup> G.F.Venè, *Vola Colomba*, Mondadori, Milano, 1990, pp.14-15.

<sup>12</sup> L.Lucci Chiarissi, *Esame di coscienza di un fascista*, Irse, Roma, 1978, pp.93-99.

A Roma era stata fondata anche un piccolissima associazione, questa legale, che si chiamava Partito nazionale della Giovane Italia, voluto da un ex generale in pensione, Vittorio Marchi, docente di filosofia a Roma.

Le buone intenzioni del professore non coincidevano con quelle dei numerosi ex fascisti che si erano iscritti al partito, infatti l'associazione veniva utilizzata per diffondere le loro idee utilizzando un apparato legale<sup>13</sup>.

Comincia a delinearsi la strategia dei neofascisti, da un lato organizzarsi in diversi gruppi illegali, composti da non troppe persone, atti ad azioni sovversive, e dall'altro lato cercare riparo sotto qualche istituzione legale per inserirsi 'democraticamente' all'interno della vita pubblica.

Tedeschi descrive così questa doppia via intrapresa dagli ex-repubblicani: "non erano due fenomeni contraddittori dimostranti l'esistenza di uno sfaldamento morale provocato dal concorrere di due elementi, il razionale, che portava all'accettazione del mondo neo-democratico e il sentimentale, che portava alla violenza e alla occasionale riesumazione del fascismo (...). I due fenomeni erano proprio la fotografia della situazione in cui si veniva a trovare chi, non accettando il nuovo stato di cose, intendeva combatterlo in tutte le maniere, con tutte le armi che la situazione metteva a disposizione. L'organizzazione legale, pubblica, aperta quale era il Partito della Giovane Italia, rientrava benissimo in questo quadro ed aveva due funzioni precise: offriva ai neofascisti un sistema pratico e semplice di riunione, e consentiva di continuare la battaglia repubblicana iniziata l'8 settembre 1943. (...) le elezioni del 2 giugno 1946 cancellano il partito del generale Marchi, e neofascisti sono costretti a cambiare casa, alcuni si ritroveranno, per un breve periodo, sotto le insegne del partito dell'Uomo Qualunque"<sup>14</sup>.

Dal punto di vista clandestino, poco prima del giugno del 1946, si assiste alla nascita del maggiore gruppo armato di destra, i Far (fasci di azione rivoluzionaria). Al vertice di questa organizzazione c'è un 'senato' e a capo un noto personaggio appartenente ai vertici dello sconfitto regime fascista, Pino Romualdi che aveva ricoperto fino all'ultimo l'incarico di vicesegretario del Partito fascista repubblicano.

In un suo diario descrive così quella terribile organizzazione: "ero ritenuto, in quel tempo, anche il capo di un'organizzazione armata, nucleo intorno al quale avrebbe dovuto, in caso di conflitto, mobilitarsi e armarsi altre forze. In realtà quell'organizzazione esisteva; ma era molto più piccola e soprattutto molto meno armata di quanto si poteva ritenere, consisteva praticamente nell'attivismo di alcuni giovani amici e camerati, soprattutto armati di coraggio, di iniziativa e di buonissima volontà (...) era il tempo in cui era importante far vedere che eravamo vivi e decisi ad agire. Diversamente non avremmo avuto importanza, e ogni trattativa sarebbe stata impossibile"<sup>15</sup>.

Le trattative alle quali si riferisce Romualdi, sono indirizzate ad uno dei momenti più importanti per le organizzazioni neofasciste: il momento della concessione dell'amnistia, stabilita il 22 giugno 1946.

<sup>13</sup> M. Tedeschi, *Facisti dopo Mussolini*, op.cit. pp.42-43.

<sup>14</sup> M. Tedeschi, *Facisti dopo Mussolini*, pp.92-93.

<sup>15</sup> P. Romualdi, *L'ora di Catilina*, Edizioni Ter, Roma, 1962, pp.214-215.



Pier Giuseppe Murgia, nel suo libro *Il Vento del Nord*, spiega che l'amnistia era voluta perché: "Intorno alla massa di ex fascisti i vari partiti cominciano a manovrare da subito per trascinarli alla loro causa (...) sul piano elettorale non si può non considerare il peso di qualche milione di uomini e di donne che si immagina ancora sentimentalmente legato al fascismo e che potrebbe avere un valore determinante in sede di votazione (...) così, dinanzi alla questione istituzionale, coi fascisti si tratta più o meno nascostamente"<sup>16</sup>.

Il Partito socialista ed il Partito d'azione, sono assolutamente contrari a qualsiasi forma di compromesso con quelli che hanno portato l'Italia in guerra, mentre il Partito comunista tenta di recuperare in qualche maniera gli ex militanti fascisti ingannati dal regime.

L'allora ministro della Giustizia, Palmiro Togliatti, affermerà di non essere contrario ad ascoltare giovani fascisti se avranno idee e proposte sui vari problemi nazionali: "Questo è quanto più necessario in quanto sappiamo che sotto il fascismo c'erano correnti, sia ideologiche che politiche e sociali, che erano ostentate dal fascismo e a volte ne portavano il marchio ufficiale, ma che però erano originali e potrebbero avere ancora una possibilità di sviluppo autonomo"<sup>17</sup>.

Oltre alla questione dei voti, c'è un altro motivo che porta alla scelta dell'amnistia: Il proliferare di organizzazioni clandestine.

Oltre ai Fasci di azione rivoluzionaria, presenti a Roma e nel centrosud, nell'Italia settentrionale entreranno in azione le Sam (squadre d'azione Mussolini) mettendo in allerta il ministero dell'Interno con allora a capo Giuseppe Romita che non tarda a darne comunicazione al governo<sup>18</sup>.

La scelta dell'amnistia, qualunque sia il vero scopo che si volesse raggiungere, porta ad un dibattito interno agli stessi gruppi armati, con una forte spinta verso la scelta dell'inserimento al sistema democratico e parlamentare.

Come abbiamo poc'anzi osservato, c'è chi ormai non ritiene più conveniente, ne sicuro, percorrere la strada della clandestinità, e si è avvicinato a partiti già esistenti come quello di Giannini.

Quest'ultimo, dopo un primo momento di infatuazione, viene accantonato per la mancanza di un valido programma politico di lungo termine, e bisogna dire che la stessa durata del partito nel panorama politico italiano è veramente modesta.

Lo stesso 'senato', che come abbiamo visto era l'organo decisionale dei Fasci armati rivoluzionari, esamina il caso dell'Uomo Qualunque, e del suo massimo esponente, Giannini, che conduce, secondo i neofascisti, una politica troppo conciliante nei confronti del Partito comunista italiano. Romualdi, propone quindi di abbandonare al suo destino Giannini e di dare vita ad un nuovo partito orientato e manovrato dal 'senato'.

<sup>16</sup>P.G.Murgia, *Il vento del Nord*, op.cit., pp.150-151.

<sup>17</sup>P.Sérant, *I vinti della liberazione*, Edizioni del Borghese, Milano, 1966, p.282.

<sup>18</sup>Circolare ministro Romita in Archivio Centrale di Stato, MI, PS, Sez.I, 19 aprile 1946.

Siamo alla metà dell'agosto del 1946, e si pensa di dare incarico a Giacinto Trevisonno e Giorgio Almirante di assumere i massimi incarichi all'interno del nuovo partito<sup>19</sup>.

A Giovanni Tonelli, direttore del settimanale *La Rivolta Ideale*, viene dato incarico di verificare tra i possibili elettori, la reazione alla nascita del futuro partito.<sup>20</sup>

Tonelli, dal suo giornale, invita le forze neofasciste e nazionali a trovare un punto d'incontro organizzativo e politico. L'azione stimolatrice di Tonelli fa sì che il 26 settembre 1946 si costituisca il Fronte dell'italiano, di cui *Rivolta Ideale* diviene il portavoce. Lo stesso Tonelli, intraprenderà una serie di incontri con, ad esempio, Augusto De Marsanich, futuro segretario del Msi, ed il principe Valerio Pignitelli<sup>21</sup>.

La fondazione del Movimento sociale italiano viene descritta da Cesco Giulio Baghino, uno dei fondatori, come: "la naturale confluenza di tutte quelle forze, di tutti quei gruppi, di tutti quei nuclei che si erano spontaneamente formati subito dopo la fine della seconda guerra mondiale, appena cessato il primo smarrimento per la sconfitta. Senza organizzazione, senza strumenti direttivi, senza contatti diretti ed indiretti, in molti ci cercammo, riuscimmo a ritrovarci, formando dei gruppi desiderosi di fare qualcosa per salvaguardare i permanenti valori morali che parevano in quel momento deleterio patrimonio per chi riuscisse a conservarli (...) ecco perché le parole del nostro inno suonavano così: siamo nati in un cupo tramonto..."<sup>22</sup>

Romualdi, dal canto suo, ricorda la fondazione del Movimento sociale italiano come uno strumento: "per consentirci di riprendere, non soltanto clandestinamente, ma a viso aperto e quindi ufficialmente, la nostra battaglia politica; una battaglia che non potevamo ritenere conclusa con la sconfitta militare, ma che in forme diverse, secondo il diverso mondo politico al quale dovevamo riferirci era necessario continuasse.(...) le forze che ci spingevano erano il dolore e la fiera di decine di migliaia di latitanti (...) ma noi non potevamo costituire un partito solo per noi. Se era un partito per il popolo italiano doveva essere aperto a tutto il popolo italiano"<sup>23</sup>.

Un altro protagonista, forse il massimo protagonista della vita politica del Movimento sociale italiano, Giorgio Almirante dichiara: "L'Msi costituisce un vero e proprio miracolo. Fu voluto da pochi e umili coraggiosi, tra cui c'erano i reduci dei campi di prigionia dell'India, del Sudafrica (...) di Russia. E poi ancora: L'esercito degli epurati, dei perseguitati politici, di coloro a cui avevano tolto ogni risorsa di lavoro. Il Msi, benché sia stato costituito da tanti ex fascisti, non è mai stato un partito meramente nostalgico,

<sup>19</sup> N.Rao, *Neofascisti! La destra italiana da Salò a Fiuggi nel ricordo dei protagonisti*, Settimo Sigillo, Roma, 1999, p.23.

<sup>20</sup> Relazione del questore di Roma, Saverio Polito, alla magistratura, 27 agosto 1950, in ACS, MI, PS 1950, I sezione, b.29.

<sup>21</sup> G.de'Medici, *Le origini del Msi, (dal clandestinismo al primo congresso, 1943-1948)*, Edizioni Isc, Roma, 1986, pp.51-52.

<sup>22</sup> C.G.Baghino, *I quarantanni del Msi*, in UNCRSI, periodico dell'associazione nazionale combattenti Rsi, del 23 settembre 1986.

<sup>23</sup> P.Romualdi, *Discorso al Teatro Adriano*, in "Secolo d'Italia", del 16 dicembre 1986.

attenendosi sempre al motto di Augusto De Marsanich al primo congresso del partito: Non restaurare e non rinnegare<sup>24</sup>.

Durante i primi anni del dopoguerra, l'iniziativa che tende a formare un nuovo partito che riesca a raccogliere tutti gli ex fascisti è assistita da una serie di giornali; abbiamo visto che uno di questi era *Rivolta Ideale* di Tonelli, troviamo poi *Manifesto* diretto da Pietro Marengo, che esce a Bari dal 29 aprile 1945, *Rataplan* di Arnaldo Genoino e Nino Tripodi, che esce a Roma e si pone come primo obbiettivo la pacificazione degli italiani<sup>25</sup>, *Fracassa* di Enzo Nasso, che esce a Roma fortemente polemico contro i politici al potere, soprattutto contro il ministro della Giustizia Togliatti<sup>26</sup>.

A Milano esce *Meridiano d'Italia* diretto da Franco de Agazio, pubblicato dal febbraio 1946 e si batte a favore dell'iniziativa privata auspicando che gli epurati tornino al più presto nelle fabbriche per favorire lo sviluppo del Paese<sup>27</sup>.

Ci sono poi periodici che pur non possedendo le caratteristiche della militanza, diffondono idee e valori riconducibili alla destra, uno di questi è *L'Ultima*, rivista di poesia e metasofia, stampato a Firenze e diretto da Adolfo Oxilia, è una rivista fortemente caratterizzata da articoli di ispirazione cattolica e cristiana<sup>28</sup>, nella quasi totalità dei casi, gli articoli pubblicati non erano firmati o a volte solo con le iniziali, rendendo così impossibile risalire agli autori, così accadeva in quasi tutti i giornali d'area, questo a dimostrazione del clima di clandestinità che continuava a regnare.

Coerentemente con il progetto di un nuovo partito, il 3 dicembre 1946 si tiene a Roma una riunione nello studio di Arturo Michelini, nell'odierna via Barberini (allora via Regina Elena) a cui partecipano alcuni rappresentanti delle testate giornalistiche poc'anzi accennate, rappresentanti di movimenti politici (come del Movimento italiano di unità sociale), rappresentanti di gruppi nazionalisti lombardi e dei reduci indipendenti.

Nel corso di questo incontro viene proposto di far confluire tutti i gruppi sotto un'unica sigla, quella del Movimento sociale italiano, evitando così una dispersione di voti alle prossime elezioni.

Dopo una serie di combattute riunioni, il 26 dicembre viene fondato ufficialmente il Movimento sociale italiano. A seguito della fondazione viene emanato un comunicato: "I rappresentanti del Fronte del lavoro, della Unione sindacale ferrovieri italiani, del Movimento italiano di unità sociale, del movimento de La Rivolta sociale, del Gruppo reduci indipendenti, constatata la perfetta identità di vedute e finalità politiche sociali, hanno costituito il Movimento sociale italiano"<sup>29</sup>.

La decisione di chiamare la nuova organizzazione Movimento anziché partito, sembra sia da far risalire a Romualdi: "Movimento e non partito in quanto la nuova

<sup>24</sup> G. Almirante, *I quarantanni festeggiati al Teatro Adriano*, in "Secolo d'Italia", del 16 dicembre 1986.

<sup>25</sup> A. Genoino, *Pacificare!*, in "Rataplan", n.4, 31 agosto 1946.

<sup>26</sup> *E ci risiamo*, in "Fracassa", n.1, del 22 settembre 1948, (articolo non firmato).

<sup>27</sup> *Gli allontanati alla riscossa*, in "Meridiano d'Italia", n.20, del 20 giugno 1946 (articolo non firmato).

<sup>28</sup> S.f., *Gli Ultimi: Carta d'identità*, in "L'Ultima", n.37, del 25 gennaio 1949 (articolo non firmato).

<sup>29</sup> *È nato il Msi*, in "Rivolta ideale", del 26 Dicembre 1946 (articolo non firmato).

organizzazione aveva una ragione dinamica, dovendosi muovere verso la ricostruzione del Partito fascista repubblicano<sup>30</sup>.

Naturalmente intorno alla nascita del Movimento sociale italiano, sono nate numerose ipotesi e leggende, ogni volta coinvolgendo nuovi personaggi, uno dei fondatori del movimento a Napoli, Gianni Roberti racconta che: "il primo gruppo, dopo essersi riunito intorno al giornale Rivolta Ideale, si riunì più volte nell'ufficio di Arturo Michelini. Conobbi allora, tramite Nicola Foschini, quelli che dovevano poi diventare per un trentennio i miei compagni di strada e di lotta: Augusto De Marsanich, Arturo Michelini, Pino Romualdi, Valerio Pignatelli, Giorgio Almirante, Giorgio Bacchi, Mario Cassiano, Biagio Pace, Ernesto De Marzio, Alfredo Cucco, Domenico Pellegrini Giampiero, Francesco Saverio Siniscalchi, Ernesto Massi (...) e un'associazione femminile un po' romantica e a carattere risorgimentale con a capo la principessa Maria Pignatelli di Cerchiara e Mina Magri in Fanti"<sup>31</sup>.

I primi documenti ufficiali del Movimento sociale italiano sono l'appello agli italiani e i dieci punti programmatici che vengono resi noti lo stesso 26 dicembre ma che verranno appesi in forma di cartelloni, per le città solo dal 29 dicembre, dopo aver avuto l'autorizzazione da parte della questura, questi manifesti sono rimasti affissi in tutte le sezioni del movimento fino alla fine di gennaio del 1995, cioè fino alla fine dello stesso Movimento sociale italiano.

Questo il testo dei Dieci punti programmatici:

1) L'unità, l'integrità territoriale e l'indipendenza dell'Italia debbono essere rivendicate, nessuna prescrizione o coazione può interrompere il nostro diritto sui territori indispensabili alle nostre esigenze economiche, già consacrati dall'eroismo e dall'opera civilizzatrice del popolo italiano

2) Politica estera ispirata unicamente agli interessi concreti e contingenti della Nazione, auspicando la formazione di una Unione Europea su piede di parità e giustizia

3) L'autorità dello Stato deve essere ristabilita. Partecipazione del popolo alla scelta dei suoi dirigenti e alle decisioni più importanti della vita nazionale, mediante referendum, da indire in primo luogo nei riguardi della Costituzione e del Trattato di Pace.

4) Nessuna legge di eccezione può sovrapporsi al diritto comune: soppressione della vigente legislazione eccezionale. Assoluta indipendenza della magistratura dal potere politico.

5) Entro i limiti stabiliti dal costume morale, libertà di associazione, di parola e di stampa.

6) La religione Cattolica Apostolica Romana è la religione dello Stato, garantendosi il dovuto rispetto degli altri culti che non contrastino con le leggi vigenti. I rapporti tra lo Stato e la Chiesa sono da intendersi definitivamente regolati dal complesso inscindibile dei Patti Lateranensi.

<sup>30</sup> Relazione del questore di Roma, Saverio Polito, alla magistratura, 27 agosto 1950, doc.cit.

<sup>31</sup> G.Roberti, *L'opposizione di destra in Italia*, Editore Gallina, Napoli, 1988, pp.31-32.

7) Lo Stato deve riconoscere ad ogni cittadino il diritto al lavoro, fondamento della società e della ricchezza nazionale. La proprietà individuale, frutto del risparmio, in quanto assolve ad una funzione sociale, è riconosciuta e garantita dallo Stato

8) Completa collaborazione tra i vari fattori della produzione, attribuendo ai sindacati dignità e responsabilità di istituzioni pubbliche; effettiva compartecipazione dei lavoratori alla gestione dell'azienda e al riparto degli utili. Diritto per tutti i cittadini ad una casa sana e decorosa.

9) Possibilità ad ogni cittadino, che ne abbia la capacità, di accedere a qualsiasi ordine di studi a spese dello Stato.

10) Piani organici per potenziare le attività fondamentali del Paese, con particolare riguardo a quelle del Mezzogiorno e delle Isole, indispensabili per l'autonomia economica della nazione<sup>32</sup>.

Ciò che colpisce di più tra questi dieci punti sono la commistione tra vecchie teorie fasciste e la presunta accettazione di alcune fondamentali regole democratiche, ad esempio, si parla di libertà di stampa, di associazione e all'articolo n.8, di compartecipazione, altro modo di chiamare quel sistema economico auspicato dal fascismo, che era il corporativismo.

Nella stessa riunione costitutiva, viene deciso di varare un primo statuto provvisorio (rimarrà in vigore fino al I congresso del partito) suddiviso in cinque parti.

Lo statuto stabilisce che gli organi del Msi siano otto: l'assemblea nazionale degli aderenti; il comitato centrale (che sarà l'organo che sceglierà il segretario ed è composto da quindici membri); la segreteria politica; la giunta esecutiva nazionale; le delegazioni interregionali; gli ispettori regionali; le giunte esecutive provinciali; le giunte esecutive comunali; In queste due ultime sezioni, viene autorizzata la possibilità di istituire fronti giovanili.

L'assemblea nazionale è formata da tutti gli aderenti al Movimento sociale, rappresentati dai delegati eletti nelle assemblee provinciali nella proporzione di un rappresentante per ogni mille aderenti. Ed è l'assemblea nazionale che nomina i componenti del comitato centrale.

La prima sede ufficiale del Movimento sociale viene inaugurata a Roma, in corso Vittorio Emanuele 24.

All'interno della sezione verranno organizzati i *giornali parlati*, primo sistema di confronto e di dibattito al quale vengono invitati a partecipare anche esponenti di altri partiti, compresi quelli antifascisti.

In un racconto di Almirante si ricorda che: "la sede di corso Vittorio era decorosa, ma era vuota; per alcune settimane la sola macchina per scrivere disponibile non disponeva a sua volta di un tavolino su cui poggiare (...) mancavano i collaboratori, anche gratuiti. Ma la mia gente si fece viva. Era stato lanciato l'appello attraverso *Rivolta Ideale* (...) e i lettori di *Rivolta Ideale* andavano costituendo e annunciando, via via, le sezioni del partito"<sup>33</sup>.

<sup>32</sup> I dieci punti programmatici, in "Rivolta Ideale", del 26 dicembre 1946.

<sup>33</sup> G.Almirante, *Autobiografia di un fucilatore*, Ciarrapico, Roma, II edizione, 1995, p.128.

I primi periodi di vita vengono completamente dedicati all'organizzazione, soprattutto nell'intento di attivare sempre più numerose sezioni provinciali e comunali.

La prima giunta esecutiva provvisoria, che viene comunicata alla questura di Roma dagli organi del partito, è formata da Giacinto Trevisonno, romano, Raffaele Di Lauro, napoletano, Giovanni Tonelli, nato a Rimini, Carlo Guidoboni, anche lui di Roma e Alfonso Cassiano, nato a Catanzaro<sup>34</sup>.

Trevisonno viene nominato segretario della giunta, mentre Guidoboni è incaricato di organizzare il fronte giovanile.

Nel giugno 1947 Almirante sostituirà Trevisonno alla guida della giunta nazionale a seguito di un'aspra polemica tra chi era favorevole ad accogliere anche gli ex fascisti che non avevano aderito alla Repubblica sociale e i deputati dissidenti dell'Uomo Qualunque e chi, invece, era contrario a qualsiasi apertura.

Tra i possibilisti: Romualdi, Almirante e Cassiano, mentre gli irriducibili erano: Trevisonno, Parini, Mieville, ed Esy Pollio.

Essendo prevalsa la prima tesi, Trevisonno dovette dimettersi, mentre Mieville e Esy Pollio cambieranno idea e si schiereranno tra i possibilisti. Alla direzione della sezione femminile viene eletta Amalia Sirabella.<sup>35</sup>

Il fronte dei possibilisti, non sta a dimostrare una forma di apertura 'democratica' ma semmai ad una maggiore lungimiranza politica, constatando che un partito di reduci repubblicani non avrebbe avuto che un modestissimo seguito.

Il simbolo del partito viene ideato nel settembre 1947 poco prima delle elezioni comunali di Roma. Secondo la più accreditata tesi, tra le tante leggende, la nascita del simbolo sarebbe avvenuta in questo modo: "Un giorno Almirante incontra un mutilato di guerra che gli chiede se già avesse un simbolo il partito, Almirante rimane perplesso. Risale le scale, entra nel suo studio e traccia su un foglio la bozza di una fiamma. Pochi giorni dopo la fiamma tricolore appare per la prima volta sulle mura di Roma"<sup>36</sup>.

Il partito tenta in tutti i modi di farsi conoscere, e tra i mezzi che usa, i preferiti sono i notiziari ciclostilati.

Sono notiziari settimanali, redatti dalla giunta esecutiva, che vengono inviati a tutti gli iscritti.

I primi tre numeri sono notiziari ciclostilati poi i successivi verranno stampati e inviati come circolari settimanali della lunghezza di otto pagine. Il primo notiziario viene distribuito a metà febbraio 1947, subito dopo il primo 'giornale parlato' che venne tenuto domenica nove febbraio.

Questo un piccolo stralcio del messaggio di apertura: "Ogni settimana il Movimento sociale italiano farà pervenire direttamente a tutte le sezioni, comunali e provinciali, questo notiziario, il quale si aprirà con un articolo politico orientativo, che i dirigenti delle sezioni potranno utilizzare per la propaganda, e conterrà tutte le informazioni che di volta

<sup>34</sup> Nota alla questura di Roma del 15 febbraio 1947, in ACS, MI, PS, 1947-48, b.73.

<sup>35</sup> G. de'Medici, *Le origini del Msi, (dal clandestinismo al primo congresso, 1943-1948, op.cit., p.61.*

<sup>36</sup> E. Erra, *Dialogo con Giorgio Almirante, come nacque il Msi*, in "Intervento", n.78, settembre 1986.

in volta la giunta esecutiva nazionale dovrà far pervenire agli organi periferici del movimento", l'articolo politico di questo primo numero si intitolava: *Chi siamo, Cosa vogliamo* e iniziava così: "Immodestamente cominciamo infatti col dire che il nostro movimento, tanto per rimettere a nuovo una frase di gergo giornalistico, colma una grossa lacuna politica; e può colmare addirittura un enorme crepaccio, entro il quale si sono disperse e annichilite le migliori energie italiane, dalla cosiddetta liberazione in poi. (...) il Movimento sociale italiano è la voce dei reduci della prigionia, degli ex combattenti, dei lavoratori, dei profughi, degli esuli"<sup>37</sup>.

Inoltre nel notiziario vi sono altri due brevi interventi: il primo per rispondere alla questione istituzionale sulla diatriba monarchia-repubblica e il secondo per ricordare che in alcune occasioni il Movimento sociale era stato scambiato con un qualsiasi partito socialista e per ribadire le differenze tra socialismo di sinistra e di destra. Alle circolari settimanali si sostituiranno prima il quotidiano *L'Ordine sociale* (marzo-agosto 1948) e poi il settimanale *Lotta politica* (ottobre 1949).

La struttura del Movimento sociale tenta di espandersi e prevede di suddividere il territorio italiano in quattro grandi zone: Alta Italia, Centro, Meridione e Sicilia. Zone dove vengono costituite le sezioni provinciali e quelle comunali.

Un dato interessante per comprendere lo sviluppo del partito, riguarda la nascita delle sezioni, provinciali e comunali, sorte subito dopo la fondazione del Movimento sociale italiano. L'unica fonte ufficiale è quella dei notiziari e delle circolari della giunta esecutiva nazionale.

Una prima lista risulta già inserita nel numero iniziale uscito il 18 febbraio del 1947, e vengono citate le sedi provinciali di Milano, Torino, Genova, Venezia, Como, Padova, Bolzano e Trento per l'Alta Italia, mentre per il Centro figurano Roma, Firenze, Perugia, Ancona, Forlì, Lucca, Modena, Chieti, Viterbo, Pescara e Pesaro. Per il Meridione: Napoli, Reggio Calabria, Cosenza, Catanzaro ed Avellino.

In Sicilia: Caltanissetta, Ragusa e Siracusa. La situazione appare nettamente differente per quanto riguarda l'elenco delle sedi comunali, infatti al Nord risultano attive solo due sezioni, quella di Busto Arsizio e Brunate. Netamente più elevato il numero delle sezioni nel Centro, dove se ne contano tredici e nel Meridione ed Isole se ne contano ventotto.

Il ricordo della guerra civile e delle stragi nazifasciste è ancora troppo scottante e vivo al Nord e questo limita e rende ardua qualsiasi iniziativa politica da parte degli eredi del fascismo.

In una circolare uscita nel mese di maggio sempre del 1947, figura un articolo dal titolo: *Democrazia nel partito*.

L'articolo sta a dimostrare la volontà, da parte dei vertici missini, di inviare un segnale di democrazia all'interno e all'esterno del partito, oltre che propagandare l'immagine di un partito che bandisce l'improvvisazione, dando alla propria struttura regole certe ed elettive, alle quali tutti i dirigenti debbono attenersi. Il Movimento sociale italiano, nei suoi quarantanove anni di vita ha spesso dimostrato che la democrazia non era il suo forte, mentre le scelte calate dall'alto erano la norma. Tornando all'articolo

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<sup>37</sup> Archivio Movimento sociale italiano, sezione regionale Alleanza Nazionale, Ancona, Circolare settimanale n.1, 18 febbraio 1947.

leggiamo: "All'interno del partito la democrazia è assolutamente necessaria (...) se vogliamo che il Msi continui sempre ad essere un movimento autentico di gente fedele ad una immacolata insegna di combattimento, è necessario che all'interno del partito l'aria circoli liberamente e si rinnovi spesso. È necessario che non ci sia nel partito un alto e un basso nettamente divisi; ma che dal basso all'alto, e viceversa, ci si muova di continuo e ci si rinnovi senza soste"<sup>38</sup>.

Dopo quattro mesi dalla sua fondazione, il Movimento sociale italiano è riuscito ad avere una buona espansione. Ha iniziato a costruire un'organizzazione capillare che costituirà il suo zoccolo duro e lo salverà nel corso degli anni dalle crisi interne ed esterne. Le sezioni provinciali cambieranno denominazione e si chiameranno federazioni provinciali con un nuovo statuto elaborato durante il primo congresso nazionale ed approvato dal comitato centrale l'undici luglio 1948<sup>39</sup>.

Il lavoro svolto dagli aderenti al Movimento sociale, avviene in una situazione di forte precarietà economica. A Milano per pagare l'affitto della sede di via Sforza e svolgere almeno le iniziative indispensabili, si attinge ai fondi dell'autofinanziamento e agli aiuti di alcuni sostenitori proprietari di grandi industrie, come Franco Marinotti e Antonio Ferretti.

A Roma, Michellini e Romualdi sono coloro che cercano finanziamenti per sostenere le spese della sede di corso Vittorio Emanuele e per dare impulso alla macchina organizzativa del partito.

Il costruttore Mario Vaselli, Carlo Baratto ed Ezio Camuncoli, diventano i primi finanziatori del Movimento sociale italiano.<sup>40</sup>

Un appello viene anche lanciato tramite il notiziario settimanale: "come tutti sanno il Msi è povero, senza dubbio il più povero dei partiti politici italiani: se ciò è bello, politicamente, in quanto denota indipendenza di cui si è fieri, d'altro canto è d'impaccio considerando le grandi spese che si debbono affrontare per la diffusione delle nostre idee per la campagna elettorale. Finora, però, il Msi non aveva chiesto nulla ai suoi aderenti, cercando di tirare avanti con mezzi di fortuna, desideroso, prima di porre una richiesta ai suoi amici, di offrire loro qualcosa. (...) non poniamo nessun limite alle offerte che saranno fatte: da poche lire ai milioni tutto ci sarà gradito. Avanti per il primo milione!"<sup>41</sup>.

Sulle reali disponibilità finanziarie dei neofascisti, ci sono molti dubbi. Con una lettera del 30 marzo 1946, la Divisione affari riservati, per conto del ministro dell'Interno, aveva trasmesso al ministero degli Esteri alcune notizie pervenute da una 'fonte fiduciaria' non meglio identificata.

Secondo la 'fonte', a seguito di alcune operazioni commerciali compiute precedentemente dal governo della Repubblica sociale con Austria, Ungheria e Romania, i

<sup>38</sup> Archivio Movimento sociale italiano, sezione regionale Alleanza Nazionale, Ancona, Circolare settimanale n.10, 3 maggio 1947.

<sup>39</sup> G.de'Medici, *Le origini del Msi, (dal clandestinismo al primo congresso, 1943-1948, op.cit., p.71.*

<sup>40</sup> Relazione del questore di Roma, Saverio Polito, alla magistratura, 27 agosto 1950, op.cit.

<sup>41</sup> Archivio Movimento sociale italiano, sezione regionale Alleanza Nazionale, Ancona, Circolare settimanale n.6, 3 aprile 1947.



fascisti avrebbero ricavato circa tre milioni di franchi svizzeri depositati presso la Banca Solari di Lugano.

Presso la stessa banca, in una cassetta di sicurezza, sarebbero custodite monete d'oro per circa cinquanta mila franchi svizzeri e in altre due banche contanti e valori per circa settanta milioni di franchi svizzeri.

Nel vorticoso giro d'affari, sarebbero state coinvolte aziende italiane come Snia Viscosa, Ital Crep e Ital Viscosa, straniere come Abegg e C. di Zurigo, e poi industriali, rappresentanti e agenti di società quali Franco Marinotti, Alessandro Rossini e Amedeo Tedeschi.

Parte di questo denaro avrebbe rappresentato il patrimonio di movimenti clandestini, *in primis* i Fasci armati rivoluzionari, e poi alimentato la nascita del Movimento sociale italiano. Per la 'fonte' la centrale del movimento clandestino si sarebbe trovata in Svizzera e avrebbe potuto contare su numerosi corrieri.<sup>42</sup>

La volontà di aprire sedi in tutta Italia, rischia a volte di creare forti contrasti all'interno della società italiana, è il caso della nuova sezione comunale nella città natale di Mussolini, Predappio in provincia di Forlì. Se a tale richiesta le forze antifasciste chiudono un occhio, reagiscono però con fermezza alla volontà di tenere una manifestazione pubblica presso il teatro della cittadina.

Il comitato centrale dell'Anpi, Associazione nazionale dei partigiani italiani, fa affiggere un manifesto contro i neofascisti e chiede l'intervento del governo. La società Enal, proprietaria del teatro, considerata la situazione non concede l'uso dello stabile ai dirigenti missini, e si evita così l'intervento delle forze dell'ordine ed inutili spargimenti di sangue.<sup>43</sup>

La situazione è difficilissima in tutto il nord, ed anche a Milano non si fa eccezione: il ricordo della tragedia era vivissimo.

I neofascisti che fondarono il Movimento sociale italiano milanese erano tutti di estrazione repubblicana, e questo si doveva anche al fatto che il maggior esponente del movimento intorno al quale si ritrovarono era Angelo Tarchi un ex ministro della passata dittatura fascista.

Il giornale di propaganda milanese era il *Meridiano*, la prima sede fu quella di via Santa Redegonda 10, distrutta da un attentato nel luglio del 1947 e poi quella di via Rugabella 11.<sup>44</sup>

Una menzione particolare merita poi Napoli, considerando che nell'intero arco della vita del partito missino, costituirà un notevole serbatoio di voti. Oltre alla sezione provinciale, nel capoluogo campano sorgono ben nove sezioni comunali, Gino Agnese in un suo scritto dichiara che Napoli: "è una base nazionale da sempre composita che un pò ripete il tipo di adesione che toccò il fascismo dominato da Aurelio Padovani, grande figura popolare, messo da parte dopo la Marcia su Roma. Ma il Msi ebbe adesioni anche

<sup>42</sup> Archivio centrale dello Stato, MI, Pubblica Sicurezza, Sez.I, appunto della Divisione affari generali, 10 giugno 1946.

<sup>43</sup> Lettera del Prefetto di Forlì al ministero dell'Interno, 29 ottobre 1947, in Archivio centrale dello Stato, MI, Pubblica Sicurezza, 1951, I sez., b.36.

<sup>44</sup> U.Scaroni, *Quarant'anni con l'Almirante (1947-1987)*, Cdl Edizioni, Milano, 1998, pp.31-34.

nell'aristocrazia: per esempio il duca Gaetano del Pezzo di Capannello che diventerà federale missino alla fine degli anni cinquanta, e il duca Michele Giovane di Girasole".<sup>45</sup>

Le adesioni di cui ci parla Gino Agnese richiamano un pò tutta la storia del Movimento sociale italiano, combattuta tra le due anime del partito, quella d'espressione più sociale, rivolta alle classi più deboli e quella che richiamava ad una aristocrazia e alle élite; espressione di tale doppia personalità si ritrova negli scritti del massimo esponente culturale del Msi, Julius Evola, patrocinatore di una società di soli eletti ma che contemporaneamente aveva dato la sua adesione alla Repubblica sociale italiana che doveva avere uno stampo socializzante.

Ritornando a Napoli, da sottolineare la figura di Edmondo Cione, che ha portato un notevole contributo dialettico e culturale; Cione era stato allievo di Benedetto Croce e frequentatore assiduo di Palazzo Filomarino dove appunto il grande filosofo abitava. Cione durante la Repubblica sociale, fu protagonista di una vicenda particolare: con il consenso dell'allora regime creò un partito di opposizione, Il Raggruppamento socialista, con il proposito di recuperare nella Rsi, i vecchi socialisti.<sup>46</sup>

Anche in Sicilia il Movimento sociale ottiene buoni risultati e numerosi aderenti, tra questi un personaggio del quale i missini prima e i dirigenti di Alleanza nazionale poi vanno molto orgogliosi è stato Paolo Borsellino uno dei più coraggiosi magistrati italiani, assassinato dalla mafia nel 1992 e che militò nell'organizzazione giovanile della sezione missina palermitana.

Tornando alla costituzione del Movimento sociale, la prima riunione del comitato centrale si tiene a Roma domenica 15 giugno 1947 nella sede centrale di corso Vittorio Emanuele. È un appuntamento necessario perché i dirigenti missini debbono fare il punto della situazione dopo quasi sei mesi di attività e definire in linea di massima i compiti dei principali organi del partito.

Il comitato centrale è composto dai promotori del Movimento sociale italiano, dai componenti la giunta esecutiva nazionale e dagli ispettori regionali. La seduta è aperta da Biagio Pace che specifica subito che il comitato centrale sia composto dalle anime ispiratrici del partito e che si debbono a loro tutti gli eventuali successi. La riunione del comitato, sempre secondo Pace, si è resa necessaria per: "un primo tentativo di regolamentazione di un lavoro che, nei primi tempi, si è svolto necessariamente in maniera talvolta confusa".<sup>47</sup>

Almirante al quale spetta il compito di svolgere la relazione a nome della segreteria nazionale, affronta vari problemi, da quello finanziario a quello organizzativo, dai settori giovanile e femminile a quello della propaganda, inoltre denuncia che la commissione finanza istituita presso la sede centrale "non ha realizzato nulla" e che i mezzi a disposizione del partito sono insufficienti. Almirante afferma che: "ci sono partiti che in mezza giornata spendono molto più di quanto abbiamo speso noi in sei mesi (...)

<sup>45</sup> G.de'Medici, *Le origini del Msi, (dal clandestinismo al primo congresso, 1943-1948, op.cit., p.54.*

<sup>46</sup> A.Baldoni, *Fascisti 1943-45*, Settimo Sigillo, Roma, 1993, pp.242-245.

<sup>47</sup> I lavori ed interventi del comitato centrale, sono riassunti nelle circolari settimanali nn.16-17 del Movimento sociale italiano, 14-21 giugno 1947.

dobbiamo far leva sulle piccole sottoscrizioni. Questo è l'unico modo per mantenere sano e puro il movimento, come noi vogliamo che rimanga. Altrimenti esso dovrà cessare di esistere o vendersi al miglior offerente"<sup>48</sup>.

Dopo l'attacco alla commissione finanza, l'attenzione di Almirante si rivolge al settore stampa e propaganda: "La propaganda è, dopo la questione finanziaria, l'altro nostro punto debole ed è tale appunto in dipendenza di quella, per assoluta deficienza di mezzi. È doveroso ringraziare *La Rivolta Ideale*. Questa voce si è levata quando le altre voci tacevano, quando parlare era veramente un grosso rischio e non un affare (...) *Rivolta Ideale* ha questo grandissimo merito: di aver iniziato la battaglia, di averla preparata e resa possibile. Senza *Rivolta* non avrebbe potuto sorgere il Msi."<sup>49</sup>

Oltre a *Rivolta Ideale*, altri giornali erano schierati verso la destra radicale rappresentata dal Movimento sociale, tra questi ricordiamo: il *Meridiano d'Italia*, che usciva a Roma e diretto da Roberto Mievile, *Critica Nuova* di Milano, *La Ruota* di Napoli, *Testa di Ferro* di Bari, *Ordine Nuovo* di Brescia.<sup>50</sup>

Ritornando all'assemblea missina, constatiamo come già dall'inizio il concetto di democrazia non riesca a farsi largo all'interno della struttura del partito. Lo stesso Almirante, riferendosi alla giunta centrale, riconosce che abbia funzionato come unico organo, assolvendo non solo alle funzioni propriamente esecutive ma anche a quelle consultive e deliberative, creando "seri inconvenienti"<sup>51</sup>.

Il primo atto ufficiale della nuova giunta esecutiva è l'elezione di Giorgio Almirante a segretario della stessa giunta ed il banco di prova del lavoro svolto da Almirante durante questa sua prima esperienza come segretario è rappresentato dalle elezioni amministrative che si svolgono a Roma il 12 ottobre 1947, i risultati danno al Msi il 4% dei voti, corrispondenti a circa ventiquattromila elettori.<sup>52</sup>

Questo è il primo risultato di numerose campagne elettorali alle quali il Movimento sociale italiano si è presentato, a volte con esiti inaspettati e a volte con clamorose sconfitte, raccogliendo i voti dei nostalgici, a volte dei monarchici, altre quello di protesta, fino a rischiare l'estinzione durante la segreteria di Pino Rauti nel 1991, per poi ottenere incredibili risultati alle elezioni comunali di Roma e Napoli nel dicembre del 1993 ed infine sciogliersi e confluire, quasi totalmente, in Alleanza nazionale.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>49</sup> Circolari settimanali nn. 16-17 del Movimento sociale italiano, op.cit.

<sup>50</sup> N.Rao, *Neofascisti!*, op.cit., p.63.

<sup>51</sup> Circolare settimanale, n.17 del Movimento sociale italiano, op.cit.

<sup>52</sup> Ministero dell'Interno, *I risultati delle elezioni dal 1946 al 1952*, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, Roma, 1953.



***Nota su un aspetto dell'integrazione culturale  
dell'emigrazione ungherese. Il contributo degli emigrati  
ungheresi al cinema negli Stati Uniti, in Inghilterra, in  
Francia e in Italia.***

Alessandro ROSSELLI  
Università di Szeged

*Stati Uniti*

Se si pensa al cinema americano fin dai suoi inizi, si deve parlare di Adolph Zukor, nato in Ungheria nel 1873 ed emigrato negli Stati Uniti nel 1899, che, dopo un lungo apprendistato come gestore di *nickelodeons*, fondò nel 1919 la *Paramount*, una delle più grandi case cinematografiche americane, ancora oggi esistente, di cui fu padrone assoluto ed incontrastato fino al 1945.<sup>1</sup> Né si può prescindere da William Fox, nato nel 1879 in Ungheria e poi fondatore in America, nel 1914, della *Fox*, una delle più importanti case cinematografiche di Hollywood. Lanciò molti attori all'epoca del muto, ma si interessò anche al cinema parlato (sistema *Fox Movietone*) e fu costretto nel 1930 a lasciare la sua casa che, nel 1935, si unì alla *20<sup>th</sup> Century* di Joseph M. Schenk, dando vita alla *20<sup>th</sup> Century Fox*.<sup>2</sup>

È però importante soffermarsi sul contributo dato al cinema americano da certi registi di origine ungherese, alcuni dei quali attivi fin dall'epoca del muto. Il primo fra loro fu King Vidor, la cui emigrazione può essere definita impropria perché era nato da una famiglia ungherese da tempo emigrata negli Stati Uniti. Prima di accettare le regole dello *star-system* hollywoodiano, egli diede al cinema muto americano due grandi film, *La grande parata* (*The big parade*, 1925) e *La folla* (*The crowd*, 1928), in cui si ritrovava un certo spirito europeo ma in cui si cercherebbero invano ricordi dell'Ungheria e, con l'avvento del sonoro, girò (con un atto di coraggio non indifferente per l'epoca) il primo film interamente interpretato da negri, *Alleluia* (*Hallelujah!*, 1930) e, negli anni che seguirono la crisi economica del 1929, *Nostro pane quotidiano* (*Our daily bread*, 1934),

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<sup>1</sup> Su Adolph Zukor cfr. Georges Sadoul, *Il cinema. I cineasti*, Firenze, Sansoni, 1967, pp. 417-418; Carl Vincent, *Storia del cinema*, I: *Dallo origini alla fine della seconda guerra mondiale*, Milano, Garzanti, 1990, p. 120; Lewis Jacobs, *L'avventurosa storia del cinema americano*, I: *Dagli esordi all'apogeo del << muto >>*, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1966, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Su William Fox cfr. G. Sadoul, op.cit., p. 144; C. Vincent, op.cit., p. 120 e pp. 178-179.

film che venne ostacolato dalle grandi banche per il ritratto molto negativo del potere finanziario che vi si trovava.

In seguito, non ritrovò più la sensibilità per i problemi sociali che aveva caratterizzato la prima parte della sua carriera e dette ancora tre film importanti come *Duello al sole* (*Duel in the sun*, 1946), *Ruby fiore selvaggio* (*Ruby Gentry*, 1952) e *L'uomo senza paura* (*Man without a star*, 1954), tre incursioni molto personali in un genere cinematografico (il *western*, anche se il secondo film citato è in abiti moderni) molto popolare negli Stati Uniti: terminò poi la sua carriera con due *kolossals*, *Guerra e pace* (*War and peace*, 1956, da Lev Tolstoj) e *Salomone e la regina di Saba* (*Solomon and Sheba*, 1959).<sup>3</sup>

Non si può però trascurare, in questo quadro, il nome di Charles (Károly) Vidor, anche se il suo contributo al cinema americano fu molto meno importante.

Nato in Ungheria nel 1900, dopo aver lavorato a Berlino, si trasferì in America nel 1924. Da allora fu un *director* americano buono a tutto e pronto a fare quanto gli si chiedeva. In una carriera piuttosto impersonale ed incolore, ebbe un momento di celebrità per aver diretto *Gilda* (*Gilda*, 1946), il film che lanciò Rita Hayworth e, in seguito, tornò alla normale *routine* hollywoodiana girando il *remake* a colori di *Addio alle armi* (*A farewell to arms*, 1956, da Ernest Hemingway), che non regge il confronto con la precedente versione – in bianco e nero – realizzata nel 1932 da Frank Borzage.

Curiosamente, però, questo regista fu l'unico ungherese stabilitosi ad Hollywood che in qualche modo tornò alla sua terra natale girando *Il cigno* (*The swan*, 1956), dall'opera teatrale di Ferenc Molnár, scrittore ungherese anch'egli emigrato in America dove era morto nel 1952.

Vidor morì a Vienna nel 1959, mentre girava *Estasi* (*Song without end*), anch'esso un *remake* dell'omonimo film cecoslovacco del 1932 di Gustav Machaty, che fu terminato da un altro regista di lontane origini ungheresi, George Cukor.<sup>4</sup>

L'ultimo regista citato, George Cukor, fu, invece, uno dei *directors* più interessanti di Hollywood dal 1930 al 1981, anno della sua morte ma anche del suo ultimo film *Ricche e famose* (*Rich and famous*), in cui offre un delicatissimo ritratto di una sincera amicizia femminile che prosegue ininterrotta nel tempo nonostante i cambiamenti sociali nella vita delle due protagoniste.

Nato a New York nel 1899 da famiglia ungherese da tempo emigrata in America, nella sua lunga carriera ha frequentato quasi tutti generi cinematografici americani, *musical* e *western* compresi. Ha diretto, nei suoi film, molti grandi attori come Cary Grant, James Stewart, Spencer Tracy, e attrici importanti come Constance Bennet, Ingrid Bergman, Greta Garbo, Katharine Hepburn, o Sophia Loren e Anna Magnani durante i loro

<sup>3</sup> Su King Vidor cfr. G. Sadoul, op.cit., p. 390; F. L. P. (Franco La Polla), *Vidor, King*, in AA.VV., *Cinema di tutto il mondo* (a cura di Alfonso Canziani), Milano, Mondadori, 1978, pp. 486-487; C. Vincent, op.cit., pp. 182-183; Goffredo Fofi-Morando Morandini-Gianni Volpi, *Storia del cinema*, II: *Dal neorealismo alla guerra fredda*, Milano, Garzanti, 1990, pp. 34-35.

<sup>4</sup> Su Charles (Károly) Vidor cfr. G. Sadoul, op.cit., p. 390; F. L. P. (Franco La Polla), *Vidor, Charles*, in AA.VV., op.cit., p. 486; C. Vincent, op.cit., p. 220; G. Fofi-M. Morandini-G. Volpi, op.cit., p. 28, 45, 66 e 84.

soggiorni americani e, negli ultimi anni, Jane Fonda, Jacqueline Bisset e Candice Bergen, protagonisti proprio del suo ultimo film.

Della sua immensa produzione si ricordano Pranzo alle otto (Dinner at eight, 1933), Il diavolo è femmina (Sylvia Scarlett, 1935), Giulietta e Romeo (Romeo and Juliet, 1936, da William Shakespeare), Scandalo a Filadelfia (The Philadelphia story, 1940), Angoscia (Gaslight, 1944) e molti altri, tra i quali In viaggio con la zia (Travels with my aunt, 1972, da Graham Greene), Amore tra le rovine (Love among the ruins, 1975), e il già citato Ricche e famose. Cukor, nato negli Stati Uniti, è un regista sensibile ma, soprattutto, molto attento alla realtà americana. È solo nelle sue ultime opere che egli torna in qualche modo all'Europa ma, anche in esse, è molto difficile trovare tracce delle sue origini ungheresi, molto lontane e che, evidentemente, non hanno resistito alla sua perfetta integrazione nel Nuovo Mondo.<sup>5</sup>

A questo personaggio, che segnò numerosi momenti del cinema americano sonoro, è necessario aggiungere la presenza, negli Stati Uniti, di una figura ugualmente importante: Michael Curtiz, il cui vero nome era Mihály Kertész.

Nato a Budapest nel 1887, fu implicato, durante la Repubblica dei Consigli di Béla Kun, nella produzione del *Vörös film*,<sup>6</sup> e fuggì in Austria non appena capì che la Repubblica stava per cadere. Dopo aver lavorato a Vienna e a Berlino, si trasferì ad Hollywood dove, dal 1926, iniziò una nuova carriera in cui frequentò quasi tutti i generi del cinema americano, con particolare predilezione per il film d'avventura, il *gangster-movie*, il film storico e il *western* con, ai suoi esordi americani, un'incursione nel cinema sociale e nell'*horror film*. Inoltre, durante la seconda guerra mondiale, diresse due film destinati a resistere all'usura del tempo: *Casablanca* (Casablanca, 1942) e *Il giuramento dei forzati* (Passage to Marseille, 1944): Il suo nome fu legato a due grandi attori degli anni '30 e '40, Humphrey Bogart e Errol Flynn. Negli anni successivi, non ritrovò mai più lo slancio epico delle sue precedenti realizzazioni e cadde nella *routine*. Oltre ai due film citati, si possono ricordare *20000 anni a Sing Sing* (20000 years in Sing Sing, 1933), *Capitan Blood* (Captain Blood, 1935), *La carica dei 600* (The charge of the light brigade, 1936), *La leggenda di Robin Hood* (The adventures of Robin Hood, 1938), *Gli angeli dalla faccia sporca* (Angels with dirty faces, 1938), *Il Conte di Essex* (The private lives of Elisabeth and Essex, 1939), *Il lupo di mare* (The seawolf, 1941), *Il romanzo di Mildred* (Mildred Pierce, 1945, da James M. Cain) e *Non siamo angeli* (We're not angels, 1955), penultimo film di Humphrey Bogart. Se nel cinema di Curtiz si può notare una certa influenza del cinema tedesco degli anni di Weimar (dovuto certo al suo soggiorno in

<sup>5</sup> Su George Cukor cfr. G. Sadoul, op.cit., pp. 84-86; F. L. P. (Franco La Polla), Cukor, George, in AA.VV., op.cit., pp. 96-97; C. Vincent, op.cit., p. 190, 196, 209, 214 e 357; G. Fofi-M. Morandini-G. Volpi, *Storia del cinema*, IV: *Dagli anni sessanta ai giorni nostri*, Milano, Garzanti, 1990, p. 18, 39, 52, 122. Occorre aggiungere che George Cukor fu anche il primo regista di *Via col vento* (Gone with the wind, 1939), celebre film tratto dal romanzo di Margaret Michell che passò anche nelle mani di Sam Wood e fu terminato da Victor Fleming.

<sup>6</sup> Su questa circostanza cfr. Bruno De Marchi, *Vörös film, avanguardia del cinema e cinema d'avanguardia*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria tra decadentismo e avanguardia* (a cura di Zsuzsa Kovács e Péter Sárközy), Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1990, p. 401.

Germania prima di spostarsi negli Stati Uniti), nulla nei suoi film lascia pensare alle sue origini ungheresi. segno evidente, anche qui, della sua perfetta integrazione americana.<sup>7</sup>

Da questa esposizione non può essere escluso un altro cineasta ungherese, André de Toth (il cui vero nome era Endre Tóth) che, dal 1943, lavorò negli Stati Uniti percorrendo tutti i generi del cinema americano. Si dedicò soprattutto al *western* con *La maschera di fango* (*Springfield Rifle*, 1952) e con *Il cacciatore di indiani* (*The indian fighter*, 1955) e al poliziesco, con *La città spenta* (*The city is dark*, 1954), con un'escursione nell'*horror film*, *La maschera di cera* (*House of wax*, 1953). Ma, durante la seconda guerra mondiale, diresse *Nessuno sfuggirà* (*None shall escape*, 1944), unico film americano di propaganda antinazista che abbia sfiorato il tema del genocidio e che, in una carriera di cineasta minore, resta la sua opera migliore.<sup>8</sup>

Il quadro dei registi ungheresi negli Stati Uniti non sarebbe completo se non si parlasse di Paul (Pál) Fejős, singolare personaggio di giramondo che, oltre che cineasta, era anche ricercatore scientifico.

Dopo aver iniziato la carriera in Ungheria con film commerciali ed aver poi partecipato alla produzione cinematografica della Repubblica dei Consigli di Béla Kun<sup>9</sup>, fu regista d'avanguardia negli Stati Uniti, dove girò un film giustamente definito pre-neorealista, *Primo amore* (*Lonesome*, 1928). Tornato per qualche tempo in Ungheria, vi realizzò un film di produzione francese, *Maria, leggenda ungherese* (*Marie, légende hongroise* o *Tavaszi zápor*, 1932), in cui seppe rinnovare il genere melodrammatico inserendovi una problematica sociale. Dopo un documentario in Siam, *Un pugno di riso* (*Saggakb* o *En handfull ris*, 1938), di produzione svedese, dal 1941 Fejős abbandonò per sempre il cinema dedicandosi, negli Stati Uniti, alla ricerca scientifica.

Curioso personaggio, autore di film molto importanti e spesso misconosciuti o del tutto sconosciuti alla loro epoca, Fejős non riuscì a trovare, per lo meno in campo cinematografico, la sua integrazione culturale negli Stati Uniti.<sup>10</sup>

Non si potrebbe però passare sotto silenzio il contributo dato al cinema americano da alcuni grandi direttori della fotografia a partire dagli anni '50. da Ernest (Ernő) László, che lavorò in numerosi film di Robert Aldrich, fra cui *L'ultimo Apache* (*Apache*, 1954), *Un bacio e una pistola* (*Kiss me deadly*, 1955), *Il grande coltello* (*The big knife*, 1955), e

<sup>7</sup> Su Michael Curtiz (Mihály Kertész) cfr. G. Sadoul, op.cit., pp. 86-87; F. L. P. (Franco La Polla), *Curtiz, Michael*, in AA.VV., op.cit., pp. 97-98; G. Fofi-M. Morandini-G. Volpi, op. cit., II, p. 10, 12, 17, 42, 45, 63, 65.

<sup>8</sup> Su André de Toth (Endre Tóth) cfr. G. Sadoul, op.cit., p. 100. Su *Nessuno sfuggirà* (*None shall escape*) (1944) cfr. Mino Argentieri, *Il cinema in guerra. Arte, comunicazione e propaganda in Italia 1940-1944*, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1998, p. 206. È singolare constatare come il film di de Toth e *La settima croce* (*The seventh cross*, 1944) di Fred Zinnemann fossero gli unici film americani di propaganda antinazista che già nel 1944 superavano largamente la circostanza storico-produttiva in cui nacquero, e che ambedue erano stati realizzati da due emigrati europei, un ungherese e un tedesco.

<sup>9</sup> Su questa circostanza cfr. Zsuzsa L. Nagy, *Gli intellettuali ungheresi e le rivoluzioni del 1918-1919*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria ...*, cit., p. 250.

<sup>10</sup> Su Paul (Pál) Fejős cfr. G. Sadoul, op.cit., pp. 128-129; C. Vincent, op.cit., p. 208, p. 293, e pp. 365-366.



*L'occhio caldo del cielo* (*The last sunset*, 1961) a Vilmos Zsigmond, emigrato dopo il 1956, che diresse la fotografia per tre film di Robert Altman, *I compari* (*McCabe and Mrs. Miller*, 1971), *Images* (*Images*, 1972) e *Il lungo addio* (*The long goodbye*, 1973, da Raymond Chandler).<sup>11</sup>

Per concludere questa panoramica sull'emigrazione ungherese – e sulla sua integrazione culturale – negli Stati Uniti, non si deve dimenticare il contributo offerto dagli attori ungheresi al cinema americano da Wilma (Wilma) Banky già all'epoca del muto a Béla Lugosi (che, negli anni '30, interpretò spesso il personaggio di *Dracula* ma che fu anche il commissario bolscevico in *Ninotchka* (*Ninotchka*, 1938) di Ernst Lubitsch), a Peter Lorre (che, dopo essere stato il protagonista di *M* (*M.*, 1931) di Fritz Lang, si trasferì in America e divenne famoso per i ruoli interpretati in film come *Il mistero del falco* (*The maltese falcon*, 1941, da Dashiell Hammett) di John Huston e in *Casablanca* (*Casablanca*, 1942) di Michael Curtiz), a Paul Lukas (Pál Lukács) (che ottenne spesso parti di secondo piano, ma molto significative, come in *Confessioni di una spia nazista* (*Confessions of a nazi spy*, 1939) di Anatole Litvak, in *20000 leghe sotto i mari* (*20000 leagues under the sea*, 1954, da Jules Verne) di Richard Fleischer o in *Lord Jim* (*Lord Jim*, 1964, da Joseph Conrad) di Richard Brooks).

Negli anni '50 ebbe un momento di popolarità Zsa Zsa (Zsuzsa) Gábor, ricordata soprattutto per *Moulin Rouge* (*Moulin Rouge*, 1953) di John Huston.

Ma non si può dimenticare l'ungherese più famoso di Hollywood, Tony Curtis (all'anagrafe Bernard Schwartz). Specialista nella commedia brillante (ricordiamo *Operazione sottoveste* (*Operation petticoat*, 1959) e *La grande corsa* (*The great race*, 1965) di Blake Edwards, ha interpretato anche film drammatici, fra i quali spiccano *Il mago Houdini* (*Houdini*, 1953) di George Marshall, *Piombo rovente* (*Sweet smell of succes*, 1957) di Alexander Mackendrick, *La parete di fango* (*The defiant ones*, 1959) di Stanley Kramer e *Gli ultimi fuochi* (*The last tycoon*, 1976, da Francis Scott Fitzgerald) di Elia Kazan.

## Inghilterra

Sul contributo ungherese al cinema inglese non si può non parlare di Alexander (Sándor) Korda.

Transfuga della Repubblica dei Consigli di Béla Kun, per la quale aveva girato numerosi film,<sup>12</sup> si recò negli Stati Uniti e, in seguito, in Francia, dove fu regista girando alcuni film, fra i quali *Marius* (*Marius*, 1931), prima parte della trilogia di Marcel Pagnol.

Giunto in Inghilterra per dirigere film per la *Paramount*, vi si stabilì, e nel 1932 fondò la sua compagnia, la *London Film*.

<sup>11</sup> Su Ernest (Ernő) László cfr. G. Sadoul, *Robert Aldrich*, in op.cit., pp. 3-4. Su Vilmos Zsigmond cfr. Enrico Magrelli, *Robert Altman*, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1977, pp. 125-126.

<sup>12</sup> Su questa circostanza cfr. Zsuzsa L. Nagy, *Gli intellettuali ungheresi ...*, in AA.VV., *Venezia, Italia e Ungheria ...*, cit., p. 250 e István Nemeskürty, *La formazione dell'estetica del cinema nei primi anni del Novecento in Ungheria*, ibidem, p. 389, 390 e 392.

Da quel momento, continuò a realizzare pellicole (*Le sei mogli di Enrico VIII* (*The private life of Henry VIII*<sup>13</sup>, 1933) e *L'arte e gli amori di Rembrandt* (*Rembrandt*, 1936), ma soprattutto ne produsse molte altre e rilanciò il cinema inglese di fronte alla concorrenza hollywoodiana, dandogli nuovi impulsi creativi.

Durante la seconda guerra mondiale, diresse ancora due film, *Lady Hamilton* (*That Hamilton woman*, 1941) e *Intermezzo matrimoniale* (*The perfect stranger*, 1945), ma si dedicò essenzialmente alla produzione.

Fra le sue produzioni, oltre ai film diretti dal fratello Zoltán, occorre ricordare *Il ladro di Bagdad* (*The thief of Bagdad*, 1940) di Ludwig Berger, Michael Powell e Tim Whelan, *Vogliamo vivere* (*To be or not to be*, 1942) di Ernst Lubitsch e *Il terzo uomo* (*The third man*, 1949) di Carol Reed e molti altri.

Se non fu mai un grande artista, Alexander (Sándor) Korda si rivelò tuttavia tale come organizzatore, e a lui si deve il nuovo slancio del cinema inglese degli anni '30 e '40.

Morì nel 1956 e, ormai divenuto Sir Alexander Korda, aveva completamente dimenticato le sue origini ungheresi.<sup>13</sup>

Con Alexander (Sándor) Korda lavorarono in Inghilterra alcuni membri della sua famiglia, fra i quali suo fratello Zoltán che, dopo essere stato produttore esecutivo, diresse alcuni film (*Bozambo* (*Sanders of the river*, 1935), *La danza degli elefanti* (*Elephant boy*, 1935), *Le quattro piume* (*The four feathers*, 1939), tutti prodotti dal fratello Alexander. Trasferitosi negli Stati Uniti durante la seconda guerra mondiale, vi diresse ancora alcuni film (*Il libro della giungla* (*Jungle book*, 1942, da Rudyard Kipling), *Sahara* (*Sahara*, 1943), *Contrattacco* (*Counter attack*, 1945), *Passione selvaggia* (*The short happy life of Francis Macomber*, 1947, da Ernest Hemingway) e terminò la sua carriera con *Piango la terra amata* (*Cry the beloved county*, 1952, da Alan Paton).

Se Zoltán Korda non fu grande regista, tuttavia seppe certamente trasmettere ai suoi spettatori il suo gusto per l'esotico, e i suoi film sono affascinanti sul piano visivo.<sup>14</sup>

Dell'*équipe* Korda fecero parte anche la moglie Mária (nata Farkas) che, dopo qualche film in Germania, Inghilterra e Italia scomparve dagli schermi e, soprattutto, l'altro fratello Vincent (Vince), che lavorò come scenografo per i fratelli Alexander e Zoltán, ma anche per altri registi. Gli si devono, fra l'altro, le scenografie per *Vita futura* (*Things to come*, 1936) di William Cameron Menzies e per il già citato *Il ladro di Bagdad*.<sup>15</sup>

Nel contributo degli artisti ungheresi al cinema inglese rientra anche l'attività del regista Paul (Pál) Czinner.

La sua carriera fu internazionale perché, dopo alcuni film in Germania e in Inghilterra, si fissò definitivamente in quest'ultimo paese nel 1934, e continuò una carriera in cui realizzò opere storiche e adattamenti di testi teatrali come *Caterina la Grande* (*Catherine the Great*, 1934) o *A piacer vostro* (*As you like it*, 1936, da William Shakespeare).

<sup>13</sup> Su Alexander (Sándor) Korda cfr. G. Sadoul, op.cit., p. 209; E. M. (Emanuela Martini), *Alexander Korda*, in AA.VV., op.cit., pp. 241-242; C. Vincent, op.cit., p. 59, 70, 159, 175, 230, 276, 340, 341, 345, pp. 346-347 e p. 353.

<sup>14</sup> Su Zoltán Korda cfr. G. Sadoul, op.cit., p. 210; E. M. (Emanuela Martini), *Korda, Zoltán*, in AA.VV., op.cit., p. 242; C. Vincent, op.cit., p. 175, 357.

<sup>15</sup> Su Vincent (Vince) Korda cfr. G. Sadoul, op.cit., p. 210.

Paul Czinner, che non diede un grande contributo al cinema inglese, perseguì sempre la realizzazione di un *cinema per tutti* e, al di là dei film storici e dell'adattamento di testi teatrali, frequentò tutti i generi, dalla commedia al dramma.<sup>16</sup>

Il quadro non sarebbe però completo se non si parlasse del contributo, per le musiche, del compositore Miklós Rózsa, che iniziò la sua carriera di musicista per il cinema lavorando per Alexander Korda (*Le quattro piume, Il ladro di Bagdad*).

Trasferitosi negli Stati Uniti, lavorò per Zoltan Korda (*Sahara*, 1943, *Passione selvaggia*, 1947), per Billy Wilder (*La fiamma del peccato* (*Double indemnity*, 1944, da James M. Cain, *Giorni perduti* (*The lost weekend*, 1945)), per John Huston (*Giungla d'asfalto* (*The asphalt jungle*, 1950, da William Ridley Burnett), per Anthony Mann (*Il Cid* (*The Cid*, 1960) e per molti altri registi. Verso la fine della vita, tornò in Inghilterra, dove scrisse due partiture per *Providence* (*Providence*, 1977) di Alain Resnais e per *La cruna dell'ago* (*The eye of the needle*, 1979) di Richard Marquand.

Musicista eclettico, Miklós Rózsa ha dato al cinema anglo-americano numerose musiche originali che resteranno nella sua storia.<sup>17</sup>

## Francia

Per quanto riguarda i registi, la Francia non offre alcun esempio di integrazione culturale ungherese, che invece si esercita ad altri livelli nel cinema francese.

Per esempio, l'ebreo ungherese Sándor Trauner, emigrato per motivi razziali, divenne lo scenografo francese Alexandre Trauner. Autore di numerose scenografie, lavorò per Marcel Carné (*Lo strano dramma del Dottor Molineaux* (*Drôle de drame*, 1937), *il porto delle nebbie* (*Quai des brumes*, 1938, da Pierre Mac Orlan), *Albergo Nord* (*Hôtel du Nord*, da Eugene Dabit), *Alba tragica* (*Le jour se lève*, 1939), *L'amore e il diavolo* (*Les visiteurs du soir*, 1942), *Amanti perduti* (*Les enfants du paradis*, 1943-'45), *Mentre Parigi dorme* (*Les portes de la nuit*, 1946)), per Jean Grémillon (*Tempesta* (*Remorques*, 1939-'41), *Luce d'estate* (*Lumière d'été*, 1943)), per Orson Welles (*Otello* (*Othello*, 1952, da William Shakespeare)) e per Anatole Litvak (*La notte dei generali* (*The night of the generals*, 1967)).<sup>18</sup>

Un'altra presenza ungherese, molto importante per il cinema francese, fu quella del musicista Joseph Kosma (cioè, dell'altro ebreo magiaro József Kozma), che scrisse partiture destinate a restare nella storia della cinematografia francese.

Lavorò per Jean Renoir (*Il delitto del signor Lange* (*Le crime de Monsieur Lange*, 1935), *Una gita in campagna* (*Une partie de campagne*, 1936), *La grande illusione* (*La grande illusion*, 1937), *La Marsigliese* (*La Marseillaise*, 1938), *L'angelo del male* (*La bête humaine*, 1938, da Émile Zola), *La regola del gioco* (*La règle du jeu*, 1939), *Eliana e gli uomini* (*Eléna et les hommes*, 1956)), per Marcel Carné (*Jenny* (*Jenny*, 1936), *Amanti*

<sup>16</sup> Su Paul (Pál) Czinner cfr. G. Sadoul, op. cit., p. 87; L. Q. (Leonardo Quaresima), *Czinner, Paul*, in AA. VV., p. 98; C. Vincent, op. cit., p. 262, 268, 276, 281, 340.

<sup>17</sup> Sull'attività di Miklós Rózsa cfr. G. Fofi-M. Morandini-G. Volpi, op. cit., II, p. 293.

<sup>18</sup> Su Alexandre (Sándor) Trauner cfr. G. Sadoul, op. cit., p. 379.

perduti, Mentre Parigi dorme) ), per Luís Buñuel (Amanti di domani (Cela s'appelle l'aurore, 1956) ), per Juan Antonio Bardem (Calle Mayor, 1956) e per molti altri registi <sup>19</sup>.

### Italia

Per l'Italia, si può parlare di presenza ungherese itinerante nel cinema. Ad esempio, il regista László Vajda fece una breve apparizione nel cinema italiano dell'epoca fascista girando *La congiura dei Pazzi* (1941), film che gli valse l'onore di una censura personale dello stesso Mussolini.<sup>20</sup>

Un'altra presenza ungherese itinerante nel cinema italiano dello stesso periodo fu quella del regista Géza Radványi, che girò in Italia *Inferno giallo* (1943), film singolarmente antirazzista: anche se ambientato in un'isola del Pacifico, non vi era nessuna superiorità dei due medici bianchi (Fosco Giachetti, il Marlon Brando italiano dell'epoca, e l'attore ungherese Pál Jávör, già protagonista di numerose commedie, drammi e film musicali in Ungheria) sulla popolazione indigena. A questo film partecipava anche un'altra attrice ungherese, Mária Tasnady-Fekete (meglio nota all'estero come Maria de Tasnady o Maria Von Tasnady) che, l'anno prima, era stata la moglie di Giachetti in *Bengasi* (1942), film di propaganda bellica di Augusto Genina.<sup>21</sup>

Ma questo quadro non sarebbe completo se non si parlasse della presenza, negli anni '50, di un'altra attrice ungherese, Tamara Lees, che in questo periodo ebbe un momento di popolarità interpretando film come *Vita da cani* (1950) di Steno (Stefano Vanzina) e Mario Monicelli, *Filumena Marturano* (1951) di Eduardo De Filippo, *Il segreto delle tre punte* (1952) di Carlo Ludovico Bragaglia e *La donna più bella del mondo* (1955) di Robert Ziegler Leonard, ma senza mai riuscire ad imporsi come attrice protagonista, e di Gábor Pogány, direttore della fotografia che lavorava in Italia fin dagli anni del fascismo e che diede a Vittorio De Sica le immagini de *La ciociara* e de *Il giudizio universale* (1961).

Se, da quanto sopra esposto, si può trarre un bilancio, esso è il seguente: i membri dell'emigrazione ungherese che hanno dato un contributo al cinema americano, inglese, francese e italiano hanno perduto del tutto – salvo un'eccezione – il contatto con la loro origine ungherese per assumere anche culturalmente l'identità del paese che li ospitava.



<sup>19</sup> Su Joseph Kosma (József Kozma) cfr. G. Sadoul, op.cit., p. 210.

<sup>20</sup> Su László Vajda e il suo film cfr. M. Argentieri, op.cit., p. 144.

<sup>21</sup> Su Géza Radványi cfr. G. Sadoul, op.cit., p. 310; E. C. (Ennio Costantini), *Radványi, Géza*, in AA.VV., op.cit., p. 316.

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